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ABSTRACT 
In Part I of this thesis we employ novel econometric techniques to explore elicitation 
anomalies in contingent valuation (CV). According to standard assumptions regarding 
preferences, changes in the way values are elicited in CV questions should be decision-
irrelevant. That responses are observed to systematically differ according to elicitation 
format has, therefore, called the CV method into question. One possible explanation 
lies in the proposition that respondents are uncertain about their preferences and that 
their uncertainty precipitates systematically different responses to different question 
formats. We test this hypothesis using data from a split-sample CV survey. We analyse 
our data using an innovative application of a semi-parametric estimator more 
commonly used for duration modelling in the medical sciences but find that 
uncertainty alone cannot explain away common elicitation anomalies.  
In Part II we employ simulation modelling and experimental techniques to investigate 
payment for ecosystem services (PES) schemes that involve multiple buyers. In 
Chapter 2, we explore opportunities for buyers in PES scheme to realise Pareto-
improving outcomes through spatial coordination in their independent purchases of 
changes to land-management practices. We develop a simulation environment 
imitating a heterogeneous agricultural landscape and using techniques of integer-linear 
programming solve for outcomes under different institutional arrangements. Our 
simulations allow us to explore how gains from negotiated or fully-cooperative 
purchasing differ across different configurations of landscape and buyer objectives.  In 
Chapter 3, we investigate negotiation as a multiple-purchaser ecosystem service 
procurement mechanism. We design and conduct novel three-person bargaining 
experiments in which two potential buyers can negotiate not only between each other 
but also with a seller of ecosystem services. We find that negotiated deals can be 
reached that are mutually advantageous to all parties. In all treatment scenarios 
presented, the vast majority of groups are able to reach agreements; in addition, these 
agreements are reached relatively quickly.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis focuses on applying some of the core quantitative techniques of 
environmental economics—econometrics, simulation modelling and experiments—to 
examine three problems. Part I of this thesis uses econometric techniques to analyse 
uncertain responses to contingent valuation surveys. Part II of this thesis explores two 
related topics: Chapter 2 uses simulation modelling techniques to assess the 
opportunities and barriers for forming multiple-purchaser payment for ecosystem 
services (PES) schemes; Chapter 3 uses experimental economics techniques to 
examine the potential workings of a negotiated multiple-purchaser PES scheme. 
 
In the first chapter we utilise novel econometric techniques to explore elicitation 
anomalies in contingent valuation (CV) surveys. The CV method is commonly used 
to elicit value estimates for non-market goods, and in particular environmental non-
market goods, however the validity of the method has been questioned as responses 
are observed to systematically differ according to the elicitation format—so called 
elicitation anomalies. According to standard assumptions regarding preferences, 
changes in the way values are elicited in CV questions should be decision-irrelevant. 
Asking respondents of CV surveys to value non-market environmental goods is often 
a complex task in that it is unlikely that individuals will have previously considered 
the trade-off between the provision of such goods and money. One explanation which 
has been proposed (Ready, et al. 1995; Welsh and Poe 1998; Ready, et al. 2001; 
Flachaire and Hollard 2007) is that respondents are uncertain about their preferences 
and that their uncertainty precipitates systematically different responses to different 
question formats. In other words it is the process of requiring individuals to express 
values in CV surveys as if they had well-defined certain preferences that leads to 
elicitation anomalies. Testing this hypothesis is the first key contribution of Chapter 
1.  
The chapter is structured around two common CV elicitation anomalies: (i) the 
disparity between values elicited using dichotomous choice and those elicited using 
open-ended CV questions and (ii) starting point bias or anchoring on an initial bid. 
Values elicited using dichotomous choice (DC) questions have been shown to be 
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consistently higher than those elicited using open ended (OE) questions (Brown, et al. 
1996; Champ, et al. 1997; Vossler, et al. 2003). Likewise, it is well-established that 
when eliciting values using a series of two or more DC questions (for example, the 
double-bound DC format) responses to later questions are anchored on the initial DC 
bid (Whitehead 2002; Flachaire and Hollard 2006, 2007).  
To assess for evidence of elicitation anomalies when respondents are allowed to 
express uncertainty we use a large contingent valuation dataset from Suffolk, UK, 
collected in 2004. Individuals in the study participated in a valuation exercise 
comprising three tasks: initially respondents were allocated to a treatment group in 
which they received either a standard open ended or single-bounded dichotomous 
question; subsequently, they answered a follow-up question in which they could state 
their level of certainty; finally, all respondents completed a novel payment-ladder style 
question to establish the range of values over which they were certain and uncertain. 
The third task, the novel payment-ladder, is closely linked to the multiple-bounded-
dichotomous-choice (MBDC) elicitation method; Mahieu et al. (2014) provide a recent 
summary of MBDC studies. A key difference in our dataset is that respondents state 
their level of certainty to a semi-continuous payment ladder ranging from £1 to £500 
with £1 increments. This allows for more precision when locating the highest values 
which respondents are certain they would be willing to pay and also the lowest value 
they are certain they are not willing to pay. If there exists a gap between these values 
then that forms the range of values a respondent is uncertain about paying—their 
uncertainty range.   
The second key contribution of Chapter 1 is the development of a novel econometric 
method to investigate responses to CV questions when respondents are allowed to 
express uncertainty ranges as part of their CV response. In particular we model the 
size (or width) and location of the uncertainty range. The estimator we describe is 
adapted from the duration modelling techniques used in the medical literature to 
statistically analyse the ‘time to event’; for examples see: (Frydman 1995; Commenges 
2002; Frydman and Szarek 2009) and for a review of duration modelling see Klein and 
Moeschberger (1997). Our econometric method is not the first to analyse uncertainty 
ranges from CV surveys but so far no consensus has yet emerged on the most 
appropriate method. In Chapter 1 we review the alternative methods, including the 
Random Valuation Model developed in Wang (1997), a probability based model 
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developed in Evans et al. (2003) and the Latent Threshold Estimator developed in 
Kobayashi et al. (2012). Our method is closest to the Latent Threshold Estimator in 
that it analyses the transition between different states of certainty, however it does this 
in a radically different way by adapting the multi-state duration models used in the 
medical literature to analyse the progression along a WTP scale rather than a 
progression through time. This allows statistical analysis over the full range of the 
WTP value distribution without requiring restrictive parametric assumptions.  
As far as we are aware this is the first time that this form of multi-state duration 
modelling has been used in economic analysis. We employ our estimator in Chapter 1 
to test the hypothesis that elicitation anomalies commonly observed in CV studies are 
the result of asking respondents with uncertain preferences to answer as if those 
preferences were precisely-defined. Our econometric model allows us to 
simultaneously explore how the width and the location of the uncertainty range are 
influenced by the CV elicitation method used (DC or OE) and the initial bid offered if 
in a DC group. If the expectation of procedural invariance is supported by our data 
when respondents are allowed to express uncertain preferences, then the prognosis for 
the CV method is rather encouraging; by allowing for the possibility of uncertainty, 
CV can elicit preferences that are procedurally invariant and conform to many of the 
expectations of standard economic theory.  
 
In Chapter 2 of this thesis we develop a sophisticated framework of simulation 
modelling methods to investigate multiple-buyer payments for ecosystem services 
(PES) schemes.1 Recently there has been a significant increase in interest in creating 
markets, payments or regulations to encourage the production of ecosystem services 
(Salzman 2005; Engel, et al. 2008; Wunder 2008; Kemkes, et al. 2010; Kinzig, et al. 
2011; Defra 2013; Quick, et al. 2013). In Chapter 2, we focus on modelling a voluntary 
scheme in which landowners are compensated for the ecosystem services they 
produce—a PES scheme. In PES schemes, the landowner is paid to produce ecosystem 
                                                 
1
 The motivation for studying multiple-purchaser PES schemes in this thesis stems primarily from 
interest expressed by stakeholders in collaborative work undertaken by the University of East Anglia, 
The Department of Environment Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) and a number of water companies in 
the UK, see Defra reports Day and Couldrick (2013) and Day et al. (Forthcoming).  
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services, commonly this involves the farmer undertaking an alternative land-
management practice, those alternative land uses are costly; possibly requiring 
additional expenditure in land management or resulting in a lower yield of agricultural 
output. At the same time, those changes often deliver flows in one or more ecosystem 
service. Importantly, those flows may accrue to different beneficiary groups each of 
whom might be prepared to contribute to payments made through the scheme. 
Furthermore, those flows depend on the spatial pattern of land use—which landowners 
are in the PES scheme and what land-management change they are undertaking.  
Designing a method which can find the spatial pattern of land-use that produces the 
maximum amount of ecosystem service(s) is a complex task but one that has been 
previously studied. Recently, Polasky et al. (2014) study this from the point of view 
of a regulator with limited knowledge of landowner’s costs, proposing a special type 
of auction which incentivises the landowners to truthfully reveal their costs, this allows 
the regulator to select the optimal spatial pattern of land-use. In addition, the 
conservation biology literature contains many examples that focus specifically on 
biodiversity, for a review see Williams et al. (2005). Previously the majority of PES 
literature has largely concentrated on the single-purchaser problem; Chapter 2 differs 
markedly by focusing on the issue of PES mechanism design when the activity 
incentivised through the scheme benefits multiple independent groups—multiple-
purchaser PES schemes.  
Of course, multiple-purchaser PES schemes are a subset of all PES schemes. In some 
situations single-purchaser schemes may be more appropriate, in other situations a 
single buyer, such as the government, may act on behalf of multiple beneficiary 
groups. However, certainly in the UK, there is interest in developing multiple-
purchaser PES schemes, this is captured in the following quote from the Department 
for Environment Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) “There is a need to explore new 
means to aggregate demand from beneficiaries and mobilise funding solutions” 
“These approaches … draw in multiple sources of funding and strengthen the overall 
economic case for action” p23. (Defra 2013). 
There exists a wide variety of potential buyers of ecosystem services, realistically any 
group or organisation that benefits from an increase in ecosystem service flows is a 
potential buyer, for example, national or local governments, NGO’s, environmental 
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groups or private companies, such as water companies. Historically, governments have 
been considered the main buyers of ecosystem services, predominately through agri-
environmental schemes (FAO 2007). The largest schemes are currently in the US and 
EU. The US, in 2013, spent just less than $6 billion on conservation programmes, with 
approximately a third of the spending on the largest scheme—the Conservation 
Reserve Program (USDA 2014). Agri-environmental schemes were introduced into 
European policy in the late 1980s (Regulation (EEC) No 797/85) and since 1992 have 
been compulsory for member states. Initially agri-environmental schemes were 
included as an “accompanying measure” to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
reform and later became a dedicated regulation (Regulation (EEC) No 2078/92). Since 
that time, member states have been required to introduce agri-environmental measures 
throughout their land; with the aim to limit risks to the environment and promote 
biodiversity and preserve cultural landscapes.2, 3 EU expenditure on agri-environment 
measures for 2007 - 2013 amounts to nearly €20 billion (European Commission 2014) 
and in England agri-environmental spending is over £400 million per year (Natural 
England 2014).  
Nevertheless, governments are not the only agents interested in purchasing ecosystem 
services. It is increasingly recognised that risks to the environment create risks to 
business; either directly—through the reliance on ecosystem services as inputs to 
production—or indirectly—through markets or supply chains (TEEB 2012). While for 
many in the private sector opposition remains to the concept of paying for something 
that they have not paid for before, for others there is the realisation of potential 
business benefits. Some private sector companies have direct incentives to protect a 
natural business input; for example, Vittel in France (Perrot-Maître 2006) and water 
companies such as Wessex Water, United Utilities and South West Water in the UK 
(Defra 2013). Other private sector companies may be more interested in offsetting 
some of their environmentally damaging activities by paying for improvements 
elsewhere through carbon offsetting or biodiversity offsetting. Still other private sector 
                                                 
2
 Member states are required to implement the European regulations into Rural Development 
Programmes and they are currently drawing up new programmes to begin in 2015 with the previous 
programmes having ended on 31st December 2013. 
3
 The Rural Development Programmes in 2015 will be based on the latest regulation (Regulation (EU) 
1305/2013) which repeals (Regulation (EC) 1698/2005). 
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companies or NGOs may be interested in eco-certification or labelling to improve 
brand image. Whatever the motivation, it is clear that funding from sources other than 
governments has the potential to increase further the procurement of ecosystem 
services and thus the justification for exploring multiple purchaser PES schemes 
becomes stronger.  
In Chapter 2 we explore multiple-purchaser PES schemes by focusing on the issue of 
spatial coordination on the demand side of the market; that is to say, the question of 
which beneficiary buys land-management changes on which land parcels. Introducing 
multiple buyers adds complexity to finding optimal spatial patterns of land-use, 
moreover, it introduces unique problems such as opportunities for free-riding on other 
investments4. We start with a simple motivating example, in that we assume that while 
all buyers may be interested in incentivising the same type of land-management change 
(for example, reducing the intensity of agricultural activity or taking land out of 
production altogether), it is not necessarily the case that each would choose for those 
changes to be sited in the same locations. As an example, imagine the differing spatial 
preferences for a water company interested in paying for land-management changes 
on land that is likely to lead to water quality improvements (for example, land close to 
water courses or land with direct drainage into water courses); and a biodiversity 
buyer, for example the government, who might be interested in creating large 
contiguous areas of habitat by paying for land-management changes on land close to 
established reserves, following the principles set out in the Lawton report (Lawton, et 
al. 2010). The first key contribution of Chapter 2 is to develop a general framework of 
methods that can incorporate the spatial purchasing decision of multiple PES buyers. 
The framework needs to be capable of incorporating different buyers’ objectives, for 
example objectives for different ecosystem service benefits, and include different 
constraints on those objectives. In addition we need to model how the buyers might 
come together in a PES purchasing institution. To do that we develop four example 
decision making institutions: in the first the buyers are independent and make their 
decisions simultaneously and without regard for the actions of the other buyer; in the 
second the buyers are independent and make their decision sequentially where the 
second buyer to decide is aware of the first buyer’s purchasing decisions; in the third 
                                                 
4
 Multiple buyers can also lead to the issue of collusion, however this is not studied in this thesis. 
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the buyers make their buying decisions strategically as the outcome of a process of 
negotiation; in the fourth the buyers make their decisions cooperatively.  
The framework of methods developed to model the buyer’s decision making allows us 
to identify situations in which we might expect a multiple purchaser PES scheme to be 
practical—this is the second key contribution of Chapter 2. To compare the solutions 
from the four decision making institutions (outlined above) we use the concept of 
Pareto efficiency, that is solutions that can make one buyer better off without making 
another buyer worse off. We explore multiple purchaser PES institutions in two 
simulation environments. In the first simulation we investigate the effect that 
correlation in the production of ecosystem services has on the efficiency for the 
multiple buyers using our four PES purchasing institutions. In the second simulation 
we investigate a more complex and perhaps more realistic situation, in which we model 
a catchment landscape comprising agricultural land parcels and a river system. In that 
simulation we imagine two buyers, one (a water quality buyer) whose benefits rely on 
the spatial heterogeneity of the landscape—sites closer to the river were more 
beneficial to a water quality buyer—and another (a biodiversity buyer) whose benefits 
rely on the spatial interdependency and configuration of the landscape—connected 
habitats provide more benefits to the biodiversity buyer. Modelling a buyer with spatial 
interdependency in their benefits necessarily creates a non-linear problem, we show 
how our framework of methods is capable of creating solutions even for spatially 
interdependent benefits by forming a linearised version of the buyer’s decision 
problem.   
The two simulation environments show how the general framework of methods can be 
used to assess the opportunities for realising Pareto-improving outcomes through a 
PES scheme when multiple independent groups stand to benefit from changing 
landowners’ land-management practices. In addition, the method we develop allows 
us to identify optimal patterns of land use across a spatial landscape, potentially 
providing a useful tool for both ecosystem services buyers and policy makers—this is 
the third key contribution of Chapter 2. The decision making problems of the buyers 
are modelled in such a way as to be solvable by linear integer programming methods 
allowing for exact optimal solutions to be found over a reasonably large and 
heterogeneous landscape. 
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In Chapter 3, we design a novel economic experiment to examine the potential 
workings of a negotiated multiple-purchaser ecosystem service scheme.  
The motivation for this chapter stems primarily from a collaborative project between 
the University of East Anglia, South West Water, Defra, and Westcountry Rivers 
Trust. The report, Day and Couldrick (2013), shows a pilot ecosystem service 
procurement scheme conducted in the River Fowey catchment area. The scheme 
distributed funds for capital investment on farms to improve water quality and was 
funded by South West Water’s Upstream Thinking Initiative. It explores and contrasts 
a negotiated scheme (‘advisor-led mechanism’) with a competitive reverse auction. 
The authors conclude that the advisor-led mechanism, in which farm advisors go out 
to visit and negotiate directly with farmers, is recommended for small scale schemes, 
where the farm advisors have good local knowledge, and known target farms are likely 
to yield positive outcomes. In contrast, competitive auction mechanisms are 
recommended for large scale schemes where the buyers have little local knowledge. 
The procurement of ecosystem services is possible through a number of different 
mechanisms, such as fixed price mechanisms, competitive bidding or negotiation. The 
choice of mechanism for PES schemes will depend on the specific circumstances of 
any particular scheme. The most appropriate mechanism, in some situations, such as 
when the number of bidders is high, may be a competitive bidding scheme, in other 
situations, such as when the details are particularly complex, a negotiated scheme may 
be recommended (Bajari and Tadelis 2001; Bajari, et al. 2009). Since the exchanges 
transacted in PES schemes are often complex, negotiation between buyers and sellers 
may play an important role in certain PES mechanisms; accordingly, our experimental 
investigation focuses on an exchange process facilitated through the multilateral 
bargaining of buyers and sellers.  
Bilateral negotiated ecosystem service procurement schemes have been successfully 
implemented both in real world schemes, Perrier-Vittel (Perrot-Maître 2006) and 
United Utilities UK (Smith, et al. 2013), and in laboratory experiments (Bruce and 
Clark 2010b,2012). In Chapter 3 of this thesis, we extend the literature on negotiation 
as an ecosystem service procurement mechanism by moving beyond bilateral 
negotiation to consider multilateral negotiation. In order to provide clarity and also to 
keep the experiment computationally manageable for the participants, our experiments 
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involve just three parties to those negotiations—two buyers and one seller. The two 
potential buyers can negotiate not only between each other but also with a seller of 
ecosystem services to reach a mutually beneficial outcome. The aim of Chapter 3 is 
therefore to gather insights as to whether negotiated multiple purchaser PES schemes 
might be achievable and to explore the factors shaping the division of gains from 
negotiations between multiple purchasers and sellers in such a scheme. 
The experiments are structured as non-cooperative alternating bargaining, in which 
two buyers alternate in proposing how much each buyer should pay and therefore also 
how much the seller receives should a deal be agreed, the seller acts as a veto player, 
able to reject any unsatisfactory deal. If negotiations fail then each participant receives 
their default payment, for the buyers this is comparable to purchasing their next best 
alternative, for the seller it is comparable to receiving their normal income. The 
experiment is conducted over a maximum of 15 rounds of negotiation, although each 
time a participant rejects an offer there is an increasing risk (presented clearly to the 
participants) that negotiations will fail and therefore no deal will be agreed.  
We use this experimental framework to investigate a number of complexities of the 
negotiating environment that might typically arise in a PES scheme. First, the degree 
to which the buyers offer (and the seller accepts) an amount over and above the sellers 
costs. By including a seller in the negotiation process, buyers not only have to negotiate 
between themselves regarding how much each might contribute but they must also 
ensure that that offer is satisfactory for the seller. Second, the degree to which 
asymmetry in the gains enjoyed by the two buyers from a successful transaction affects 
the outcome of negotiations. Here we imagine that one buyer would benefit more from 
a PES scheme being implemented. Third, the degree to which asymmetry in the income 
of the two buyers (irrespective of their gains from the transaction) affects the outcome 
of negotiations. Here we imagine that one buyer might be a large, wealthy organisation 
and that the relatively less wealthy buyer might be more inclined to free ride on the 
wealthy buyer’s contribution to the PES scheme. Fourth, how negotiations differ under 
conditions of incomplete information. Here we imagine that differences in knowledge 
exist between the buyers and sellers, for example the seller may know the costs for 
supplying the environmental output but the buyers might not. Finally, how 
negotiations evolve when the benefits enjoyed by the buyers from the transaction are 
not known for sure but are stochastic in nature. Here we imagine that the buyers are 
17 
 
paying for the seller to undertake an action and therefore they are not entirely certain 
of the actual environmental output that will be produced, this could be due to 
unpredictable phenomenon such as weather patterns. This is a common situation for 
PES schemes but has received relatively little attention in the experimental economics 
literature. Chapter 3 explores these five issues within our experimental design to not 
only establish whether participants can successfully negotiate multilateral agreements 
in such a purchasing setting but also to explore how the gains from successfully-
negotiated exchanges are partitioned both between the purchasers and between the 
purchasers and sellers. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
UNCERTAINTY AND ELICITATION ANOMALIES IN CONTINGENT VALUATION: AN 
ANALYSIS USING A STATE-DEPENDENT SEMIPARAMETRIC ESTIMATOR 
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1.1. Introduction 
Economic research often proceeds under the assumption that individuals hold 
precisely-defined preferences over all bundles of consumption goods. It is not at all 
evident however, that this is the case; evidence suggests that individuals’ valuations, 
even for familiar market goods, are uncertain (Roselius 1971; Heiman, et al. 2001; Jin, 
et al. 2005). The existence of uncertainty in preferences is also evident in various 
market institutions; for example, in the money-back guarantees offered by retailers 
that allow customers the opportunity to try the good in their daily routine before 
deciding whether to keep or return it and also in second-hand markets that allow 
customers to sell unwanted or bad fitting items. The valuation of non-market goods is 
often additionally complex in that it is unlikely that individuals will have ever 
previously considered the trade-off between the provision of those goods and money. 
Moreover, it is rarely the case that individuals are sufficiently well-informed regarding 
the benefits of such goods that they could hope to express the value in some single 
willingness-to-pay (WTP) amount.  
Typically, however, attempts to estimate WTP for non-market goods using contingent 
valuation (CV) make no adjustment for uncertainty; despite evidence to the contrary 
(Kahneman and Knetsch 1992; Dubourg, et al. 1994; Ready, et al. 1995; Champ, et al. 
1997; Dubourg, et al. 1997; Wang 1997; van Kooten, et al. 2001; Ariely, et al. 2003; 
Akter, et al. 2008; Hanley, et al. 2009). The possibility exists, therefore, that subjects 
with uncertain preferences may provide unanticipated patterns of response to standard 
CV questions. Likewise, analysts wrongly assuming certainty in preferences, may 
interpret those responses incorrectly; for example, in construing CV responses as 
providing evidence of so-called elicitation anomalies. 
The central purpose of this paper is to investigate the claim made by numerous authors, 
(Ready, et al. 1995; Welsh and Poe 1998; Ready, et al. 2001; Flachaire and Hollard 
2007) that commonly observed elicitation anomalies in CV—for example, differences 
in WTP between open ended (OE) and dichotomous choice (DC) formats, and 
differences in WTP according to the initial bids in repeated DC formats—arise as a 
result of asking individuals with uncertain preferences to express their value as if those 
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preferences were precisely-defined5. Certainly, the possibility exists that subjects with 
uncertain preferences may provide unanticipated patterns of response when presented 
with standard CV questions. 
In Section 1.2 we discuss the rationale behind suggestions that uncertainty could 
explain anomalies in CV; specifically, we look at the effect of requiring individuals 
with uncertain preferences to answer CV questions in a certain or precise manner. The 
fundamental position underpinning this argument is that individuals, in the presence 
of uncertainty, may adopt contrasting heuristics in answering CV questions posed in 
different ways. The first objective of this chapter is to assess this hypothesis.  
To assess the hypothesis we require a CV elicitation technique which allows for the 
expression of uncertainty. One such method that has been widely applied is the 
multiple bounded discrete choice (MBDC)6 method (Welsh and Bishop 1993; Welsh 
and Poe 1998; Alberini, et al. 2003; Evans, et al. 2003; Vossler, et al. 2004; Kobayashi, 
et al. 2010). The MBDC method presents respondents with an ordered list of bids7. For 
each bid, respondents report on a certainty scale their likelihood of being willing to 
pay that amount. Accordingly, the MBDC method typically presents respondents with 
a multiple-bounded choice across bid amounts, consistent with the payment card 
                                                 
5
 Another possible explanation for the observed elicitation anomalies is that there is something 
specific about the CV method that fails to encourage respondents to accurately or truthfully reveal 
their preferences. Research has focused on the idea that certain formats of CV elicitation encourage 
strategic (Carson et al., (2001) or ill-considered responses (Poe and Vossler (2009), Hutchinson et al. 
(2007). 
6
 The multiple bounded discrete choice method is also known as the multiple bounded uncertainty 
choice method.  
7
 There is mixed evidence that the MBDC method may itself lead to elicitation anomalies. Vossler et 
al. (2004) assess the MBDC method for bid design effects; specifically, three arrays of bids were varied 
according to how many high (or low) bids were included, with the maximum and minimum bid kept 
constant throughout all three arrays. They found no statistical difference between the WTP values 
elicited from the three samples. Dubourg et al. (1997) and Roach et al. (2002) in similar analyses had 
differing maximum bids in their bid arrays and specifically tested for range effects; they both found that 
groups offered a bid array with a higher maximum value had significantly higher WTP estimates. This 
contrary evidence raises doubt about the procedural invariance properties of the MBDC method.  
22 
 
method8, combined with a polychotomous choice from a scale of certainty ranging 
from definitely yes to definitely no. An alternative is the payment ladder approach 
from Hanley et al. (2009), as in the MBDC method they present respondents with a 
multiple-bounded choice across bid amounts but with just two choices: “I would 
definitely pay that amount” and “I would definitely NOT pay that amount”. For each 
respondent, both the MBDC elicitation method and the payment card method from 
Hanley et al. (2009) provide data recording a range of values for which that respondent 
is certain they would pay, we label this the certainty range, and a range of values over 
which they are certain they would not pay. Between those two there may exist a range 
of values over which they are uncertain—we label this the uncertainty range9.  
In this study respondents undertake a single valuation exercise split into three tasks, 
the final stage of that exercise is an MBDC task, prior to this the respondents are 
allocated to certain treatment groups, those treatment groups each receive either a 
single-bounded DC question or an OE question with all groups then answering a 
follow-up question on their certainty. If, as has been hypothesised, the respondents 
underlying preferences are uncertain and procedurally invariant then the particular 
treatment group in which the respondent is assigned should not influence the 
uncertainty ranges expressed in the MBDC part of the exercise. Of course, individual 
uncertainty ranges are likely to vary due to individual characteristics such as their 
experience of the good in question (Ackerberg 2003 and Czajkowski et al. 2015) but 
on average those differences should be randomised across the treatments. To analyse 
the procedural invariance of the respondents’ uncertainty ranges we measure the 
uncertainty range over two key parameters: location and width. We denote the location 
as how far up the WTP scale the uncertainty range is, and the width as the size (or 
precision) of the uncertainty range.  
                                                 
8
 The payment card method allows respondents to state the maximum bid they would be willing to 
pay, this can be expanded to the multiple-bounded format. In the multiple bounded format the 
respondent answers the question “would you be willing to pay?” for each of the k bid amounts. If 
implemented with a “yes”/”no” response to each bid the method reveals the interval within which the 
WTP exists. Welsh and Bishop (1993) took the multiple bounded format and incorporated 
polychotomous responses in each of the k bid amounts to give the multiple bounded discrete choice 
method. 
9
 Referred to as the “value gap” in Hanley et al. (2009). 
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The second objective of this chapter is to explore a new method for the econometric 
analysis of CV data with an uncertainty range. While the analysis of MBDC data has 
grown in sophistication, previous attempts at modelling such data have all been based 
on strong parametric assumptions; for example, Wang 1997; Alberini, et al. 2003; 
Evans, et al. 2003; Kobayashi, et al. 2012. We propose the use of a radically different 
semiparametric estimator based on the multi-state duration models used in the medical 
statistics literature (Commenges 2002; Frydman and Szarek 2009). The estimator we 
describe is a three-state duration-dependent Markov model which allows us to 
simultaneously explore how the width and location of the uncertainty range are 
influenced by different treatments. As far as we are aware this is the first time that this 
form of multiple-state duration modelling has been used in economic analysis. 
The chapter is organised as follows. In Section 1.2 we expand on the argument that 
uncertainty might explain elicitation anomalies in CV data, review previous empirical 
evidence in this area of study, and develop the central hypothesis of the research. In 
Section 1.3 we review the literature on methods for analysing CV data with an 
uncertainty range, specifically from MBDC surveys, and justify using our semi-
parametric estimator. In Section 1.4 we outline our semi-parametric estimator which 
is used to analyse the invariance of the uncertainty ranges to external cues. In Section 
1.5 we describe the design of a CV survey experiment developed to explore the central 
hypothesis of uncertainty as an explanation of elicitation anomalies in CV surveys. In 
Section 1.6 and 1.7 we present the results of our empirical analysis and consider the 
implications of our findings and Section 1.8 concludes and presents some closing 
remarks. 
1.2. Uncertainty as an explanation of elicitation anomalies in CV 
It has been hypothesised that the underlying uncertainty in individuals’ preferences 
may explain elicitation anomalies in CV studies (Ready, et al. 2001; Flachaire and 
Hollard 2007). In this chapter, we focus specifically on two such anomalies: the 
divergence in values between OE and DC elicitation methods and starting point bias10.  
                                                 
10
 Here we focus on the OE-DC disparity and starting point bias but other elicitation anomalies have 
plausible explanations through the lens of uncertain preferences: for example, the disparity between 
WTP and WTA (Dubourg et al., 1994; Horowitz and McConnell 2002). Elicitation anomalies could 
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It is well established in the literature that DC methods of elicitation invariably report 
higher estimates of WTP when contrasted with OE methods of elicitation (Boyle, et 
al. 1996; Brown, et al. 1996; Ready, et al. 1996). A number of authors have argued 
that uncertainty is an explanation for that observation (Ready, et al. 1995; Welsh and 
Poe 1998; Ready, et al. 2001; Flachaire and Hollard 2007). At the core of those 
arguments is the conjecture that in the presence of uncertainty, respondents interpret 
OE and DC questions very differently. In particular, when faced with an OE question 
respondents are believed to report a value that they are reasonably certain they would 
pay. In contrast, when presented with a DC question offering a bid amount in their 
range of uncertainty, respondents are believed to react as if the question is asking them 
whether there is some possibility they would pay that amount. In the words of 
Flachaire and Hollard (2007), “anomalies come from the fact that, when uncertain, 
respondents tend to answer yes. Indeed, if the bid belongs to his range of acceptable 
values, a respondent answers yes...” (p. 192). Ready et al. (2001) report empirical 
findings that support that assertion. In their data, they observe that the norm response 
for respondents that are unsure is to say “yes” when answering DC questions. In 
contrast, when answering an OE question respondents will tend to state that they are 
not prepared to pay that amount. 
To illustrate, imagine an individual with the uncertain preferences shown in Figure 1.1 
At values below £UL, on the WTP scale, the individual is certain she would pay; at 
values between £UL and £UH the individual is uncertain about paying (uncertainty 
range), and finally, at values above £UH the individual is certain she would not pay. 
When asked to state WTP in an OE valuation task, Ready et al. (2001) predict the 
respondents will answer towards the lower end of their uncertainty range. On the other 
hand, if the respondent had instead been offered a DC format question and presented 
with a bid amount within their uncertainty range the respondent would tend to say yes. 
                                                 
be explained through respondents with uncertain preferences answering questions in the former frame 
in a risk averse manner and questions in the latter frame in a risk seeking manner. 
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Figure 1.1. WTP Scale showing the uncertainty range and the predictions of 
answering different elicitation methods when the respondent is uncertain. 
The central tenet of the Ready et al. (2001) conjecture is that elicitation anomalies are 
observed because individuals use different heuristics to deal with their uncertainty in 
responding to OE as compared to DC format questions. The variance in WTP from the 
two elicitation methods may therefore be explained simply by allowing for the 
possibility of uncertain preferences.  
A second common elicitation anomaly is starting point bias; commonly observed in 
CV studies which ask a series of DC questions. A widely documented result is that the 
bid value offered in the first DC question systematically influences the response to 
subsequent valuation questions. While several possible explanations for starting point 
bias have been proposed11, a plausible possibility is that this too arises from preference 
uncertainty in which respondents adopt a simplifying heuristic. 
                                                 
11
 A number of interpretations have been proposed, such as the initial value signalling the cost or 
alternatively acting as an anchor (McFadden 1994); (Herriges and Shogren 1996); Bateman et al., 
(2009); (Flachaire and Hollard 2007). The general explanation for anchoring is that the initial value 
creates the possibility, at least momentarily, that the valuation being estimated is near to the initial 
value. It was famously shown in Tversky and Kahneman (1974) work in which respondents’ answers 
on the subject of the number of African countries in the United Nations were significantly related to a 
number randomly generated in front of the respondents on a spinning wheel from 1 to 100. Anchors 
are particularly prevalent in situations when the source of the anchor is perceived as knowledgeable 
and trustworthy and the recipient is low in knowledge (Kahneman and Tversky 1982; Vanexel, et al. 
2006). The situation described is very common in CV studies as the respondent has very little 
experience of the good or may be very uncertain of their WTP and could see the source of the bid as 
an ‘expert’.  
UNCERTAINTY RANGE 
£UH £UL £0 
Max WTP in 
Open Ended 
Dichotomous 
choice ‘YES’ 
£∞ 
Certain would pay Certain 
wouldn’t pay 
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To illustrate, imagine two individuals with identical but uncertain preferences shown 
in Figure 1.2. One individual is initially offered a low bid, denoted BL1, and one is 
offered a high bid denoted BH1. BL1 is comfortably within the certain would pay range 
and so the individual would answer yes they would pay. Conversely, BH1 is 
comfortably within the certain would not pay range and so that individual would 
answer no. Both individuals are then asked a second valuation question for the same 
value B2 which is within their uncertainty ranges. Observe that the individual initially 
offered BL1 is coming from a state of certainly would pay to a state of uncertainty; 
whereas the individual initially offered BH1 is coming from a state of certainly wouldn’t 
pay to uncertainty. For the individual coming up from the low bid, a natural reaction 
might be to reason that, ‘I was previously certain I would pay and so answered yes. 
Now I am not certain that I would pay so to signal that change in state I’ll answer no’. 
The reverse is true for the other individual, having previously answered with certainty 
that they would not pay the high bid amount a way to signal that there is now a 
possibility they might pay would be to answer yes. In other words, by adopting a 
simplifying heuristic to deal with their change in certainty the individuals may want to 
express that B2 puts them in a different state of certainty by reversing their answers to 
the initial question. 
 
Figure 1.2. WTP scale showing the uncertainty range and the predictions of 
answering iterative CV questions when the respondent is uncertain. 
Again the conjecture is that starting point bias is not the consequence of shifting 
preferences; but that respondents interpret DC questions differently when moving to a 
state of uncertainty from different ‘directions’. Answers to the follow up question are 
therefore dependent upon which state they were in previously. An important prediction 
resulting from this hypothesis is that individuals’ preferences do not change but they 
UNCERTAINTY RANGE 
£UH £UL £0 B2 BL1 BH1 
“Yes” “No” “Yes” “No” 
Certain would pay Certain 
wouldn’t pay 
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express the transition from a state of certainty to a state of uncertainty in their responses 
to multiple DC elicitation questions. 
As we have shown, both the DC-OE anomaly and starting point bias might plausibly 
be explained through uncertain preferences. The key prediction of that explanation is 
that the elicitation procedure does not shift around the underlying preferences but 
instead the elicitation procedure might lead respondents to express those preferences 
differently in the presence of uncertainty. This chapter tests for such patterns by 
eliciting uncertainty ranges using the MBDC method and observing if value-irrelevant 
details of the elicitation procedure lead to variation in the uncertainty ranges. If we can 
show that the responses from the MBDC method are invariant to external cues in the 
elicitation procedure, then this would provide two particularly useful results. It would 
not only add support for using the MBDC method as the core method in CV survey 
design, but in addition, it would provide strong evidence to support the hypothesis that 
common CV elicitation anomalies can be explained by uncertain preferences. If the 
expectation of preferences that are uncertain but also procedurally invariant is 
supported by our data, then the prognosis for the CV method is rather encouraging; by 
allowing for the possibility of uncertainty, CV methods can elicit preferences that 
conform to many of the expectations of standard economic theory. 
1.3. Modelling CV data with uncertainty ranges 
Here, we review the current modelling techniques used to analyse uncertain response 
data in CV studies. The common assumption is that individuals do not hold fixed 
values for environmental goods and services, rather an individual’s value, , is 
considered to be a random variable with a continuous probability density function, (). Figure 1.3 depicts a hypothetical individual valuation probability density 
function, with mean 
(), certainty thresholds  and  and the difference between  
() and  and  denoted by	 and	 respectively. The certainty thresholds are 
defined here as the WTP value at which respondents switch their state of certainty 
about paying for a particular bid. Two thresholds are of particular importance for this 
discussion, the threshold in which respondents of CV methods switch from a state of 
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‘certainly would pay’ to a state of ‘uncertainty’ and the threshold from a state of 
‘uncertainty’ to a state of ‘certainly would not pay’.12  
 
Figure 1.3. Random valuation model for an individual’s probability density 
function with certainty thresholds and response categories.13 
Wang (1997) first introduced a method of modelling uncertain responses to CV 
surveys in his random valuation model. The random valuation model posits that a 
respondent answers “yes” only if their value is sufficiently large relative to the bid 
amount, 
() −  > 	; “no” only if their value is sufficiently small relative to the 
bid, 
() +  < 	; and “not sure” if their value lies in between, 
() −  <	 < 	
() + . For other response categories used in MBDC surveys, such as 
probably yes or probably no, similar boundary expressions are derived in Alberini et 
al. (2003) who adapt the Wang (1997) model to include five response categories.  
                                                 
12
 Traditionally in MBDC studies there are four thresholds, one that separates definitely yes from 
probably yes (PY), one from PY to not sure (NS), one from NS to probably no (PN) and one from PN 
to definitely would not pay; for simplicity we assume PY, NS and PN are contained within the 
uncertainty range. 
13
 Increased knowledge or experience of the good is likely to reduce the width (ai + bi) of the 
individual’s uncertainty range, in addition, a change in income could shift the location of the 
uncertainty range (Ackerberg 2003 and Czajkowski et al. 2015).  
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Both Wang (1997) and Alberini et al. (2003) look to gain inference on the population 
distribution of 
() using the random valuation model. However, doing so comes at 
the cost of imposing restrictive assumptions on the location of 
() relative to the 
certainty thresholds, since underlying the random valuation model is an ordered Probit 
model. The ordered Probit model produces one less estimate coefficient than the 
number of parameters in the model, as such, one identification restriction is required. 
One such restriction imposed by Wang (1997) and some of the sub-models in Alberini 
et al. (2003) is symmetry around 
(). This assumption restricts 
() to lie precisely 
between the thresholds  and  such that  =	−. An alternative restriction is to 
set / equal to a constant. Both restrictions impose the assumption that all 
respondents have the same relationship between the location of 
() and their 
certainty thresholds.  
An alternative method of modelling uncertain responses to CV is the probability based 
estimator used in Evans et al. (2003). They use psychological studies to justify the 
mapping of categorical MBDC responses to certain survival probabilities. For 
example, imagine a respondent who states they “probably would pay” when presented 
with a bid. The probability based estimator attaches certain probabilities with various 
verbal probability terms, so the interpretation of the term “probable” (that the event 
occurs) could be 0.75; therefore, the probability that respondent ’, value , lies above 
that bid is ( > ) = 0.75 for any respondent. As noted by Hanley et al. (2009), 
the polychotomous choices in the MDBC method rely on the researcher interpreting 
how different respondents consider terms such as “probable” and “likely”, models such 
as Evans et al. (2003) effectively assume that all respondents interpret these terms in 
the same way. Given the wide variety of unobserved forces that have the potential to 
affect an individual’s valuation density function it seems unlikely that they would 
share common factors across individuals such as the same density families, let alone 
identical probabilities.  
Finally, Kobayashi et al. (2012) propose an alternative method, the Latent Threshold 
Estimator. The estimator, rather than focusing on the expectation of the underlying 
individual valuation distribution, instead focuses on the certainty thresholds. Each 
threshold is modelled as a linear function and a normally distributed additive error 
term. The authors state that the model parameters could be estimated using maximum 
likelihood techniques but instead use a Bayesian approach highlighting the 
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computational challenges of the applying maximum likelihood techniques and the 
small sample sizes. The Bayesian approach requires all priors to be specified and the 
authors use standard multivariate normal and inverse Wishart priors. The Latent 
Threshold Estimator models uncertain responses to CV questions and can estimate 
certainty threshold means and variances without requiring restrictive assumptions to 
the individual valuation distribution, as such, each individual valuation probability 
density function has its own expectation and variance.  
Our semiparametric estimator, similar to Kobayashi et al. (2012), models the certainty 
thresholds that respondents change to different levels of certainty about paying for the 
good. By analysing thresholds instead of the expectation of the valuation distribution 
both models can assess correlation between the widths of certainty ranges and 
uncertainty ranges. For example, it may be the case that respondents with a narrow 
certainty range will also have a relatively narrow range of values over which they are 
uncertain. Likewise, respondents that have a large certainty range may also have a 
large uncertainty range. In Kobayashi et al. (2012) the certainty thresholds are 
modelled using normally distributed error terms; our estimator can be viewed as an 
alternative to the Latent Threshold Estimator with the parametric assumptions 
removed. 
1.4. A semiparametric estimator for uncertain WTP data 
A key contribution of this work is to propose a radically different semiparametric 
estimator based on the multi-state duration models used in the medical statistics 
literature (Commenges 2002; Frydman and Szarek 2009). Duration modelling deals 
with the statistical analysis of data recording ‘time to event’; most commonly, this is 
time to death or illness in medical science, and time to failure in engineering, although 
there are a wide variety of other uses (Klein and Moeschberger 1997).  
In the medical literature the objective is to explore the progressions of illness over time 
and to identify durations spent in different stages of an illness and how those durations 
relate to each other. The estimator we describe is similar to the three-state duration-
dependent Markov model developed by Frydman (1995) to analyse data on the 
progression of HIV/AIDS. In the context of uncertain WTP data the progression we 
are interested in is across money amounts and through states of certainty. As illustrated 
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in Figure 1.4, moving up money amounts respondents transition between three states, 
certainly would pay, uncertain whether would pay or not, certainly would not pay.  
 
Figure 1.4. Three state duration dependent Markov process. 
To construct our econometric model, we assume that each respondent, i, knows the 
highest amount they certainly would pay, an amount we label ti, and the lowest amount 
they certainly would not pay, an amount we label xi. The gap between these two values 
defines their uncertainty range, the width of which (in money amounts) we define as 
wi such that xi = ti + wi.  
Accordingly, at the heart of our econometric model is a calculation of the probability 
of observing a respondent reporting intervals of the width ti and wi. We write that 
probability as  
 Pr ,  ! = Pr! Pr 	|	! (1.1) 
Observe that we allow for the possibility that the width of the uncertainty range   
may be dependent on the width of the ‘certainly would pay’ interval . 
In the MBDC exercise respondents reveal information on their preferences over a 
finely spaced grid defined by the M bid points; 
0 = $ 	%  	%  	% ⋯ 	% ' 	% '( = 	∞ 
Accordingly, our data are discrete in nature identifying only the interval between bid 
points in which ti and xi fall. We shall refer to the bid interval between bid point *+ 
and * as ,*. We assume that bids are equally spaced along the WTP scale such that 
each interval ,*	(- = 1, 2, … ,1 + 1) is of the same width.  
Now imagine that individual i indicates that they are certain they would pay each of 
the first 23 bid amounts. Subsequently, they report that they are in a state of 
State 2: Uncertainty range 
£0 
State 1: Certainly 
would pay 
State 3: Certainly 
would not pay 
£∞ 
Transition 1 Transition 2 
 4 
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uncertainty over the next 25 bid amounts. Accordingly, for all bid amounts, *, 
where - > 23 + 25 they are certain they would not pay. For the purposes of 
developing our estimator, we summarize that discrete data using the following dummy 
variables; 
• 673 	(8 = 1,2, … ,1 + 1) is a set of dummy variables identifying the certainly 
would pay range, where 673 = 1 if respondent  stated that they certainly would 
pay 7 (such that 673 = 1 for all 8 = 1,2, … , 23 intervals) and 673 = 0 
otherwise. 
• 73 	(8 = 1,2, … ,1 + 1) is a dummy variable indicating the bid interval within 
which  must fall. It is identified as the bid interval after the highest bid amount 
that respondent i indicated they certainly would pay.  
The notation is a little different for the state of uncertainty. In particular, we are now 
concerned with the number of bid intervals over which a respondent reports a state of 
uncertainty, while, for the time being we ignore the fact that individuals may enter this 
state at different bid levels. For the purpose of clarity we use 9 to index the uncertainty 
range, where 9 = 1,2, … , : and : is the greatest number of bid intervals in the 
uncertainty range observed in the data. Accordingly; 
• 6;5 	(9 = 1,2, … , :) is a set of dummy variables identifying the uncertainty 
range, where 6;5 = 1 if respondent  stated that they were uncertain (such that 6;5 = 1 for all 9 = 1,2, … , 25 intervals) and 6;5 = 0 otherwise. 
• ;5 	(9 = 1,2, … , :) is a dummy variable indicating the bid interval within 
which  must fall. It is identified as the first bid interval before the bid amount 
that respondent i indicated they certainly would not pay.  
The Model: 
Our model adopts the maximally flexible parameterisation of Pr! in which a set of 
parameters <7(8 = 1, 2, … ,1 + 1) are estimated that capture the probability of 
respondent i having a certainly would pay range that ends in interval j. Accordingly; 
 
Pr! = 	=<7>?@A7  (1.2) 
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Following Frydman (1995), we parameterise Pr !, that is the probability that 
respondent  has an uncertainty range of width  , using the hazard function. In 
particular, we specify the hazard function using the logistic form;  
 ℎ;5() = C;	DE3?1 +	C;	DE3? 	(9 = 1,2, … , :) (1.3) 
Where ℎ; = ℎ;5() represents the probability that respondent  transitions from a 
state of uncertainty to a state of ‘certainly would not pay’ after k intervals of 
uncertainty. Observe that the hazard is expressed with maximal flexibility through the 
estimation of a set of parameters C;	(9 = 1, 2, … , :) that define the baseline hazard. 
At the same time, we allow for the width of the state of ‘certainly would pay’, , to 
influence the hazard through the parameter F. For example, with a positive F the 
hazard is increasing with , in other words, longer ranges of certainly would pay are 
associated with shorter ranges of uncertainty. Conversely, with a negative F the hazard 
is decreasing with , in other words, longer ranges of certainly would pay are 
associated with longer ranges of uncertainty. From (1.3) and the earlier dummy 
variable definitions we derive; 
 Pr 	|	! 		= 		=ℎ;>?GH 		=(1 − ℎ;)I?GHJ;K 	
J
;K  
(1.4)14 
From (1.1), (1.2) and (1.4) we obtain the loglikelihood; 
 
L2M(N, O, F) = 	PQP73 	 ln <7 	7
T
K
+		P;5 	 L2(ℎ;) 	+ 		6;5 	L2(1 −	ℎ;)!J;K U 
(1.5) 
Where < = <<…<'!, C = CC…CJ! 
                                                 
14
 The hazard function is defined as the ratio of the probability density function (4) to the survival 
function V(4), ℎ(4) = W(X)Y(X); therefore (4) may be obtained by multiplying the hazard function by the 
survival function, (4) = ℎ(4) ∗ V(4). 
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Maximising (1.5) with respect to (N, O, F), subject to the following constraints, <7 ≥0	(	8 = 1,2, … ,1 + 1),  ∑<7 = 1, C; 	≥ 0		(	9 = 1,2, … , :), results in the following 
estimating equations (derived in Appendix A1); 
 <7 =	27] 				(8 = 1,2, … ,1 + 1) (1.6) 
 P5^TK =Pℎ5^(5^ +	65^)
T
K 		 = 1,2, … , : (1.7) 
 PTK P;5 	_1	 −	ℎ;(C;, F)` 	= 		P
T
K P6;5 	ℎ;
J
;K
(C;, F)	J;K  (1.8) 
Where 27  is the number of respondents with ti in the interval j and N is the total sample 
size. Notice that in this specification we have a closed form solution for <7(	8 = 1,2, … ,1 + 1), but not for the C;’s and F. To estimate those parameters we 
use the self-consistency algorithm suggested by Frydman (1995). The algorithm steps 
are as follows, 
0. Calculate <7 from (1.6)  
1. Choose initial values C;	(9 = 1,2, … , :) and F, which we denote C;$ 	(9 = 1,2, … , :) and F$, where the superscript 0 indicates the initial 
iteration of the algorithm.  
2. Calculate new values for C;	(9 = 1,2, … , :), which we denote C;a , where  indexes the iteration of the algorithm such that in the first iteration  =1. From (1.7) we obtain the estimating equation (derived in appendix 
A1); 
 
C;a 	= C;a+			25^∑ 	b		ℎ;		(	;5	+	6;5	)			cTK 			(9 = 1,2, … , :) (1.9) 
Where 2^5 is the number of people who fail in a particular interval  (such 
that, 2^5 	= 	∑ ^5TK 	( = 1,2, … , :)). 
3. Calculate new value for Fa from (1.8). Accordingly, one has to solve a 
non-linear equation. To do so we apply the Newton-Raphson method 
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where convergence is achieved when the change in Fa falls below a 
certain threshold, d.  
4. Stop when |C;a − C;a+| < d	and	|Fa − Fa+| < d	, otherwise return to 
step 2 and iterate. 
As demonstrated by Frydman (1995) the self-consistent algorithm returns maximum 
likelihood estimates of the parameters of the model. 
1.5. Experimental design 
Survey respondents in our experiment each faced a valuation exercise made up of three 
tasks, see Figure 1.5 for the progression of the tasks. In Task 1 respondents were 
randomly allocated by an unseen process into one of eight treatment groups, seven of 
the eight groups received a single bounded DC question at a specific bid level and the 
other group received an OE question. The DC bid amounts were chosen according to 
two criteria: that they represented reasonable values suggested by prior focus group 
testing, and that they produced results which could be unambiguously tested against 
our hypotheses. Accordingly, five DC bid levels of £5, £30, £60, £100 and £150 
provide a range of bid levels which vary in terms of the absolute value; in addition, the 
original survey included two bid levels that were designed to test if respondents answer 
CV questions differently because the bid levels are not round numbers. The effect of 
this spurious accuracy in the bid levels on CV responses is not explored in this chapter 
but the two additional treatment groups of £28.70 and £31.30 are included in the 
subsequent analyses where appropriate.  
 
Figure 1.5. The valuation exercise. 
Three-step valuation exercise 
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Task 2 and Task 3 were completed by all respondents regardless of their treatment 
group. Following the procedure of Li and Mattsson (1995) and Ready et al. (2001), 
Task 2 presented respondents with a follow-up question that required them to state the 
level of certainty they attached to their DC or OE answer from task 1. Five responses 
were available: 
• I definitely would pay the amount of money. 
• I probably would pay the amount of money. 
• I am not sure if I would pay this amount of money. 
• I probably would not pay the amount of money. 
• I definitely would not pay the amount of money. 
Task 3 uses a novel version of the MBDC method15 to establish the values over which 
respondents are certain and uncertain. The standard format of an MBDC question is to 
                                                 
15
 Our MBDC task was undertaken as follows: 
If definite in task 2: Just now you said that you would/(would not) pay £ … for the enlarged 
beaches. I’ll indicate your answer by placing a tick in the “Definitely Yes”/(“Definitely No”) 
box next to that amount. 
Now consider the higher/(lower) amounts on the list. (Pass list and clipboard to respondent). 
Starting with £ … (next highest/(lowest) amount), work down/(up) the list considering each 
of these amounts in turn until you reach an amount that there’s a possibility you would 
not/(would) pay, however small. Again, looking at the card decide which category best 
describes your response to that amount and tick the corresponding box on the list. 
Continue working down/(up) the amounts on the list, ticking one box for each amount. Stop 
once you reach an amount that you definitely would not/(would) pay. 
If Not Sure/probably in task 2: Just now you said that you “probably would”/”uncertain 
whether would”/“would not” pay £ … for the enlarged beaches. I’ll indicate your answer by 
placing a tick in the “probably yes”/”not sure”/“probably no” box next to that amount. 
Now consider the next amount down on the list. Still looking at the card, if the amount was 
(£next highest amount) which of the categories on the card best describes your response to 
that amount (tick in appropriate box next to amount on valuation sheet). 
Work down the amounts on the list, ticking one box for each amount. Stop once you reach an 
amount that you Definitely Would Not Pay. 
Now I’d like you work up the amounts on the list. Starting at (£next lowest amount) tick one 
box for each amount and stop once you reach an amount that you Definitely Would Pay. 
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have five to ten bids in which the respondent states their certainty to paying these 
bounds using the standard polychotomous choice options. In our application those 
handful of bounds were replaced by a semi-continuous range of bids. The values on 
the MBDC card ranged from £1 to £500, increasing in £1 increments. The large 
number of bids was presented over two pages which were shown to the respondents in 
advance.16, 17 
It has been shown that the range of bids on a payment card can systematically influence 
responses to MBDC questions (Dubourg, et al. 1997; Roach, et al. 2002). Accordingly, 
we held the range of bids constant for all respondents. Moreover, the traditional format 
for MBDC questions is to space bids along a logarithmic scale, for example, see Ready 
et al. (2001) and Welsh and Poe (1998). As a result, more precise information is 
provided on the location of low WTP amounts than of high. In contrast, our design 
using £1 increments across the whole range of bids ensures high precision regarding 
the uncertainty range at all levels of WTP. 
The MBDC data for each respondent reveals their maximum definitely would pay 
amount, the value at which they transition to probably would pay, not sure, and 
probably would not pay, and also a minimum value for their definitely would not pay 
amount. We label the uncertainty range as the range between the lower bound (the 
maximum definitely would pay amount) and the upper bound (the minimum would 
not pay amount). This method provides the exact size (within £1) of respondents’ 
uncertainty ranges. Accordingly, we can test these uncertainty ranges for movement 
in both location and width over the whole range of bids in the MBDC design.  
In the context of a carefully designed split-sample experiment we aim to test the 
hypothesis that it is the process of requiring individuals to express values in CV 
surveys as if they had well-defined certain preferences that leads to elicitation 
anomalies. To test this we elicit uncertain CV responses and test for invariance to the 
nature of the elicitation procedure using three key tests: (i) is the location of the 
uncertainty range invariant to the absolute value of the bid of a prior DC question; (ii) 
is the width of the uncertainty range invariant to the bid of a prior DC question; (iii) 
                                                 
16
 The survey is included in Appendix A3. 
17
 The full MBDC payment card in shown in Appendix A4. 
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are the location and the width of the uncertainty range invariant to whether the 
respondent received a prior OE or DC question? 
1.6. Implementation 
Our specific case study concerns potential improvements in coastal protection 
(extending the size of the beach through the installation of more groynes) in the town 
of Southwold in Suffolk, UK. The data was originally collected for use as part of 
dissertation projects at the University of East Anglia in 2004, the data has not 
previously been published in any peer reviewed source. Personal interviews were 
conducted by four interviewers at three locations close to areas that would receive the 
additional coastal protection if the project were to go ahead. The proposal was 
described by the interviewer who also presented respondents with maps and visual 
representations of the site before and after the construction of additional coastal 
protection. Survey respondents were informed that the existing defences would be 
maintained by government funding but that additional improvements would require 
funding through an increase in general taxation.  
Respondents were first asked questions regarding the frequency with which they 
visited the beaches, as well as their reasons for visiting and how far away they lived. 
Subsequently, they were presented with the information on the coastal-protection 
proposal before proceeding to complete Task 1 (answering either an OE or DC CV 
question) and Task 2 (the uncertainty follow-up question) of the value-elicitation 
procedure. Task 3 (MBDC elicitation) began by introducing respondents to the MDBC 
card listing the bid levels from £1 to £500 and the certainty scale associated with each. 
The interviewer then translated a respondent’s answers from Task 1 and Task 2 onto 
the MBDC card. For example, if the respondent answered that they were probably sure 
(Task 2) they would pay £10 (Task 1) then the interviewer ticked that particular box 
on the MBDC card. Respondents were asked to proceed from that point in completing 
the MBDC card. If they were sure they would pay that initial amount then they were 
asked to work up the card marking their certainty against each amount until they 
reached amount they were certain they would not pay. The reverse was true if they 
were certain they would not pay the initial bid amount. If a respondent was unsure as 
to whether they would pay the initial bid amount then they were first asked to work up 
the card to an amount they were certain they would not pay and then down the card to 
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identify the highest amount they were certain they would pay. The final part of the 
survey elicited socio-economic details.  
Individuals in the study were randomly allocated to either an OE group or one of seven 
DC treatment groups. The total sample was 952 respondents, of that 36 are classified 
as unusable for the subsequent analysis undertaken in this chapter. The exclusion of 
observations is mainly due to incomplete MBDC tasks. For example, a number of 
respondents only stated a single ‘not sure’ figure and no values for any of the other 
polychotomous choice options. In addition to this, 4 respondents ticked that they were 
certain they would pay all the way up to £500 (the upper limit of the payment card). 
This data, although possibly very important for total WTP estimates in standard CV 
analyses, fails to provide any information about the location or width of the range of 
values to which the respondent is uncertain and so is ignored for the purposes of this 
study. As such, the total usable sample was 916 respondents, with the OE group 
containing 272 respondents and the DC groups each containing between 85 and 95 
respondents. 
Table 1.1 provides summary details of the socioeconomic composition of each 
treatment group. As can be seen from the final column, no significant differences are 
observable across socioeconomic characteristics in the eight treatments, suggesting 
that the randomisation to treatment groups was largely successful. 
 
 
 
Variable 
Sample means (standard deviations for continuous variables) 
Test of 
difference 
in groups 
(p-value) 
Open 
ended £5 £28.7 £30 £31.3 £60 £100 £150  
Gender 
(1=Male) 0.60 0.63 0.55 0.52 0.59 0.52 0.66 0.47 0.108
a
 
Employed % 
(1 =yes) 0.57 0.63 0.67 0.54 0.52 0.65 0.54 0.66 0.160
a
 
Nature/green 
group member 
(1=yes) 
0.42 0.34 0.44 0.37 0.43 0.39 0.32 0.41 0.592a 
Number of 
people in 
household 
2.82 
(1.3) 
2.64 
(1.3) 
2.79 
(1.2) 
2.69 
(1.3) 
2.51 
(1.1) 
2.91 
(1.3) 
2.72 
(1.3) 
2.82 
(1.2) 0.446
b
 
Age (Years) 52.96 (14.5) 
51.44 
(14.5) 
52.06 
(12.3) 
55.48 
(14.3) 
54.03 
(14.5) 
53.77 
(12.9) 
53.52 
(15.0) 
53.33 
(13.0) 0.648
b
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Income per 
household 
(£/month) 
2856 
(1353) 
2626 
(1266) 
2845 
(1372) 
2690 
(1261) 
2892 
(1333) 
3122 
(1350) 
2729 
(1253) 
3122 
(1369) 0.209
b
 
Sample size 272 91 85 95 91 93 95 94 Total = 916 
Table 1.1. Comparison of descriptive statistics across samples. 
a
 p-value calculated from χ2 test of equality of proportions across multiple groups. 
b
 p-value calculated from ANOVA F-test of equality of means across multiple groups. 
1.7. Results 
Elicitation effects 
A number of studies have reported that DC questions generate larger WTP estimates 
than OE questions, for a review see Brown et al. (1996). Figure 1.6 demonstrates a 
similar pattern in our results. OE responses are summarised through the survivor 
function of that data (calculated using the Kaplan-Meier estimator) which plots the 
percentage of respondents whose initial WTP (from Task 1) is greater than or equal to 
each bid level used in the DC treatments. Equivalent data for each DC treatment group 
is plotted on the graph; in this case, each point illustrates the percentage of respondents 
in a group stating they would pay the DC bid level. What is immediately evident from 
Figure 1.6 is the fact that the implied distribution of values from the DC treatment 
groups greatly exceeds that volunteered by the OE treatment group. This observation 
is confirmed statistically through a series of two-sample proportional tests using the 
Fisher-Exact method (p-values 0.000 to 0.016) with the results reported in table 1.2.  
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Figure 1.6. Empirical survivor function of OE treatment group and acceptance 
rate for the DC treatment groups at discrete bid levels. 
Bid 
level 
Original Recoded OE and Recoded DC 
OE 
(higher:lower) 
DC  
(yes:no) 
Fisher Exact 
test 
CS OE 
(higher:lower) 
CS DC 
(yes:no) 
Fisher Exact 
test 
5 106:166 58:33 0.000 99:173 36:55 0.617 
28.7 29:243 47:38 0.000 23:249 31:54 0.000 
30 29:243 32:63 0.000 23:249 15:80 0.051 
31.3 27:245 41:50 0.000 21:251 18:73 0.003 
60 13:259 18:75 0.000 9:263 5:88 0.360 
100 13:259 12:83 0.016 8:264 5:90 0.334 
150 2:270 11:83 0.000 3:269 6:88 0.011 
Table 1.2. Open Ended, Dichotomous Choice and Certainty Standardised 
(CS) results with two sample proportional tests 
Convergence of DC and OE after recoding to the same certainty level 
Now consider the hypothesis of Ready et al. (2001) who conjecture that respondents 
process OE and DC questions differently in the face of uncertainty; in a DC setting a 
respondent may state that they are willing to pay a bid amount lying in their uncertainty 
range, but submit a WTP value from the bottom of that range in response to an OE 
question. We test that hypothesis by recoding the DC and OE responses in Task 1. 
Following Ready et al. (2001), if the respondent subsequently expressed a state of 
certainty less than “definitely would pay” in Task 2, then “yes” answers to Task 1 DC 
questions are recoded to “no”. Ready et al. (2001) contrast their DC treatment with a 
payment card elicitation method; they recode to the “definitely would pay” level of 
certainty by requiring those respondents who state a lower level of certainty to point 
to a number on the payment card that they definitely would pay. In our survey, we did 
not require our OE respondents to express a new open ended value, instead we 
gathered equivalent information through the MBDC method in Task 3. As such, for 
those respondents in the OE treatment group who stated a certainty level of less than 
“definitely would pay” we recoded their value to the highest amount they indicated in 
the MBDC method that they “definitely would pay”. 
As illustrated in Figure 1.7 and reported in table 1.2, once responses from the DC and 
OE treatment groups have been standardised to the ‘definitely would pay’ level of 
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certainty a significant gap still remains between acceptance rates for DC questions and 
the survivor function for OE responses. A series of pointwise comparisons using 
Fisher-exact proportion tests reveal statistically significant differences between the 
two certainty-standardised data sets at WTP amounts of £28.70, £31.30 and £150 with 
marginally significant differences at £30. Contrary to the findings of Ready et al. 
(2001) our data suggest that respondents to DC questions continue to indicate higher 
levels of WTP than respondents to OE even once the levels of certainty in responses 
has been standardised. 
 
Figure 1.7. Empirical Survivor function OE and DC responses after recoding to 
“definitely would pay” level of certainty. 
A second pattern of response that stems from the Ready et al. (2001) hypothesis is that 
respondents presented with a DC bid amount lying within their uncertainty range are 
more likely to respond “yes”. In their empirical application Ready et al. (2001) 
document 11 respondents that classed their level of certainty with respect to their 
response to a DC question as being “not sure”. Of those 11, nine respondents (82%) 
had opted to answer “yes” to the DC question, a result that Ready et al. (2001) claim 
supports their hypothesis. However, data from our experiment displayed in Table 1.3 
presents a contradictory result; only 12% of the 25 respondents that classed their level 
of certainty in answering a DC question as being “Not Sure” opted to answer “yes” to 
that question. One important difference may be the use of language in the follow-up 
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polychotomous choice certainty question. Our method used the phrase “definitely 
sure” and “probably sure” whereas (Ready et al. 2001) used “95% sure” and “more 
likely”, importantly though, both studies have an “unsure” group which should 
produce consistent results. 
Follow up certainty 
response 
Open-ended DC “yes” DC “no” DC % “yes” a 
Definitely would pay 208 
(75%) 
119 0 100% 
Probably would pay 63 
(23%) 
116 0 100% 
Not Sure 4 
(1%) 
3 22 12% 
Probably would not 
pay 
0 
(0%) 
1 29 3.3% 
Definitely would not 
pay 
2 
(1%) 
0 385 0% 
Table 1.3. Follow-up certainty responses for DC and OE groups.18 
a
 calculated from ‘DC yes’/(‘DC yes’ + ‘DC No’) 
Overall, our data replicate the standard finding from the CV literature in which DC 
format questions elicit responses implying higher WTP than responses to OE format 
questions. Our data provide little support for the Ready et al. (2001) hypothesis in that 
responses remain significantly different even when answers under the two formats 
were compared at the same level of respondent certainty. In addition, our data 
contradict the finding of Ready et al. (2001) in that we find no propensity for 
respondents to answer “yes” when a DC question falls in their uncertainty range. 
Indeed, our data suggest the opposite tendency with a large majority of respondents in 
those circumstances opting to answer “no”.  
Multiple Bounded Discrete Choice – Uncertainty Ranges 
                                                 
18
 All 952 respondents are used for this analysis as all respondents completed the first two tasks. 
Removing the 36 respondents with incomplete data in the third (MBDC) task results in 18.75% of 
“not sure” respondents answering “yes” to the DC question in the first task (3 out of 19). 
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If the patterns of response identified from standard CV elicitation can be explained 
through the existence of underlying uncertain preferences then the central question 
becomes whether those uncertain preferences are themselves influenced by the 
elicitation procedures. We examine responses to the MBDC elicitation from Task 3 of 
our valuation experiment to explore whether the uncertainty ranges identified in that 
task are invariant to the nature of the standard CV elicitation question presented to 
them in Task 1. 
Figure 1.8 summarises our data from the MBDC exercise in graphical form; each bar 
shows the average uncertainty range for each treatment group. The OE group is 
represented by the lower most horizontal bar with the other seven DC treatment groups 
above. Visually, the uncertainty range for the £5 DC treatment group is lower to that 
from the OE treatment group and, for successively larger DC bid level treatment 
groups, those uncertainty ranges shift up the WTP scale and span a seemingly wider 
range. 
 
Figure 1.8. Mean Uncertainty ranges of DC and OE treatment groups. 
To explore those patterns more formally, we statistically compare the lower and upper 
bounds and the widths of the of uncertainty range across treatment groups. More 
specifically, we compare the means of the highest value that respondents in each 
treatment group ‘certainly would pay’, the lowest value respondents ‘certainly would 
not pay’ and the mean width of the uncertainty range. This is summarised in Table 1.4. 
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Mean uncertainty ranges from MBDC (95% confidence intervals) 
Only positive WTP 19 
  Difference in 
means  of 
multiple 
groups (p-
values) 
Treatment 
groups 
Open 
ended 
£5 £28.70 £30 £31.30 £60 £100 £150 
Highest 
‘certainly 
would pay 
MBDC (£) 
20.3 
(14.8-
25.8) 
9.8 
(5.8-
13.8) 
26.6 
(21.6-
31.6) 
27.3 
(17.4-
37.3) 
24.6 
(19.5-
29.7) 
31.9 
(24.8-
39.0) 
30.5 
(19.5-
41.4) 
45.4 
(30.7-
60.1) 
0.000a 
Lowest 
‘certainly 
would not 
pay’ 
MBDC (£) 
42.3 
(33.9-
50.6) 
25.3 
(17.2-
33.4) 
42.0 
(36.4-
47.6) 
48.3 
(34.5-
62.1) 
44.3 
(38.9-
49.6) 
54.3 
(38.3-
70.3) 
67.4 
(49.0-
85.7) 
81.1 
(57.0-
105.2) 
0.000a 
Width of 
uncertainty 
range (£) 
22.0 
(16.9-
27.1) 
15.5 
(10.4-
20.6) 
15.4 
(12.1-
18.7) 
21.0 
(14.2-
27.7) 
19.7 
(14.4-
25.0) 
22.4 
(9.4-
35.3) 
36.9 
(23.2 
50.7) 
35.7 
(23.3-
48.0) 
0.001a 
Obs 143 59 54 48 48 36 42 48  
Table 1.4. MBPC responses for OE and DC treatments. 
a
 p-value calculated from ANOVA F-test of equality of means across multiple groups 
The final column in Table 1.4 contains the p-values of an F-test for equality of means 
between the multiple treatment groups. We see significant difference at the 99.9% 
confidence level showing that at least one of the treatment groups has a different mean 
to another treatment group. In addition, we also test for difference in the width of the 
uncertainty range and observe significant difference between at least one of the 
treatment groups when compared to the other treatment groups (p-value 0.001).  
To better understand the patterns of difference in the location and width of the 
uncertainty ranges of different treatment groups we employ the semi-parametric 
estimator described in Section 1.4. Our strategy is to parameterise the two durations in 
our model as functions of treatment group. More specifically we define a set of dummy 
variables g$	h	gi with g$ defining the OE treatment, and g	h	gi defining the seven 
                                                 
19
 Figures in Table 1.4 are based on only those respondents who stated a positive WTP, this data 
therefore excludes all respondents who stated they would not be willing to pay anything for the 
project. The analysis in Table 1.4 using all responses is qualitatively identical to those described here.  
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different initial bids in the DC treatments (such that, g = £5 DC treatment and gi = 
£150 DC treatment) and use those to parameterise the two ‘WTP state durations’ in 
our model; duration in a state of ‘certainly would pay’ () and duration in a state of 
‘uncertainty’( ). Specifically, we use those treatment group dummy variables to 
parameterise the probability of transitioning from a state of ‘certainly would pay’ to a 
state of ‘uncertainty’ as defined by the hazard function ℎ73	(8 = 1, 2, … ,1 + 1) and the 
probability of transitioning from a state of ‘uncertainty’ to a state of ‘certainly would 
not pay’ as defined by the hazard function ℎ;5 	(9 = 1, 2, … , :). The latter 
parameterisation is a straightforward extension of equation (1.3): 
 ℎ;5(, j) = C;	DE3?(	Eklk(⋯(	Emlm1 +	C;	DE3?(	Eklk(⋯(	Emlm 			(9 = 1,2, … , :) (1.10) 
where, as before,  C;		(9 = 1,2, … , :) define the baseline hazard,  is the maximum 
amount that respondent  was certain they would pay, and j =	 g$		g 	…	gi!	is a 
vector of dummy variables identifying respondent ’s treatment group and n =	F		F$		F 	…		Fi! is a vector of parameters to be estimated. 
In a similar vein, we define the probability of transitioning out of a state of certainly 
would pay as: 
 
ℎ73(j) = o7 	Dpklk?(	…(		pmlm?1 +	o7 	Dpklk?(	…(		pmlm? 			(8 = 1,2, … ,1 + 1) (1.11) 
Where o7 (8 = 1,2, … ,1 + 1) define the maximally flexible baseline hazard for that 
transition, j identify treatment group for respondent  and q = 	 r$		r 	…	ri! are 
parameters to be estimated. As per equation (1.2), the probability of observing a 
particular maximum ‘certainly would pay’ quantity, , can be calculated from the 
hazard function as follows; 
 
Pr|j! 		= 		=ℎ73(j)	7
>?@A 	 (1.12) 
For the purposes of identification, we set F$ = 0 and r$ = 0 such that OE elicitation 
forms our comparator treatment group. 
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Test 1: Is the location of the uncertainty range invariant to the absolute value of the 
initial bid amount? 
Table 1.5 reports parameters of the model estimated using the self-consistency 
algorithm described in Section 1.4. The first two columns of Table 1.5 report the 
parameters associated with the probability of transitioning from a state of ‘certainly 
would pay’ to one of ‘uncertainty’. Observe that the probability of transition for each 
of the DC treatment groups is statistically significantly different from that of OE 
treatment group at greater than the 95% confidence level. In the case of the £5 DC 
treatment group the parameter exhibits a positive sign indicating that individuals 
offered an initial bid amount of £5 had significantly higher transition hazards than OE 
respondents and therefore had a higher probability of exiting the ‘certainly would pay’ 
interval at lower WTP amounts. The other treatment group parameters all have a 
negative sign indicating that individuals offered an initial bid amount of £28.70 or 
more had significantly lower transition hazards than OE respondents. In other words, 
respondents offered £28.70 or more as an initial bid level had a higher probability of 
exiting the ‘certainly would pay’ interval at higher amounts relative to the OE 
respondents.  
Transition Hazard 
parameters 
Certainty to 
uncertainty transition 
– with parameters for 
initial bid effect ℎ73(j) 
Transition Hazard 
parameters 
Uncertainty to 
certainly would not 
pay transition – with 
parameters for initial 
bid effect ℎ;5(, j) 
 
 
 
Entry point certainly 
would not pay F -0.0088*** (0.0018) 
 
Open ended r 
 
 
Base case 
 
 
Open ended F 
 
 
Base case 
 
£5 r 0.6248*** 
(0.1699) 
£5 F 0.2616 
(0.1581) 
£28.70 r -0.3328* 
(0.1618) 
£28.70 F 0.2739 
(0.1613) 
£30 r -0.3730* 
(0.1733) 
£30 F -0.0467 
(0.1691) 
£31.30 r -0.3847* 
(0.1693) 
£31.30 F -0.0272 
(0.1675) 
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£60 r -0.6052** 
(0.1905) 
£60 F 0.0717 
(0.1954) 
£100 r -0.4757** 
(0.1836) 
£100 F -0.2851 
(0.1816) 
£150 r -0.8063*** 
(0.1721) 
£150 F -0.1258 
(0.1836) 
Log likelihood -1388  -1671 
Obs 473  473 Cs	2	os	are not reported. 
Significance levels:  *0.05, **0.01, ***0.001 
Table 1.5. Semi parametric estimator output. 
Our findings provide evidence that the maximum amount respondents indicate they 
are ‘certain they would be willing to pay’ in a MBDC exercise is not invariant to the 
nature of a preceding elicitation question. Relative to the OE sample, the start of the 
uncertainty range significantly shifted down for respondents previously asked about 
paying a low (£5) initial bid amount, and the start of the uncertainty range significantly 
shifted up for respondents previously offered a high (£28.70 or more) initial bid 
amount. These results are consistent with an anchoring effect in that the initial bid 
offered in the DC task significantly influenced the uncertainty ranges elicited in the 
MBDC task.  
To visualise the data we select a subset of our data. We include only those subjects 
who in task 1 were initially offered a standard DC bid amount of either £5 or £150. 
We are therefore left with a total of 185 observations with 91 observations in the £5 
group and 94 observations in the £150 group. We summarise the results graphically in 
Figure 1.9 using a survivor function representation of the WTP state distributions. In 
Figure 1.9 we illustrate the distribution for the ‘certain would pay’ state contrasting 
the £5 treatment group on the left with that of the £150 treatment group on the right. 
Clearly, those offered the £150 initial bid amount in the DC task were more likely to 
express certainty over being willing to pay higher bid amounts in the MBDC task.  
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Figure 1.9. Survival functions for the certainty range, including only those 
individuals who gave a positive WTP.20 
Test 2: Is the width of the uncertainty range invariant to the initial bid amount? 
The parameter estimates reported in the final two columns of Table 1.5 are those 
associated with the width of a respondent’s ‘uncertainty’ range. The F parameter 
allows for the width of that range to depend on the level of WTP at which a respondent 
entered a state of uncertainty. Since the model is parameterised in terms of the hazard 
function, the highly significant and negative F reveals that the higher up the WTP scale 
the individual enters uncertainty the smaller their transition probability is for exiting 
uncertainty. In other words, respondents who state higher certain WTP amounts in the 
MBDC exercise also exhibit wider uncertainty ranges.  
Now consider the parameters estimated on the treatment group dummy variables for 
the transition from ‘uncertainty’ to ‘certainty would not pay’.  The results show clear 
evidence that, having controlled for the WTP-level effect captured by F, there are no 
statistically significant treatment group effects. This result is consistent across all 
treatment groups including those offered the precise bid amounts of £28.70 and 
£31.30. Accordingly, for our sample, the width of the uncertain ranges elicited using 
the MBDC method are invariant to the nature of the Task 1 valuation exercise.  
                                                 
20
 A proportions test shows no statistical difference between treatment groups for the number of 
respondents who were not willing to pay anything for the environmental change.  
Number of zero WTP respondents = 34 out of 91 for £5 treatment group and 46 out of 94 for £150 
treatment group, P-value = 0.112. 
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Figure 1.10 compares the distribution of widths of uncertainty ranges across the same 
two treatment groups as Figure 1.9. As we have seen our model shows a significant 
WTP-level effect; that is to say, the width of the uncertainty range depends on the level 
of certain WTP. Accordingly, the distributions in Figure 1.10 are presented using the 
mean maximum certain WTP amounts () for those two treatment groups; £9.80 for 
the £5 treatment group and £45.40 for the £150 group. Again we observe a difference 
in the distributions with that for the £150 group identifying a substantially increased 
density of respondents with large uncertainty ranges. 
 
Figure 1.10. Survival functions for the uncertainty range with 	 equal to the 
mean 	 for each treatment,  = £9.80 for £5 and 	 = £45.40 for £150. 
Finally, Figure 1.11 compares the distribution of the width of uncertainty ranges while 
holding the WTP-level effect constant. In particular, we plot the distributions assuming 
an identical maximum certain WTP amount ()	of £10. Observe that the two 
distributions now appear very similar suggesting that treatment group has little 
independent effect on the uncertainty range width. In summary, the graphs visually 
confirm the results that the location of the uncertainty range can be shifted by the initial 
bid amount but the width of the uncertainty range is not independently affected.  
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Figure 1.11. Survival functions for the uncertainty range using an identical 
entry bid value  = £10, including only those individuals who gave a positive 
WTP. 
 
Test 3: Are the location and the width of the uncertainty range invariant to the OE 
treatment versus the DC treatment? 
Finally, we can consider the general differences between the DC sample as a whole 
and the OE sample. Using the results presented in Table 1.5 it is clear that the important 
characteristic is the absolute value of the initial DC bid amount. The absolute value of 
the initial bid has an anchoring effect on the respondents in such a way that it carries 
through to a subsequent MBDC task and is expressed in those elicited uncertainty 
ranges; however, this result is only seen in the location of the uncertainty range and 
not the width of the uncertainty range. We see that the differences in the width of the 
uncertainty ranges are captured by the effect from the different width of the ‘certainly 
would pay’ interval.  
Overall, we conclude that it is the absolute value of the bid level from a previous DC 
question that causes respondents to express different uncertain preferences to those 
previously offered an OE question. Our results show, visually in Figure 1.8 and 
numerically in table 1.4, that OE responses were closest to the £28.70, £30 and £31.30 
DC bid levels. In addition, those previously offered a £5 bid level expressed a 
downwards shift in their uncertain preferences and those offered £60 or higher 
expressed an upwards shift in their uncertain preferences compared to the OE 
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respondents. Therefore, for our sample, the uncertainty ranges elicited using the 
MBDC can be shifted up or down by the particular nature of a prior valuation question.  
1.8. Conclusion and discussion21 
The main focus of this chapter is to evaluate the hypothesis that individuals hold 
preferences that are uncertain but in all other respects comply with the standard 
assumptions of economic theory. Results from our empirical experiment comparing 
responses to a standard single bounded DC and standard OE questions confirmed 
findings in the existing literature on CV anomalies; in particular, the DC treatment 
implies higher WTP than the OE treatment. Our data provide little support for the 
Ready et al. (2001) hypothesis that those differences can be explained through 
differences in the certainty with which respondents answer these two different 
elicitation methods. When respondents’ answers were recoded to a comparable level 
of certainty, significant differences in WTP were still observable in our data. In 
addition, our data contradicts one of the key findings of Ready et al., (2001) as we 
found that the most frequent response for those individuals who stated they were “not 
sure” to their initial answer was to say “no” in the DC format.  
Uniquely, our experiment investigated the uncertainty of preferences by following-up 
on an initial value-elicitation task with a MBDC exercise. Our null hypothesis being 
that uncertain preferences should be invariable in response to value-irrelevant details 
of that initial elicitation task. Our data show clear evidence that the location (though 
not width) of the uncertainty range is significantly influenced by the elicitation 
procedures. Respondents updated the location of the start of their uncertainty range to 
higher amounts when offered a high DC bid amount (£28.70 to £150) and to lower 
amounts when offered a low DC bid (£5) relative to the OE method. We conclude that, 
for our sample, respondents to CV surveys readily express uncertain preferences and 
their responses can be shifted around by the elicitation procedure. Specifically, the 
results are consistent with an anchoring effect in that the initial bid offered in the DC 
task significantly influenced the uncertainty ranges elicited in the MBDC task. 
                                                 
21
 Further concluding remarks on all three chapters, in which we highlight potential future extensions, 
can be found at the end of this thesis. 
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A major contribution of this work is the development of a semi-parametric estimator 
for the analysis of uncertain preferences. The estimator we describe is commonly used 
in the medical literature and can be described as a three-state duration-dependent 
Markov model. It allows analysis of both the certainty range and the uncertainty range. 
We conclude that the semiparametric estimator presented here is an interesting and 
potentially fruitful technique for analysing uncertain WTP data. We have shown an 
example of how the estimator can be used to analyse MBDC data. Moreover, we test 
correlation in the width of the certainty and uncertainty ranges and independently test 
the effect of a prior DC question on the uncertainty range; analysis that would be very 
difficult without specifically modelling the thresholds between an individual’s state of 
certainty about paying for a good.  
We conclude that our modelling technique makes very few assumptions about the 
characteristics of the data. We believe that by extending the analysis of MBDC data 
outside of the previously used parametric methods we have broadened the potential 
for analysis on uncertain valuation preferences. As far as we are aware this is the first 
time that this form of multiple-state duration modelling has been used in economic 
analysis.  
  
54 
 
PART II 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
OPTIMAL PATTERNS OF LAND USE USING SIMULATION MODELLING: ECOSYSTEM 
SERVICES AND MULTIPLE PURCHASERS 
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2.1. Introduction 
The primary aim for landowners of agricultural land is to grow market goods such as 
food, at the same time agricultural land provides, or has the potential to provide, a wide 
array of non-market ecosystem goods and services (UK National Ecosystem 
Assessment 2011). Since those ecosystem services often have the characteristics of 
public goods, the landowners have little motivation to produce more or even preserve 
such services. As such, to deliver ecosystem services landowners will likely require 
some form of external incentive (Kemkes, et al. 2010). Mechanisms instituting such 
incentives, including regulation and direct payments, are on the rise around the world. 
The particular focus of the work described in this chapter is on Payment for Ecosystem 
Services (PES) schemes (FAO 2007; Engel, et al. 2008). A recent summary of the 
literature can be found in (Schomers and Matzdorf 2013), a review which documents 
the rapid growth in PES over recent years.  
A particular feature of PES schemes which seek to incentivise land-management 
practices on agricultural land is that they regularly deliver multiple ecosystem benefit 
flows. A frequently cited example of a change that leads to multiple benefit flows is 
the planting of a riparian buffer, in which a strip of land along a watercourse is planted 
with vegetation, usually trees. The riparian buffer can improve water quality, reducing 
sediment, nitrate and phosphate runoff, while simultaneously sequestering carbon and 
providing habitat for wildlife (Salzman 2010). Indeed, agriculture can be managed to 
deliver a whole suite of ecosystem services including hydrological and climate 
regulation services, food and water production services, pollination services and 
cultural and recreational benefits (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005). As such, 
reducing intensity of agricultural practices will likely deliver improvements in a 
variety of different ecosystem services resulting in benefits that will accrue to a variety 
of different groups. This chapter focuses on the issue of PES mechanism design when 
the activity incentivised through the scheme benefits multiple groups each of whom 
might be prepared to contribute to payments made through the scheme; that is to say, 
the design of multiple-purchaser PES mechanisms. That focus differs markedly from 
the majority of the PES literature that has largely concentrated on the single-purchaser 
problem. 
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While all purchasers may be interested in incentivising the same type of land-use 
change (for example, reducing the intensity of agricultural activity or taking land out 
of production altogether), it is not necessarily the case that each would choose for those 
changes to be instituted in the same locations. For example, a purchaser interested in 
improving water quality might gain most by reducing agricultural activity along water 
courses. Similarly, a purchaser interested in biodiversity outcomes may benefit most 
by instituting the same changes around previously established nature reserves 
(Lawton, et al. 2010). The first example represents a case where the ecosystem service 
benefits delivered by undertaking an activity in a certain location are determined solely 
by the characteristics of that location. The second example represents a case of spatial 
interdependency whereby the ecosystem service benefits of an activity in a location 
are determined in part by the activities undertaken in neighbouring locations 
(Goldman, et al. 2007). Recently, spatial targeting has been recognised as an important 
feature of PES mechanism design; see discussions of the agglomeration bonus in 
Wätzold and Drechsler (2014) and Banerjee et al. (2014), and policy relevance see the 
new Countryside Stewardship land-management scheme announced in the new Rural 
Development Programme for England (Defra 2014) and the Natural Capital 
Committee recommendations (Natural Capital Committee 2015). 
While the literature has focused on the spatial purchasing decision for a single buyer, 
even when multiple benefit flows exist, in this chapter we focus on the issue of spatial 
coordination on the demand side of the market; that is to say, the question of which 
beneficiary buys land-management changes on which land parcels. As described 
subsequently we present a framework of methods for exploring potential efficiency 
gains from multiple purchaser PES schemes. For instance, if the buyers act 
independently and both adopt a PES scheme, the landowners may receive double 
payments for the change in land-management practice (Woodward 2011). 
Alternatively, the buyers may consider it the responsibility of the other buyer to pay, 
leading to free riding behaviour. Further adverse effects may occur when one buyer’s 
decisions on the location of the land-management change adversely affect the benefit 
flows received by another buyer. In addition to adverse effects, synergies could result 
from multiple buyers working together, such as cost savings or greater overall 
ecosystem service flows (Venter, et al. 2009). Here we focus on the spatial 
coordination of the buyers’ decisions but it is important to note that the framework of 
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methods outlined in this chapter can easily be applied to considering the potential 
efficiency gains when the purchasers are paying for different land-management actions 
or even when the benefits from different actions vary according to the location. The 
first key contribution of this chapter is to develop a general framework of methods that 
can incorporate the spatial purchasing decision of multiple buyers. 
Using our framework of methods we explore four multiple purchaser decision making 
institutions— three non-cooperative and one cooperative. In the first, we assume that 
the multiple purchasers act in complete independence and implement PES schemes 
simultaneously—independent and simultaneous. In the second, we assume that the 
multiple purchasers are independent but make their decisions sequentially—
independent and sequential. In the third, we assume that the multiple purchasers enter 
into negotiation with each other—negotiated. Finally, we explore a fully cooperative 
decision making problem in which we assume the multiple buyers give up power over 
their decisions to a trusted third party—cooperative. 
The second key contribution of this chapter is to employ the framework of methods to 
allow us to identify situations in which we might expect a multiple purchaser PES 
scheme to be practical. To compare the solutions from the four decision making 
institutions (outlined above) we use the concept of Pareto efficiency, that is solutions 
that can make one buyer better off without making another buyer worse off. We 
explore the non-cooperative and cooperative decision making problems in two 
simulation environments to assess the opportunities for realising Pareto-improving 
outcomes through a PES scheme when multiple independent groups stand to benefit 
from changing farmers’ land-management practices. In both simulation environments 
we create spatial heterogeneity in the benefit flows for the multiple buyers and in the 
second simulation we include spatial interdependence in the benefit flows. Modelling 
a buyer with spatial interdependency in their benefits necessarily creates a non-linear 
problem, we show how our framework of methods is capable of creating solutions 
even for spatially interdependent benefits by forming a linearised version of the 
buyer’s decision problem.  
In addition to allowing us to identify situations in which the multiple purchasers might 
be practical, the method we develop allows us to identify optimal patterns of land use 
across a spatial landscape, potentially providing a useful tool for both ecosystem 
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services buyers and policy makers—this is the third key contribution of this chapter. 
The decision making problems of the buyers are modelled in such a way as to be 
solvable by linear integer programming methods allowing for exact optimal solutions 
to be found over a reasonably large and heterogeneous landscape. 
In Section 2.2 we introduce the key literature upon which this chapter builds, in 
particular we focus on the existing literature on multiple purchasers of ecosystem 
services and the literature on modelling the spatial decision making of buyers of 
ecosystem services. In Section 2.3 we set out our motivating example and build up a 
model that can be used to describe the spatial decision making of purchasers of 
ecosystem services, including showing how to model the costs, benefits and the 
motivations of the different buyers using integer programmes. In Section 2.4 we show 
how incorporating multiple buyers into a single PES scheme adds a level of complexity 
and then go on to develop four multiple purchaser PES institutions. In Section 2.5 and 
2.6 we present two simulation environments in which we provide insights into and 
draw conclusions about the potential for multiple purchaser schemes using 
comparisons of the solutions gained from the non-cooperative and cooperative 
decision problems. In addition, we explore how the correlation between the production 
of ecosystem services affects the potential for Pareto-improvements. Finally, through 
a more realistic simulation environment, we present an example showing how the 
framework of methods can be used by policy makers to find optimal land-use patterns 
and in Section 2.7 we provide concluding remarks. 
2.2. Literature review 
Most PES schemes are run as monopsonies (Salzman 2009). Where multiple purchaser 
schemes have been successfully implemented it has generally been coordinated 
through a single organisation operating as a monopsony buyer, such as New York 
City’s water authority acting on behalf of all of its customers by paying for a PES 
scheme in the Catskills catchment (Daily and Ellison 2002), or in Costa Rica where a 
PES scheme in which landowners are paid to protect forests developed through 
allowing new buyers to fit payments within an existing payment framework22 
(Sánchez-Azofeifa, et al. 2007; Pagiola 2008). A single purchaser PES scheme will 
                                                 
22
 The scheme in Costa Rica is financed through several sources: such as a fossil fuel sales tax, hydro-
electric companies, the World Bank and the Global Environment Facility. 
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only be efficient when a sole individual or organisation are the only beneficiary and 
potential buyer of the ecosystem service(s)—in other words the single purchaser 
captures all the benefit and has monopsony power23 (Kemkes, et al. 2010). If we 
consider that multiple groups benefit from the ecosystem services produced then 
excluding multiple buyers from the scheme may create inefficiencies. Such 
inefficiencies could arise from underutilisation of the potential available funds, for 
example beneficiaries free riding on the investment of a single purchaser, or from not 
maximising the welfare of all beneficiaries due to the single purchaser not fully 
considering the outcomes for each beneficiary or only considering their own welfare 
when making decisions about implementing a PES scheme. 
There have been relatively few studies on the provision of ecosystem services from 
land-use change with multiple purchasers. Nevertheless, several studies have 
estimated the trade-offs from land-use change with a single decision maker, for 
example the trade-off between goods such as timber or agriculture and species 
conservation (Nalle, et al. 2004; Polasky, et al. 2005; Polasky, et al. 2008) or carbon 
storage and biodiversity (Nelson, et al. 2008; Venter, et al. 2009). In solving the 
problem the authors have assumed that a single budget exists and with that single 
budget a decision maker solves for the efficient outcomes, however with the trade-offs 
in the goods studied it is easy to imagine multiple buyers, for example, separate buyers 
of REDD carbon reduction objectives and biodiversity objectives in the Venter et al. 
(2009) paper. Assuming a single decision maker fails to account for complexities that 
arise when multiple economic agents with differing objectives participate within a 
single scheme, such as one buyer free-riding on another buyer’s investment, or one 
seller receiving double or stacked payments.  
In the context of a multiple-purchaser scheme, Woodward (2011) investigates the 
specific issue of the “stacking” of payments. Stacking refers to the practice of a 
landowner receiving multiple separate payments under different schemes or from 
different buyers as a result of a single land-management change delivering multiple 
ecosystem service improvements. The majority of current PES schemes either do not 
allow stacking or dissuade stacking through requiring each payment to generate 
                                                 
23
 In such situations, the transaction costs are likely to be low as coordination or negotiation need not 
occur between buyers and therefore basic Coasean rules are likely to lead to an efficient outcome. 
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additionality (the principle that landowners should not receive payments for benefits 
that would have occurred without their actions) (Salzman 2009; Woodward 2011). As 
such, sellers of ecosystem services cannot benefit from simultaneously selling in more 
than one market, this can be to the detriment of social net benefits as shown in 
Woodward (2011). In this chapter, we move away from considering the efficiency of 
the scheme from the seller’s perspective, or society’s perspective, to considering 
efficiency from the point of view of the multiple buyers.  
The research reported in this chapter seeks to explore multiple purchaser PES schemes 
using methods of simulation modelling. A key element of that undertaking is in 
developing models of the different buyers’ purchasing decisions. To that end we 
imagine a spatially heterogeneous landscape consisting of a large number of land 
parcels each managed by a separate seller in the PES scheme. The costs of paying for 
a change in land-management activity differ from parcel to parcel as does the 
improvements in ecosystem service provision delivered by that change. A buyer’s 
choice problem is to purchase land-management changes through the PES on that set 
of land parcels that deliver the greatest net gains subject to constraints imposed, for 
example, by a limited budget.  
In the context of a single purchaser, there is a long history of developing quantitative 
methods for spatially selecting land parcels to maximise biodiversity (Kirkpatrick 
1983). The approach adopted in that literature generally involves mathematical 
programming. To optimise biodiversity outcomes a quantitative measure is required 
as an objective function; typically either a measure of species richness (the 
representation of all species from a list of target species) or a representation of habitat 
requirements has been used (Pressey, et al. 1997). Armsworth et al. (2012), in a recent 
application, quantify biodiversity by conducting a survey of the density and richness 
of bird species and then regress those measures against farm management variables to 
represent the response of biodiversity to farm management responses to agri-
environmental policy scenarios across a spatial landscape. A review of the techniques 
used to incorporate spatial objectives over biodiversity outcomes in the conservation 
biology literature is given in Williams, ReVelle and Levin (2005). The vast majority 
of studies in that literature focus on a single, budget constrained purchaser; see Sarkar 
et al. (2006) for a review. We draw on the conservation biology literature and apply 
mathematical programming methods to model buyers of ecosystem services as 
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independent agents, both when they make their decisions simultaneously and 
sequentially.  
One of the key extensions required for our research is to go beyond the modelling of 
PES buyers as independent agents and explore how the purchasing behaviour of a 
buyer in a PES scheme might adapt to, and influence the purchasing behaviour of other 
buyers. One form such interactions might take is that of bargaining in which the 
purchasers negotiate with each other regarding which parcels each should purchase. 
Indeed, in this chapter we explore negotiation between buyers through applying 
techniques of non-cooperative game theory; particularly by applying Rubinstein’s 
alternate-bargaining game (Rubinstein 1982). Similar problems have been studied in 
both mathematical programming under the name bi-level programming and in game 
theory as the Stackelberg game (Vallée and Başar 1999; Sinha, et al. 2014). In the 
Stackelberg game negotiations are assumed to proceed through multiple rounds of 
offer and counter-offer until agreement is reached. One problem encountered in 
modelling a multiple-round bargaining game where choices are patterns of purchases 
across a large spatial landscape is that those games constitute complex combinatorial 
choice problems. In this research, we address the problem of identifying solutions to 
such problems through the application of genetic algorithms. Genetic algorithms are a 
branch of evolutionary computation, which solve optimisation problems by imitating 
natural selection, selecting the ‘fittest’ solutions for ‘breeding’ in the next generation. 
We utilise the genetic algorithm over alternative search methods due to the 
computational efficiency of the genetic algorithm. A detailed account of genetic 
algorithms is given in Haupt and Haupt (2004). 
A final element of the research in this chapter is to explore outcomes when the buyers 
act cooperatively. For cooperative decision making we use multi-objective 
programming techniques. A number of techniques are available to solve multi-
objective optimisation problems, the one used in this chapter is the d-constraints 
method proposed by (Chankong and Haimes 1983). In brief, the method proceeds by 
maximising the objective of one agent whilst introducing a constraint that the objective 
of the second must reach at least a certain level d. By varying	d it is possible to trace 
out the whole production possibilities frontier. This method is utilised in an ecosystem 
services context in Polasky et al. (2005). Tóth et al. (2009) provide another example 
in their study on open space in Chicago, USA; in which their objectives are to jointly 
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minimise costs and maximise the area of open space. An alternative approach to multi-
objective optimisation problems is through the weighted-sum or scalarisation 
technique. With that approach the objective function for the maximisation is 
constructed as the sum of the objectives of the two agents. The two elements of that 
sum are weighted by scalars, 0 ≥   ≥ 1 and 0 ≥   ≥ 1	such that   +   = 1. 
The trade-off curve between the two objectives can be traced out by optimising the 
combined objective function while varying  over the range 0 and 1. This technique 
is used by Snyder et al. (2007) to maximise grassland habitat while at the same time 
minimising the pairwise distance between new habitat and existing reserves. Similarly, 
Venter et al. (2009) use the technique of assigning and then varying the weights of the 
two objectives for a study on jointly reducing carbon emissions and improving 
biodiversity.  
2.3. Spatial targeting in PES schemes 
Our motivating example concerns an agricultural landscape. That landscape comprises 
a large number of independent land parcels each managed by a farmer whose primary 
objective is to maximise profits from the production of food. Alternative land-
management practices are possible, including taking land parcels (which might be a 
field or entire farm) out of agricultural production. For farmers, however, those 
alternatives are costly: they may require additional expenditure or result in a lower 
yield of agricultural output. At the same time, alternative land-management practices 
can deliver ecosystem services beneficial to one or many groups. A payment scheme 
in which the beneficiaries compensate the farmer for the costly land-management 
change (and is beneficial for all parties involved) can be described as Pareto-
improving. The focus of this section is on the complexities that arise in realising such 
Pareto-improving outcomes through a PES scheme when multiple independent groups 
stand to benefit from changing farmers’ land-management practices.  
To address that question we simplify our analysis by assuming that farmers have an 
observable reservation price (perhaps greater than cost) at which they are prepared to 
adopt some particular change in management practices on a land parcel. Moreover, to 
maintain tractability we concentrate on the case where only one alternative land-
management practice exists; to fix ideas, let us assume that that alternative might be 
taking a land parcel out of agriculture. In particular, we focus on the question of issues 
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of spatial coordination on the demand side of the market; however the methods 
developed in this chapter could just as easily be applied to address the question of 
coordination between multiple buyers in determining which of several different 
changes in land-management practice to fund.  
For the purposes of this chapter we imagine an agricultural landscape consisting of ]	land parcels. For each land parcel 8 in that landscape we assume that the farmer has 
a binary choice; carry on with normal production or undertake an alternative land-
management practice. We use the decision variable 47 to denote the land-use choice 
on each land parcel. If a farmer carries on with normal agricultural production on their 
parcel of land then 47 = 0, however if that farmer agrees to undertake an alternative 
land-management practice then 47 = 1, such that 47 ∈ {0,1}. Building on that notation 
we denote a landscape configuration by the vector w = 4	4 	…	4T!.  
Each buyer makes a choice as to which land parcels to fund. We use x to denote the 
decision set; that is, the set of all land parcels that a PES buyer could convert to an 
alternative land-management practice by meeting the reservation price of that parcel’s 
landowner for conversion. When the buyers are not choosing simultaneously, another 
PES purchaser may have already paid for management changes on one or more land 
parcels, therefore our formal definition of the decision set is given by x = {47: 47 =0}. We describe a particular choice for buyer A by N-vector wz where element 4z,7 =1 if buyer A chooses to fund land-management changes in land parcel j (such that that 
parcel must be an element of x) and 4z,7 = 0 otherwise (either because that parcel is 
not in x or because buyer A chose not to fund changes in that parcel). The choice 
vector w{ is defined analogously for buyer B. Subsequently we shall define 
maximisation problems that identify optimal funding choices for each buyer. We will 
denote the solutions to those problems by the vectors wz∗  and w{∗ . The vector wz∗  (w{∗ ) 
is 1 for all j where buyer A (buyer B) funds the land-management change and zero 
otherwise; this differs from x, which is 1 for all parcels that have been converted across 
the whole landscape.  
2.3.1. Costs 
The creation of any PES scheme requires the exchange of information between buyers 
and sellers, one important piece of information is the cost to a farmer of adopting an 
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alternative land-management practice. It can be assumed that farmers know that cost 
more accurately than the purchasers; they know up to some degree of certainty the 
opportunity cost of an alternative land-management change and also the reservation 
price they are willing to accept to undertake the change (Salzman 2005). A number of 
payment mechanisms have been used to facilitate the exchange of cost information, 
we briefly discuss a selection of these mechanisms and the complexities that result 
from considering spatial coordination with multiple purchasers.  
A common payment mechanism is the fixed price mechanism in which the buyer posts 
a price that they are willing to pay to secure changes in land-management practices. 
Fixed price schemes often use a field-level approach in which farmers are paid for 
conservation on a field by field basis or alternatively paid per hectare or per metre. The 
Countryside Stewardship scheme in England is an example of a fixed price mechanism 
in which landowners can select from a number of land-management options each 
offered at a fixed price. From a buyer’s point of view, a fixed price mechanism leads 
to a number of inefficiencies. Due to a single price being set across the whole 
landscape, fixed price mechanisms overpay landowners, in addition, because it fails to 
differentiate between the levels of ecosystem services provided, some landowners may 
be excluded that could have provided substantial benefits because their reservation 
price was higher than the fixed price. Furthermore, fixed price mechanisms fail to 
account for the additional benefits that might arise from funding spatial patterns, for 
example concentrating participation in the scheme into one location (so called 
agglomeration benefits). With regards to the latter, mechanisms such as the 
agglomeration bonus have been proposed which attempt to communicate the value of 
certain spatial configurations to the farmers with the expectation that the farmers can 
then coordinate their land-management practices in such a way as to be most beneficial 
to the buyers (Parkhurst, et al. 2002). However, such schemes may prove costly 
(particularly in terms of the cost of coordination) when scaled up to large landscapes.  
A further payment mechanism that allows differentiation on price is provided by a 
reverse auction. For example, the Bushtender project in Australia (Stoneham, et al. 
2003) and the River Fowey Upstream Thinking initiative in the UK (Day and 
Couldrick 2013). Reverse auctions ask landowners to declare a price at which they are 
prepared to participate in the PES scheme. With that information the buyer can choose 
which farmers to accept. Through combining the reverse auction with additional 
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information on the expected ecosystem service benefits, spatial coordination is 
possible; for example, the buyer can weigh up the cost of the bids and the potential 
benefits that would arise from accepting a certain spatial pattern of bids.   
In this chapter we begin from the assumption that the cost that must be paid by a 
purchaser to achieve some particular landscape configuration, is already known to the 
buyer. We do not investigate more complex institutional arrangements where farmers 
can negotiate payment, or where there are choices across different possible land-
management practices. For example, let us assume that all farmers have submitted bids 
to a reverse auction. In that case, each cost |7 is known and independent such that a 
buyer’s costs from a PES scheme can be represented by the following simple form: 
|(4) = 	P|74z,7T7K  (2.1) 
For the purpose of clarity in the simulations we make the further assumption that the 
cost for each land parcel is uniform across the whole landscape such that: 
|(4) = 	P|4z,7T7K  (2.2) 
2.3.2. Benefits 
Despite knowing the reservation price of each farmer potential purchasers may still 
face a complex choice as to the particular set of land parcels to select for funding 
through the PES scheme. In particular, the production of many ecosystem services is 
spatially heterogeneous. As such, the choice of which land parcels to fund must at least 
consider the trade-off between the cost of funding land-management changes on a 
particular land parcel and the benefits of the ecosystem flows that arise from those 
changes. Moreover the level of flows of ecosystems services realised from funding 
change on one land parcel may depend on whether changes are also instituted on 
neighbouring or nearby parcels, a feature we describe as spatial interdependence. In 
that case, the particular spatial configuration of land parcels entering the PES scheme 
is vital in determining the overall benefit flows.  
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A further complicating factor concerns possible constraints on purchasers’ actions. For 
example, they may be working within a certain budget or need to achieve a target level 
of benefit.  
In order to capture these complexities in our simulation modelling we need to integrate 
the heterogeneity and interdependence of benefit flows from land parcels as well as 
the existence of constraints into the mathematical programmes with which we 
represent a PES purchaser’s choice problem. 
Spatial heterogeneity and interdependency of the benefits 
The spatial production of ecosystem services can be thought of in terms of two key 
components, spatial heterogeneity and spatial interdependence. Spatial heterogeneity 
refers to the uneven nature of potential ecosystem service production across the 
landscape. For example, the production of carbon storage by planting trees is relatively 
spatially homogeneous, although the carbon storage potential of trees could depend on 
spatial characteristics such as altitude, soil type, exposure, latitude the primary 
determinant is likely, in most cases, to be the amount of trees planted24. In contrast, 
the production of water quality is spatially heterogeneous, such that converting certain 
land parcels (possibly locations close to a watercourse or on a steep slope) to an 
alternative land-management practice produces more benefits than other land parcels.  
Spatial interdependence, on the other hand, refers to the relationship between land-
management practices on one parcel of land and the productive capacity of other land 
parcels. For example, this could be a quantity interdependence, such that the aggregate 
abundance of a particular land use affects the benefits from converting another land 
parcel, or a configuration interdependence, such that locating certain land-
management practices close together or far apart affects the benefits of converting 
another land parcel. An example of configuration interdependence can be found in the 
creation of a large contiguous natural habitat which delivers greater biodiversity 
benefits than the creation of a series of separate natural habitats of the same total area. 
A contrasting example concerns the location of a natural site used for recreation. The 
                                                 
24
 It is also possible to think of getting greater benefits from carbon storage in the long term by 
creating a large contiguous forested area; a large single area may be more resilient to environmental 
shocks, see Laurance et al. (2002). 
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closer that site is to an already existing site offering a similar recreational experience 
the less benefit the site is likely to provide.  
In table 2.1 we use the two spatial production components—spatial heterogeneity and 
interdependence—to identify four classes of ecosystem service production. In the first, 
production is independent of location in the landscape (spatially homogenous); in the 
second, production differs across locations in the landscape (spatially heterogeneous); 
in the third, production is dependent on the aggregate abundance of alternative land-
management practices (spatially interdependent - quantity); and in the fourth, 
production is dependent on the spatial configuration of the land use (spatially 
interdependent - configuration). 
Spatial dependency of ecosystem 
service benefits 
Spatially homogeneous 
Spatially heterogeneous 
Spatially interdependent (quantity) 
Spatially interdependent (configuration) 
Table 2.1. Spatial dependency of ecosystem service schemes. 
For the purpose of illustration, we visualise how the land parcels which give the buyers 
the most benefit may change depending on the nature of production of ecosystem 
service benefits. We imagine that a particular agricultural landscape exists and that 
running through the landscape is a river flowing from north to south. Figure 2.1 shows 
such a landscape which has been partitioned into cells; each cell represents a land 
parcel with some cells representing agricultural land (red) and other cells river (blue). 
Each of the four panels in Figure 2.1 shows an example of the cells which give a buyer 
the most benefit but the variation results from assuming the ecosystem service benefits 
are dependent on one of the four spatial dependency classifications defined in table 
2.1. Panel A shows an example for spatially homogeneous ecosystem service benefits, 
panel B shows an example for spatially heterogeneous ecosystem service benefits, 
panel C shows an example for spatially interdependent ecosystem services benefits 
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based on the quantity, and panel D shows an example for spatially interdependent 
ecosystem service benefits based on the configuration.  
A B 
C D 
Figure 2.1. Example spatial land-use patterns. 
Figure 2.1: In each picture above, the green shaded cells represent land parcels in which a buyer can 
receive their highest amount of benefits, the blue cells represent a river and red cells are agricultural 
parcels of land. (A) Shows a potential carbon storage buyer in which the ecosystem service benefits 
are spatially homogeneous such that each land parcel is of equal benefit and the buyer may choose 
based on the lowest cost. (B) Shows a potential water quality buyer in which the ecosystem service 
benefits are spatially heterogeneous such that land parcels close to the river are more beneficial. (C) 
Shows a buyer in which the ecosystem service benefits are spatially interdependent such that the 
benefits change based on the abundance of converted land parcels. (D) Shows a potential biodiversity 
buyer in which the ecosystem service benefits are spatially interdependent such that when land parcels 
close together are converted additional benefits accrue. 
The buyers’ benefits 
We denote the benefits that a buyer gains from a particular landscape configuration by 
the function (w). For spatially independent ecosystem production that function takes 
the simple form: 
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(4) =P747T7K  (2.3) 
where 7 represents the benefits from land-management changes on each land parcel. 
The ecosystem service of carbon sequestration produced through the planting of trees 
could be represented through a benefit function such as (2.3). The benefits for a buyer 
looking to secure water quality improvements might also take a similar form in which 
land-management changes on land parcels near to water courses deliver high 7. 
For spatially interdependent ecosystem services the structure of the benefit function 
becomes more complex. We take biodiversity as an example of an ecosystem service 
whose production can be described as spatially interdependent and briefly discuss 
potential benefit functions used in the conservation biology literature. That literature 
indicates that the spatial interdependence of biodiversity production is often too 
complex to represent in a form suitable for inclusion in a mathematical model 
(Williams, et al. 2005). Rather than explicitly modelling the biodiversity production 
function, a common alternative is to use a proxy based on the pattern of land use (Nalle, 
et al. 2002; Polasky, et al. 2005; Polasky, et al. 2008).  
Different desired landscape configurations call for different mathematical 
representations of the benefit function. Certain functional favour a single large area 
adjacent land parcels adopting alternative land-management practice, others a number 
of smaller areas, others can provide connectivity or a certain shape to the land parcels 
selected. Önal and Briers (2005), for example, use mathematical programming to 
minimise a benefits function calculated as the sum of the distances between 
neighbouring land parcels: 
(4) = 	PP7;47;}7 4;		
T
7K 	 (2.4) 
where 47 and 4; are pairs of binary land parcels and 7; is the distance between them. 
Minimising equation (2.4) achieves clustering of the land parcels converted to an 
alternative land-management practice, since selecting parcels separated by the smallest 
distance 7; adds the least to the objective value. 
A number of alternative approaches exist; for example, prioritising proximity to 
particular spatial features by minimising the sum of pairwise distances to the spatial 
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feature (Onal and Briers 2002); prioritising compactness of the selected land parcels 
to minimise fragmentation and boundaries (Tóth and McDill 2008); or forcing the 
selected land parcels to be fully connected (so you can walk between them) (Williams 
and Snyder 2005). 
Accordingly, there are many options available for the benefit functions of spatially 
homogeneous, spatially heterogeneous and spatially interdependent ecosystem 
services. For the simulations presented in this chapter, we take the benefit function in 
equation (2.3) to represent the buyer of a spatially independent ecosystem service and 
equation (2.4) to represent the buyer of a spatially interdependent ecosystem service.  
2.3.3. The purchasers’ problems 
With defined cost and benefit functions all that remains is to bring those together to 
form a choice problem which a purchaser is assumed to solve in selecting the optimal 
set of land parcels in which to fund changes in land-management practice. Since the 
decision involves a series of binary choices for each land parcel, that optimisation takes 
the form of an integer programme. 
In particular, we assume that buyers of ecosystem services seek to maximise the 
benefits that receive from ecosystem service flows whilst being constrained by the 
financial costs of paying farmers to convert to alternative land-management practices. 
In general form, a single purchaser maximisation problem can be formulated as 
follows: 
maxX@∈ (w),	 . . (w) % 0 (2.5) 
where (4) is the objective function and (4) is the constraint set (both equality and 
inequality constraints). As we are considering an integer programme one constraint in (w) will be to define each 47 in w as a binary integer, that is to say, 47 = 0 (not in the 
PES scheme) or 47 = 1 (land parcel 8 is in the PES scheme is converted to an 
alternative land-management practice). As such 47 ∈ {0,1} is a constraint in all 
subsequent programmes. 
To model the buyers decisions as an integer programme requires us to consider that 
the buyers may have different motivations: some may want to protect a key input into 
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their business, for example, water companies or hydroelectric power companies (Day 
and Couldrick 2013); others may want to improve ecosystem services for the benefits 
to society or local communities; still others may want to offset environmentally 
harmful activity elsewhere (TEEB 2012). Differences in the motivations of the 
purchasers lead to differences in how a buyer’s integer programme should be 
constructed. To differentiate, we classify the different buyers based on three 
characteristics—budget constrained, target constrained and profit maximising. For 
budget constrained buyers we imagine a potential purchaser wants to achieve the most 
ecosystem services they can with a limited budget. For target constrained buyers we 
imagine a potential purchaser wants to achieve a target level of ecosystem service and 
they want to achieve that using the minimum expenditure. For profit maximising 
buyers, we imagine a potential purchaser wants to buy ecosystem services up to the 
quantity which maximises their profit. Table 2.2 summarises the potential purchasers 
of ecosystem services in terms of costs and benefits, providing representation of the 
objectives and example purchasers. As before (4) represents the benefit function for 
the buyer from the PES scheme and ∑ |74z,7T7K  the sum of the independent costs of 
land parcels in the scheme;  is the target amount of ecosystem service benefits and ,  
is the budget.  
Ecosystem service Simplest representation 
of objective 
Potential purchasers 
Budget constrained 
maxX@ (4) 
. .P|74z,7 % ,T7K  
National, regional and local 
Governments, 
NGOs 
Target constrained 
minX@ P|74z,7
T
7K  . . (4) ≥  
National, regional and local 
Governments, 
NGOs, Private companies 
Profit maximising 
 
maxX@ (4) −P	|74z,7
T
7K  
Private companies, offsetting 
Table 2.2. Types of buyers and their objectives. 
73 
 
Solving a buyer’s integer programme means finding the combinations of 47’s that 
maximise their objectives; in other words, finding which combination of land parcels 
when changed to an alternative land-management practice leads to the highest 
objective value for the buyer. We denote this optimal combination of land parcels as w∗ such that w∗ = 4∗, 4∗, … , 4T∗ !.  
In the current literature, the most commonly studied objective is one in which decisions 
are constrained by a limited budget, particularly relating to payments for biodiversity 
(Williams, et al. 2005). We assume budget constrained buyers for the simulation in 
this chapter but in Appendix B1 we discuss both target constrained and profit 
maximising buyers. A profit maximising programme requires maximising the 
difference between buyers’ benefits and costs, to do this requires the benefits to be 
measured in monetary terms and assuming diminishing marginal benefits means that 
the problem becomes inherently non-linear. Appendix B1 shows how even a non-
linear profit maximising problem can be included in our framework of methods. 
2.4. Multiple-purchaser problems 
In this section, we consider another tier of complexity in a buyer’s spatial decision 
problem, the existence of another buyer. In doing so, we examine outcomes under 
increasing levels of sophistication and coordination in the interactions of buyers in 
their purchasing behaviour. We focus on a case where there are only two beneficiaries 
of ecosystem services in the locality therefore only two potential buyers of ecosystem 
services—buyer A and buyer B. In particular, we present four decision making 
problems for buyer A and buyer B: in the first the buyers are independent and make 
their decisions simultaneously and without regard for the actions of the other buyer; in 
the second the buyers are independent and make their decision sequentially where the 
second buyer to decide is aware of the first buyer’s purchasing decisions; in the third 
the buyers make their buying decisions strategically as the outcome of a process of 
negotiation; in the fourth the buyers make their decisions cooperatively. For clarity of 
results we assume that the buyers do not face transaction costs, apart from the 
bargaining delay costs which form part of the model describing the negotiated 
purchasing decision. 
 
74 
 
Independent and simultaneous decision making 
The first decision making problem we consider involves two independent buyers 
making simultaneous choices. In essence this is a simple extension of the single 
purchaser problem represented in equation (2.4) in which two buyers act without 
knowledge of the existence of the other buyer. Buyer A and buyer B’s problems are 
represented as follows: 
Buyer Problem Solution Vectors 
Buyer A 
maxX@∈ z(4) . .		z(4) % 0 4z∗ 
Buyer B 
maxX@∈ {(4) . 	{(4) % 0 4{∗  
where z(4) denotes the objective function, z(4) the constraint set and 4z∗ the 
solution vector of buyer A, and {(4) denotes the objective function {(4) the 
constraint set and 4{∗  the solution vector of buyer B.  
One immediate insight is that when buyers’ decisions are made independently and 
simultaneously, there is nothing to stop 4z,7∗ = 4{,7∗  such that both buyers choose to 
fund changes in the same land parcel. In other words, when buyers do not consider 
each other’s purchasing behaviour, they may both elect to pay the same farmer who 
will enjoy “stacked” payments. Clearly, from the buyers’ point of view efficiency 
gains are possible from alternative purchasing choices. 
Independent and sequential decision making 
The second decision making problem we consider involves independent buyers 
making sequential choices. Such a situation may occur when one buyer, the first 
mover, choses to act independently in a locality funding changes in land-management 
practices. At a later time, another buyer, the second mover, aware of the actions of the 
first mover chooses to invest in the same locality. A general form representation of 
this decision problem is: 
Buyer Problem Solution Vectors 
Buyer A 
first mover 
maxX@∈ z(4) 4z∗ 
75 
 
. .		z(4) % 0 
Buyer B 
second mover 
maxX@∈ {(4) . 	{(4) % 0 4{∗  
where z(4) and z(4) represent the objective function and constraint set of buyer A 
(assuming buyer A is the first mover) and {(4) and {(4) represent the objective 
and constraint set of buyer B (assuming buyer B is the second mover).  
The important difference between the simultaneous problem and the sequential 
problem is that in the sequential problem the second mover is advantaged from 
knowing which land parcels have been funded by the first mover. As such, the second 
mover can avoid stacking payments for those land parcels and instead use their budget 
to select alternative land parcels. We denote this in the problem by maximising over 47 ∈ , where  ⊂ x such that  = {47: 4z,7∗ = 0}, in words,  is the set of 47 that have 
not been selected in the first mover’s solution. A simple result that could be concluded 
from this setup is that if a buyer understands the benefits of moving second then we 
would expect to see free riding behaviour in which buyers wait for the other buyer to 
move first.  
Negotiated decision making 
The third non-cooperative decision making problem we consider is strategic 
negotiation between buyers. Consider how a strategic buyer would act in our 
independent and sequential problem. A strategic player would not, when moving first, 
simply choose the land parcels that are most valuable to them. Rather they would 
consider which land parcels the other buyer will choose, given any particular 
purchasing pattern of the first buyer. The optimal land parcels to purchase for the first 
buyer will therefore be to avoid purchasing sites that, despite providing buyer A with 
high benefit, would be purchased by Buyer B in their subsequent choice. Accordingly, 
in our simple setup, strategic buyers gain an advantage by moving first. 
Things get more complex when we imagine a situation in which buyers negotiate with 
each other in reaching a binding agreement over which land parcels each will fund. To 
explore negotiated outcomes we consider a form of strategic non-cooperative 
bargaining famously modelled in Rubinstein's alternating bargaining theory 
(Rubinstein 1982). In that model, bargaining proceeds via a structured non-cooperative 
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game in which two players make alternate offers to one another. In our case, those 
offers would concern the land parcels that the offering buyer would choose to fund if 
they were given the strategic advantage of buying first. For simplicity, we assume 
those decisions are made with perfect information regarding the purchasing 
preferences of the second buyer. If an offer is accepted then agreement is reached. 
Alternatively, an offer can be rejected in which case the second buyer is given the 
option of making an offer. The negotiation might be played out over a fixed number of 
rounds of offers or over an infinite horizon. 
The simplest form of such a bargaining institution is the one-round ultimatum game in 
which one player, the leader, makes an offer that the other player, the follower, can 
either accept or reject. If the follower rejects the offer then both players get nothing. 
The subgame-perfect-equilibrium for the ultimatum game is one in which the leader 
should make a proposal in which they get all the benefits and the follower should 
accept that because they can do no better. In the context of our two PES buyers, a one-
round negotiation analogous to the ultimatum game can be represented by the 
following decision problems: 
Buyer Problem Solution Vectors 
Buyer A 
Leader 
maxX@∈ z wz +  maxX@∈{X@:X,@K$}(w)	. . {(w) % 0 4z∗ 
 
Buyer B 
Follower 
 maxX@∈ {(w) . . 	{(w) % 0 
 4{∗  
 
Observe how the leader’s problem takes the form of a bi-level programme, that is to 
say, a mathematical programme that itself contains an optimisation problem. In this 
literature, this form of problem is often referred to as a Stackelberg game. In our case, 
the leader perfectly anticipates the optimisation problem of the follower, knowledge 
that they exploit in choosing which land parcels to include in their proposal. Since this 
is a simple one round negotiation, the follower has no choice but to accept that proposal 
and (since we assume perfect information) choose a set of land parcels to fund 
themselves which perfectly matches the prediction of the leader. The key point to note 
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is that in this strategic setting a buyer’s funding proposal anticipates how that proposal 
will affect the choices made by the other buyer.  
A simple extension to the ultimatum game would be to allow for a second round of 
negotiation in which the second player can refuse the first player’s initial offer and 
propose their own counter-offer. In this case, the second player gets to make the final 
proposal and would therefore be able to claim all the benefits. Indeed, in this form of 
bargaining game it is always the player entitled to make the final offer in the 
negotiation who stands to be most advantaged. 
To increase realism, the usual assumption is that the number of bargaining rounds is 
unlimited since no player would agree to participate in a bargaining institution in 
which the other player was privileged with last mover advantage. Moreover, 
bargaining itself is considered a costly endeavour; each time a player rejects an offer 
they delay the reaching of an agreement and delay costs are experienced by all buyers 
since a further round of negotiation is required. 
To understand how delay costs affect negotiations, consider a simple two round 
negotiation; the first player makes a proposal and the second player has the option to 
refuse and make a final counter-offer. With no delay costs, the first player can do no 
better than make an offer that optimises the second player’s outcome; any other offer 
will be rejected by the second player allowing them to achieve that same outcome with 
their counter offer. When that rejection is associated with a delay cost, however, things 
are a little different. The first player knows that if the negotiation goes to an extra 
round of negotiation the benefits are reduced by the amount of the delay cost. As a 
result, they can make a first round offer which claims that delay cost for themselves at 
the expense of second player’s payoff. Indeed, the subgame-perfect equilibrium in any 
finite length bargaining procedure is determined by the delay costs to the players. If 
there are unlimited rounds of negotiation then, with equal delay costs, the equilibrium 
will tend towards an equal split of the benefits.  
In our simulation of negotiations between PES buyers we use a multiple round 
Stackelberg game and simplify by assuming equal delay costs for the buyers and 
setting the delay cost at exactly the cost of a single land parcel, |. Accordingly, with 
each round of negotiation each budget-constrained buyer incurs a cost which reduces 
the number of land parcels they can afford to fund by one. Those negotiation costs can 
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be simply included in the budget constraint presented in 2.3.3 according to: 
P|4z,7 % , − |( − 1)T7K  
where the budget is reduced by the product of the cost of a single land parcel | and the 
round of negotiation , such that in round one  − 1 equals zero and therefore the full 
budget is available.  
In our analysis, we explore how different numbers of rounds of costly negotiation 
affect non-cooperative bargaining outcomes. The maximum number of rounds of 
negotiation is denoted ̅, we calculate solution vectors 4z∗ and 4{∗  for a range of ̅. In 
addition, the buyer moving first is varied for each of the ̅, such that, a single ̅ gives 
two solutions—one when buyer A is the leader in the first round and one when buyer 
B is the leader in the first round.  
To solve the Stackelberg game over multiple rounds of negotiation we use backwards 
induction, starting by setting   = ̅ we solve for a solution that optimises the benefits 
realised by the buyer with the advantage of being the proposer in the final round of 
negotiation. The method then moves back one round of negotiation so that  =  − 1 
and the buyer that was previously the leader becomes the follower and the buyer that 
was previously the follower becomes the leader. In this problem we know that the new 
leader must make an offer that ensures that the follower receives at least as much 
benefit as realised in the solution to the problem when  = ̅, minus the delay cost. 
Following that logic back up through the rounds of negotiation of the game until  =1, we solve for the subgame-perfect equilibrium offer made by the leader in the first 
round of negotiation that will be accepted by the follower.  
Since solving for optimal solutions to a multiple buyer negotiated decision problem is 
a difficult combinatorial problem, we employ a heuristic search method called the 
genetic algorithm25 to solve the optimisation problem. An overview of the specific 
algorithm used is given in table 2.3. The basic premise of the genetic algorithm is to 
mimic the process of natural selection. To that end, many solution vectors w∗  (w∗ ) of 
the leader’s problem are generated and those solution vectors together are called the 
                                                 
25
 The genetic algorithm is from the branch of computer science known as evolutionary computation 
used for solving combinatorial constrained optimisation problems.  
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population. The starting population is a number of randomly generated solution vectors 
across the solution space. The follower then performs a maximisation of their benefits 
over the 47s not selected in the leader’s solution vector for each of the solution vectors 
in the population. Thus the follower solves the same number of problems as the number 
of vectors in the population. The follower’s problems lead to different levels of benefits 
for the leader and subsequently those solution vectors in the population that result in a 
high payoff for the leader are selected for reproduction (or crossover) in the next 
generation. The crossover process combines 47s in one wz∗  with those of another wz∗  to 
create “offspring” that contain traits of both wz∗ . We use a uniform crossover method 
(see Haupt and Haupt (2004)) that compares the 47′ of each parent one by one and 
flips the 47′ in the offspring according to a probability parameter (0.5 in our case) 
from 0 to 1 or 1 to 0. To protect the genetic algorithm method from fixing on a local 
optimum random mutation is added to the solution vectors, a mutation parameter of 
0.001 is used such that approximately 1 47 in every 1000 is flipped.  
 
 
Parameters for multi round 
negotiation 
 
Set: delay cost (cost of negotiation) 
Set: maximum number of rounds of negotiation 
 
Start Solved by backwards induction so start at the maximum 
number of rounds of negotiation and subtract the delay costs 
from the budgets of the buyers. 
1. Initialisation The ‘population’ of leader choices is randomised for the first 
iteration. 
2. Fitness The follower moves second optimising their objective 
subject to the leaders moves. 
3. Selection The solutions are ranked according to the benefit to the 
leader and the top 50% are kept with the bottom 50% 
discarded. 
4. Crossover A new generation of populations are created by recombining 
the 4∗’s of two parent solution sets. In addition, the top 
performing population is carried over intact to the new 
generation. 
5. Mutation A mutation operator randomly flips 47s  from ones to zeros 
and zeros to ones. A mutation parameter of 0.001 is used 
such that approximately 1 47 in every 1000 is flipped. 
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6. Feasibility If the populations are infeasible in that they do not meet the 
budget constraint of the problem then they are replaced by a 
randomly generated population that does meet the budget 
constraint.   
7. Update population  The population of leader choices is updated. 
8. Iterate until conversion The process repeats until the genetic algorithm reaches 
convergence in that no improvements in the objective value 
is observed for a certain number of iterations (in our case 50 
iterations). 
Next round of negotiation • Leader becomes the Follower and vice versa 
• Add the increment of the delay cost, c, to the budget of 
both buyers. 
• Include the constraint that the leader must offer the 
follower at least the amount they would have received 
as leader in the previous round. 
Stop Since backwards induction is employed the process stops 
when all rounds of negotiation have been solved. 
Table 2.3. Genetic algorithm for non-cooperative multi-round bargaining. 
Fully cooperative decision making 
In the final multiple-purchaser decision making problem we imagine full cooperation 
between the buyers. In this problem the buyers give up control of their decisions to a 
trusted third party who jointly optimises the objectives of both buyers. Recall, that 
while our two buyers both receive benefits from the same change in land-management 
practices, they gain those benefits from the impact those changes have on two different 
ecosystems services and in different quantities. One way in which the trade-offs among 
ecosystem service benefits can be illustrated is using the production possibilities 
frontier (Nalle, et al. 2004; Kline and Mazzotta 2012; Lester et al. 2013). The 
production possibilities frontier shows the combinations of ecosystem services that can 
be produced on a landscape given the landscape’s capacity for production. The 
capacity depends on physical features such as the size, also the existing land-use 
patterns and the spatial characteristics and interactions.  
The production possibilities frontier combines the complex relationship between the 
production of one ecosystem service in terms of the production of another ecosystem 
service. In Figure 2.2, we show an example with two ecosystem services (I) and (II). 
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The production possibilities frontier traces out the limit of the joint production of both 
ecosystem services given a fixed set of inputs and technology. In Figure 2.2 any point 
inwards (to the left) of the production possibilities frontier is an achievable 
combination of the production of the two ecosystem services and any point outwards 
(to the right) of the production possibilities frontier is unattainable given a fixed set of 
inputs. In our case, the set of achievable combinations of production is defined by the 
set of all possible configurations of land parcels on which the two buyers could fund 
land-management changes within the limits set by their constraints.  
 
Figure 2.2. Example of joint production possibilities frontier for ecosystem 
services. 
Point (a) in figure 2.2 represents the ecosystem service levels enjoyed by each buyer 
under some current funding allocation resulting in a particular landscape 
configuration. Pareto-improving outcomes would be ones that lead to landscapes that 
provide greater production of both ecosystem service (I) and ecosystem service (II). 
From point (a) anywhere within the dotted lines provides a Pareto-improvement and 
the ideal outcome would be to move onto the production possibility frontier itself.  
The frontier itself is based on a fixed set of resource inputs and a fixed level of 
technology, if those inputs or technology are changed, for example, by a buyer 
increasing their budget so they can pay for more land parcels then the frontier can shift 
(outwards for increasing inputs and inwards for decreasing inputs).  
The frontier can also be defined by its shape, which describes the relationship between 
the production of the two ecosystem services, for a review of the different possible 
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shapes in the context of marine ecosystem services see Box 1 in Lester et al. (2013).26 
The three frontier shapes most widely discussed are (i) a direct trade-off, (ii) a concave 
trade-off and (iii) a convex trade-off. A direct trade-off between the two ecosystem 
services results in a linear production possibilities frontier, in that situation a land-use 
pattern that increases the provisioning of one service results in a proportional decrease 
of the other service, with no diminishing returns. A concave frontier, as in Figure 2.2, 
means that although there is a trade-off, there are scenarios that increase the delivery 
of one service substantially without a large cost to the other service. A convex frontier 
means that achieving even a small increase in the provisioning of one service comes 
at a large cost for the other service (Lester et al. 2013). Some have also suggested the 
complex production of ecosystem services may be subject to non-convexities (such as 
non-monotonic trade-offs or threshold trade-offs), with Brown et al. (2011) showing 
this to be the case when strong positive externalities are present.  
To form the production possibilities frontier for two ecosystem services requires a 
method of joint optimisation in which consideration is given to the differing objective 
functions of the two buyers. In this chapter, we use the d-constraints method. To 
implement the d-constraints method one objective is maximised whilst introducing a 
constraint that the second objective must reach at least a certain level d, by varying d 
it is possible to trace out a whole production possibilities frontier. The d-constraints is 
given as follows:  
Buyer Problem Solution Vector 
Buyer A and 
Buyer B 
maxX@∈ z(4) . . {(4) ≥ d	∀ ∈ {1,2, … ,1} z(4) % 0 
4∗  
where z(4) is the objective function of buyer A and {(4) % d ensures that the buyer 
B’s objective value is at least the value d, with  representing the choice of one 
objective value out of 1 for the second buyer. Again z(4) represents the constraint 
set of the first buyer and the joint solution vector is given by w∗ . 
                                                 
26
 The absolute slope of the production possibilities frontier is called the marginal rate of 
transformation, it is the rate at which one ecosystem service must be given up to produce more of the 
other ecosystem service. 
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Comparing the non-cooperative solutions with the production possibilities frontier 
allows us to examine the potential for gains from the different decision making to be 
assessed. For example, if the non-cooperative solutions sit to the left of the frontier, 
then we know that a cooperative solution has the potential to produce more ecosystem 
services for both buyers with the same fixed inputs.  
2.5. Simulation 1 
In this section we employ methods of simulation to explore outcomes under the 
different types of multiple-purchaser PES institutions outlined above: independent and 
simultaneous, sequential, negotiated, and cooperative. Our simulation environment 
maintains the assumption that the PES consists of just two buyers. Both buyers wish 
to fund the same land-management change on land parcels in a landscape but realise 
benefits from those changes through increases in two different ecosystem service 
flows. In the initial simulations reported in this section, we adopt the simplest 
assumption regarding the production process underpinning ecosystems services. In 
particular, we assume that the benefit realised by a buyer from a change in land-
management practice on any one parcel is a constant that is independent of land-
management practices on adjoining land parcels. Of course, those benefits may differ 
across the landscape such that there is spatial heterogeneity in production (see Section 
2.3.2). Likewise the benefits realised from changes on a particular land parcel may 
differ across the two buyers. Indeed the key issue we explore in this simulation 
environment is how outcomes differ under different assumptions regarding the level 
of correlation in the two buyer’s benefits across land parcels. Negative correlation 
(trade-offs) occur when an increase in one buyer’s benefits comes at the expense of 
the other buyer. Positive correlation (synergies) occur when an increase in one buyer’s 
benefits causes an increase in another buyer’s benefits. If that correlation is positive, 
then both buyers will be motivated to invest in changes in the same land parcels 
through the PES, if it is negative then the two buyers will target land-management 
changes in different land parcels. 
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Setup 
To explore those issues we created a simulation environment consisting of 225 square 
parcels of equal size arranged on a 15x15 square grid27. In each land parcel 8 some 
form of agricultural production is taking place. For the purposes of providing clear 
results, we assume a single land-management change on a land parcel produces two 
ecosystem services, one is beneficial for buyer A and the other is beneficial for buyer 
B. The key consideration of the buyers, results from the spatial heterogeneity in 
benefits and therefore the difference in benefits realised at different locations; for 
example, one particular land parcel may produce a lot of the ecosystem service which 
is beneficial to buyer A if switched to an alternative land-management practice but 
very little of the ecosystem service beneficial to buyer B.  
Our simulation environment allows us to construct landscapes that offer different 
spatial patterns of benefit to the two buyers. The benefits to each buyer are simulated 
using two random draws from the standard normal distribution to create two vectors 
of benefits X and , following this we define a third vector,  = w + 1 − X, 
where  is also standard normal and  is the correlation coefficient between the 
vectors X and . The benefits across the landscape for buyer A can be represented 
by X and for buyer B,  and  can be varied from -1 to 1 to create specified 
correlation between the buyers’ benefits. It should also be noted that the benefit vectors 
are shifted such that each element is strictly positive. To illustrate observe Figure 2.3 
which depicts three different simulated landscapes that differ with regard to the levels 
of spatial correlation in the two buyer’s benefits. A coefficient of 1 specifies that the 
benefits for buyer A are perfectly positively correlated with buyer B, a coefficient of 
0 specifies no correlation, and a coefficient of -1 specifies perfect negative correlation 
between the benefits of buyer A and buyer B. In the figure darker cells represent higher 
levels of ecosystem service benefits to the buyer. 
                                                 
27
 We use a square land parcels on a square landscape of 15x15 land parcels for the simulation 
environment analysis although it should be noted that the same methodology can be applied to other 
geometric designs. As suggested by the agglomeration bonus literature using network games in 
laboratory experiments the shape of the network/landscape can affect the outcome (Cassar 2007; 
Banerjee et al. 2012; Banerjee et al. 2014). This is something we do not explore in this thesis but 
could be a topic worthy of future research. 
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 Buyer A Buyer B 
Perfect 
Negative 
Correlation 
r = -1 
 
No 
Correlation 
r = 0 
Perfect 
Positive 
Correlation 
r = 1 
Darker cells represent higher ecosystem service benefits to the buyer. 
Figure 2.3 Ecosystem service benefits to the buyers, showing three different 
correlation coefficients 
Given these assumptions, we can produce a specific form for the mathematical 
programme describing each buyer’s PES purchasing decision problem. In particular, a 
buyer whose benefits are dependent on the spatial heterogeneity of the landscape can 
be represented using an objective which maximises the sum of benefits, 7 realised by 
the buyer from funding changes on land parcels whilst meeting a budget constraint, ,  
(equation 2.14)28:   
maxX P(747)7  
. .P(|47) % ,  
47 ∈ {0,1}					8 = 1,2, … , ] 
(2.14) 
                                                 
28
 We have chosen to use a budget constrained optimisation problem although this could easily be 
substituted for a target constrained or profit maximising objective. 
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where we assume that the benefits to each buyer are strictly positive such that each 
land parcel when converted to an alternative land-management practice contributes at 
least some small positive benefit. Furthermore, we assume that the costs, | are uniform 
across the whole landscape. 
Our simulation environment was developed in MATLAB R2013a and used the solver 
CPLEX 12.5.1 to identify optimal solutions to the integer-linear program described by 
the PES purchasing problem in (2.14). Modelling the buyer’s choices as integer linear 
programmes creates complex combinatorial problems. In themselves they are difficult 
optimisation problems to solve, however, in our negotiated and cooperative multiple-
purchaser decision we introduce substantial additional complexity. In our negotiated 
decision making model we nest the integer-linear programme within a heuristic search 
method, the genetic algorithm, which is solved over a number of rounds of negotiation. 
In our cooperative decision making model we jointly optimise the objective functions 
of two buyers’ PES purchasing decisions and solve multiple times to trace out the 
production possibilities frontier. A sample of the code used to achieve the results is 
available in appendix B2.  
Results 
Figure 2.4 provides a graphical illustration of the PES-purchasing outcomes under the 
four different institutional setups. The Figure shows empirical outcomes from our 
simulation illustrating for each institution the benefits realised by Buyer A against 
those realised by Buyer B. 
Observe that independent and simultaneous decision making gives a single solution in 
which both buyers act independently. In contrast, sequential decision-making could 
result in one of two solutions; one in which Buyer A moves first and one in which 
Buyer B moves first. Finally, negotiated decision-making results in a range of solutions 
depending on which buyer makes the first offer, the number of rounds of negotiation, 
and the costs to each buyer of a delay in reaching a bargaining solution. In figure 2.4 
we visualise a selection of negotiated outcomes by varying both the number of rounds 
and negotiation and which buyer makes the first proposal. 
Interestingly, with two buyers whose benefits depend only on the spatial heterogeneity 
across the landscape we find that one round negotiated decision making in which buyer 
A is the proposer provides the same solution as the sequential solution in which buyer 
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B is the first mover. Clearly, this is a result of the simplifications assumed in this 
simulation environment. In particular, the uniform costs across the landscape mean 
that each buyer can afford exactly < land parcels, the buyers will therefore choose the < land parcels that provide the most benefits to them. The best land parcels for one 
buyer will either be common to the other buyer or not, the interesting case is when 
common land parcels are in both buyers’ best < land parcels. In that situation, one 
buyer gains an advantage from either being the leader in the one round negotiation, in 
which case they can leave the common land parcels for the other buyer and buy their 
second best land parcels, or as the second mover in the sequential decision making in 
which case the other buyer will have already purchased the common sites.  
 
Figure 2.4. An example landscape with no correlation between the ecosystem 
services, showing solution outcomes for all four non-cooperative and 
cooperative decision making problems. 
Figure 2.4: The benefits to each buyer are correlated random values simulated using the process 
outlined in the setup. 
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negotiated solutions tend to converge. For the remainder of this simulation we focus 
on the negotiated solutions over the sequential solution, however, in the second 
simulation we investigate spatial interdependence in the ecosystem service benefits 
flows such that the equivalence between the two decision making problems is no 
longer present.  
From the example results in Figure 2.4 it is clear that negotiated decision making 
provides Pareto-improving solutions when compared to independent and simultaneous 
decision making, moreover, cooperative decision making provides Pareto-improving 
solutions on negotiated decision making. For cooperative decision making, both 
buyers give up power over their decisions to a third party, by jointly optimising the 
objectives of both buyers we see a Pareto-efficient productions possibilities frontier.  
Negotiated decision making 
For each different negotiated solution that lies below the production possibilities 
frontier, cooperative decision making offers the opportunity for Pareto-improvements 
that would take the outcome to the production possibilities frontier. Moreover, if there 
exists a Pareto-improving zone, which we define as feasible solutions that provide 
Pareto-improvements for both buyers over all the negotiated outcomes, then there must 
exist solutions which Pareto-dominate any negotiated bargaining outcome. This 
distinction is important because if a Pareto-improving zone exists then, whatever the 
result of the negotiation, each of the buyers can realise a Pareto-improvement from 
participating in a cooperative mechanism. These Pareto-improving zones are akin to 
the self-enforcing properties of cooperative international environmental agreements 
discussed in Barrett (1994) such that neither buyer would be willing to sign up to a 
cooperative agreement (or indeed stay in a cooperative agreement) if they have a more 
attractive alternative option.  
Our simulations reveal that Pareto-improving zones tend to exist when correlation is 
low to moderate. In other words, when the two purchasers prioritise different land 
parcels. If the two purchasers both prioritise changes in land-management practice on 
the same land parcel, then the opportunities for Pareto-improvements decline; above a 
certain threshold in the correlation coefficient (approx. r= 0.65) we see a switch from 
the Pareto-improving zone existing to it not existing. When both purchasers prioritise 
the same land parcels (very high positive correlation) the advantages from being the 
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proposer in the negotiated decision making problem increase so that the negotiated 
solution moves closer to the frontier, as illustrated in Figure 2.5. The figure shows two 
scenarios, one with high positive correlation between the ecosystem service benefits 
and one with low positive correlation, for each scenarios two solutions are plotted 
using the results from one round of negotiation, one in which buyer A is the proposer 
and one in which buyer B is the proposer.  
 
Figure 2.5. One round negotiated solutions showing Pareto-improving zone in a) 
with low positive correlation but not in b) with high positive correlation. 
Figure 2.5: The benefits to each buyer are correlated random values simulated using the process 
outlined in the setup. 
 
As well as comparing the negotiated solutions to the cooperative solutions defining 
the frontier, we can compare the extreme (one round of negotiation) outcomes with 
each other; in other words, compare the solution when buyer A makes the only 
proposal in the negotiation to the solution when buyer B makes that proposal.  
Figure 2.6 plots, for five different randomly simulated environments, the Euclidean 
distance between the one round negotiated solutions (one in which buyer A is the 
proposer and one in which buyer B is the proposer) as the correlation coefficient is 
varied between -1 and 1. The results show that, for the negotiated solution, advantages 
from being the proposer can be observed above a correlation coefficient of 
approximately -0.4, peaking at moderately high levels of positive correlation. In other 
words, the first proposer advantage is largest when both the buyers prefer similar land 
parcels. To understand why this is so, imagine a situation in which both buyers get lots 
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of benefit from a particular land parcel, ‘land parcel z’ Now, if buyer A is the proposer, 
they know that buyer B also values ‘land parcel z’ highly and will be prepared to pay 
for changes in land-management practices at that location. Accordingly, buyer A’s best 
strategy is to allow buyer B to pay for ‘land parcel z’ whilst focusing their buying 
efforts on other valuable land parcels that buyer B will not want to fund. This gives an 
advantage to buyer A because buyer B will pay for the land-management change on 
‘land parcel z’ that buyer A would have been prepared to fund. Conversely, if buyer B 
is the proposer, then they get an advantage. 
Figure 2.6 also shows a decline in the first proposer advantage when the correlation 
coefficient is very highly positive, this decline occurs because the buyer proposing first 
is likely to replace ‘land parcel z’ with another land parcel that is beneficial to the 
second buyer because of the similarity in the buyers preferences.  
 
Figure 2.6. First mover advantage – measured as the Euclidean distance 
between the one round negotiated solutions (solution one is buyer A as the 
leader and solution two is buyer B as the leader).  
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Cooperative decision making 
Figure 2.7 builds on information in Figure 2.4 on the production possibilities frontier, 
specifically it shows the production possibilities frontier for ecosystem service benefits 
as the correlation coefficient (r) is varied between 1 and -1.  
The first thing to notice is that the frontiers do not reach the axes, this results from 
modelling all the benefits as strictly positive, so even using all the fixed resources to 
maximise buyer A’s benefits leads to buyer B receiving some positive benefits. Figure 
2.7 also shows differences in the shape of the frontier as the correlation is varied. When 
the benefits are perfectly negatively correlated (r= -1) the rate at which buyer A’s 
benefits have to be given up for buyer B’s benefits is constant and we see a straight 
line on Figure 2.7. The shape of that production possibilities frontier follows from the 
assumptions of our simulated environment. Specifically, as the cost of each land parcel 
is uniform across the landscape, the only important factor for the buyers in choosing 
where to pay for land-management changes is the benefits. For example, imagine the 
best we could do for buyer B in a cooperative institution is to use the combined budget 
to purchase the top p parcels on their ordered list, which as a result of perfect negative 
correlation will also constitute the worst p parcels on buyer A’s list. To construct the 
production possibilities frontier, we would then wish to increment buyer A’s benefit 
while maximising the benefits realised by buyer B. Given each land parcel can be 
funded at constant cost, that would mean choosing the land parcel one position up 
buyer A’s ordered list, which (because of perfect negative correlation) is also one 
position down buyer B’s ordered list. It follows that each time we perform this 
calculation we add a constant to buyer A’s benefit and take a constant decrement from 
buyer B’s benefit. The production possibilities frontier must, therefore, fall at a 
constant rate as we trade-off buyer B’s benefit to get more for buyer A. At the other 
extreme with perfect positive correlation (r= 1) we only a single point. With perfect 
positive correlation the two buyers have exactly the same ranking of the land parcels. 
It follows that the same land parcels will be purchased regardless of how the combined 
budget is divided between the two buyers.  
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Figure 2.7. Joint production possibilities frontier with varying correlation in the 
ecosystem service benefits. 
Figure 2.7: The benefits to each buyer are correlated random values simulated using the process 
outlined in the setup. 
 
As the correlation coefficient increases from r = -1 all the way up to r = 1 we see a 
pattern of the frontier shifting outwards. Such a pattern exists because a higher 
correlation coefficient means that an increasing number of land parcels are highly 
beneficial to both buyers so that it is possible to achieve Pareto-improving joint 
production.  
Comparisons of different PES purchasing institutions 
For the final analysis in simulation 1 we look at the difference in the solutions across 
different PES-purchasing institutions; in particular, independent and simultaneous 
decision making, negotiated decision making and cooperative decision making. Due 
to the similarities in the sequential and negotiated (one round) solutions we do not 
include sequential decision making in this comparison. As a measure of difference 
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between the solutions from the decision making problems we take the Euclidean 
distance in benefits. Due to cooperative and negotiated decision making having 
multiple solutions, the minimum Euclidean distance is used29, as such the differences 
between the solution methods can be viewed as conservative. The results are presented 
in Figure 2.8 (a, b, c) which shows results from a series of five simulations in which 
the distribution of benefits across the landscape is randomly varied. The darker lines 
represent the mean value of the five simulations.  
a. Cooperative versus negotiation decision making. 
Figure 2.8a shows the minimum Euclidean distance between the cooperative solutions 
that define the production possibilities frontier and the negotiated solutions. At the two 
extremes in correlation, the negotiated solution coincides with the frontier such that 
there is no difference between the two. The solutions coincide because at perfect 
negative correlation the land parcels that offer the highest benefits for buyer A offer 
the lowest benefit for buyer B, as such the cooperative solution determines how much 
of the combined budget goes towards paying for land-management changes on land 
parcels offering high levels of benefits to buyer A and those parcels offering high 
levels of benefits to buyer B. The solutions coincide at perfect positive correlation 
because the same land parcels offer high levels of benefit to both buyers, as such the 
exact same land parcels would be paid for when the buyers act cooperatively as would 
be if the buyers were acting in their own self-interest.  
If the negotiated solution is on the frontier, negotiated decision making is Pareto-
efficient. At all other correlation coefficient values we see opportunities for some form 
of cooperative mechanism to do better than non-cooperative negotiated decision 
making. Observe that the largest Euclidean distance between the negotiated solution 
and the frontier tends to be larger when benefits are moderately negatively correlated 
and decreases as the correlation coefficient increases. At negative correlation 
coefficients, the land parcels offering high benefits to one buyer are likely to provide 
low benefits to the other buyer. As such, the buyers thinking in a non-cooperative 
                                                 
29
 For the strategic solution, we calculate only the two extreme one round negotiation solutions and 
calculate the minimum Euclidean distance from the two solutions. Although it is possible to calculate 
the whole range of strategic solutions for each correlation coefficient value the computational time 
would be substantial due to the nested integer programme and genetic algorithm running time. 
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strategic way optimise by choosing land parcels that are best for them, but these 
provide little benefits to the other buyer. In the cooperative solutions, the optimal land 
parcels are those that provide the highest total benefit, as such land parcels which 
provide a medium level of benefits to both buyers may be Pareto-improving. It follows 
that cooperative PES purchasing institutions are likely to offer greater efficiency gains 
when benefits are less positively correlated. 
b. Negotiated versus independent and simultaneous decision making. 
Figure 2.8b shows the Euclidean distance between the negotiated solutions and the 
independent and simultaneous solution. At highly negative correlation coefficients the 
two buyers have preferences for different land parcels, as the coefficient is increased 
the number of land parcels that the two buyers would both choose increases and so in 
the independent and simultaneous solution there is a high level of stacking or double 
payments. Subsequently, at higher levels of positive correlation there is an advantage 
in terms of efficiency for the purchasers, of institutions which allow buyers to think 
strategically in making purchasing decisions. 
Cooperative versus independent and simultaneous decision making. 
Figure 2.8c shows the difference between the cooperative solutions and the 
independent and simultaneous solution. The solutions are identical at perfect negative 
correlation because, as stated previously, there are no opportunities for gains from 
cooperation. As the correlation coefficient is increased the Euclidean distance between 
the solutions increases up to a peak at perfect positive correlation. The Euclidean 
distance increases at negative correlation coefficients for the same reasons as outlined 
in a.), furthermore at positive coefficients the Euclidean distance increases due to the 
double payments reasons outlined in b.).   
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a) Differences between the Cooperative and the Negotiated solutions. 
 
b) Differences between the Negotiated solutions and the Independent and simultaneous solution. 
 
c.) Differences between the Cooperative and the Independent and simultaneous Solution. 
Figure 2.8. Comparisons of different PES purchasing institutions using 
Euclidean distances. 
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2.6. Simulation 2 
In this section, we introduce a more complex simulation environment which allows us 
to illustrate how the framework outlined in this chapter can be used by policy makers 
to assess the potential for multiple purchaser markets in a more realistic situation. The 
framework set out in this chapter is very general in that it can incorporate different 
buyers’ objectives, for example objectives for different ecosystem service benefits, 
and include different constraints on those objectives; in addition, the framework solves 
a variety of PES purchasing institutions and does this over a variety of spatial 
landscapes. Here we present one specific simulation environment in which we found 
significant possibilities for Pareto-improvement through cooperative institutions.  
In this simulation environment, we again limit ourselves to the two-buyer case. One of 
those buyers resembles the buyers described in simulation 1 insomuch as their benefits 
depend on the spatial heterogeneity of benefits across the landscape; each location 
offers a fixed benefit but those benefits differ across the landscape. In contrast, the 
second buyer’s benefit flows depend on spatial interdependency, specifically the 
connectedness of the land parcels brought under alternative land-management 
practices. 
Let us assume once again that the change in land-management practice involves taking 
a land parcel out of production (or at least moving to low intensity agriculture). 
Moreover, we can imagine that the buyer whose benefits depend just on the location 
of land parcels to be a water company. We assume that the value of taking a parcel out 
of production to the water company depends only on the proximity of that land parcel 
to water courses from which the company abstracts for water supply. Likewise, we 
could imagine the buyer whose benefits depend on the connectedness of land parcels 
to be the government interested in paying for land-management changes that would 
improve biodiversity. By introducing spatial interdependence into benefits we 
necessarily create a non-linear decision problem for the buyer. We show how our 
framework of methods is capable of creating solutions even for spatially 
interdependent benefits by forming a linearised version of the buyer’s decision 
problem.  
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Setup 
Consider the same size landscape as simulation 1, 225 square land parcels arranged on 
a 15x15 grid. This time however, that landscape constitutes a single catchment with a 
river system that flows through that catchment from north to south. Figure 2.9 shows 
the landscape with cell through which the river flows depicted in blue and other wholly 
agricultural land cells depicted in red.  
 
Figure 2.9. An example water catchment landscape and river, partitioned into 
square land parcels. 
In each land parcel 8, including those that contain the river, some form of agricultural 
production is taking place. The agricultural production leads to an initial level of 
pollution entering the water system, in addition the farmland supports an initial level 
of biodiversity. Both the water company and the government are interested in 
improving on these initial levels of ecosystem services (reducing water pollution for 
the water company and increasing biodiversity for the government). Again we assume 
that cost of taking a land parcel out of agricultural production is a constant, |. 
Water quality buyer 
As in simulation 1, equation 2.14 shows the optimisation problem for the water 
company with 7 again representing the benefit value at land parcel 8; however this 
time 7 is formed by taking the Euclidean distances to the river and adding Gaussian 
noise, with mean 0 and standard deviation . The resulting 7 are shown in Figure 2.10 
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in which darker cells represent those cells with higher benefits to the water company. 
The more valuable cells are clustered around the river, with cells further from the river 
decreasing in value to the water company. 
 
Figure 2.10. Ecosystem service benefits to the absolute spatial configuration 
buyer. 
Biodiversity buyer 
To represent the biodiversity buyer we imagine an objective of creating large / well-
connected reserves, that is, contiguous land parcels taken out of agricultural 
production. A suitable method, taken straight from the reserve selection literature, is 
to choose so as to minimise the sum of the distances between neighbouring selected 
land parcels (Önal and Briers 2005; Williams, et al. 2005): 
minX PP7;474;;}77∈  
P|47 		% ,T7K  
(2.15) 
 
(2.15a) 
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where 7; is the pairwise Euclidean distance between land parcel j and land parcel k. 
The constraint ensures that the budget limit is enforced30. However, the objective 
function (2.15) is quadratic such that it cannot be simply included in the linear 
programming framework of methods outlined in this chapter. To enable this objective 
function to be included in our framework we convert the problem to a linear problem 
by introducing two new constraints as shown in the following: 
minX 	PP 7;7;	;}77∈  . . 7; 			% 47 									∀8 ∈ , ∀9 ∈ 7 , 9 > 8 
 							7; 				% 4; 
(2.16) 
 
(2.16a) 
where 7; = 0 or 1; it is 1 if land parcels 8 and 9 are both selected and 0 otherwise. The 
two constraints (2.16a) ensure the definition of the binary 7; variables, for example, 
if 7; is 1 then both 47 and 4; must be greater than or equal to 1, since they are also 
binary variables they both have to equal 1. Finally, we take the inverse of the distances 7;, and maximise, so we are maximising the sum of the inverse pairwise Euclidean 
distances in our integer linear programme for the biodiversity buyer: 
14	PP 17; 7;;}77∈  (2.17) . .															7; 		% 47 									∀8 ∈ , ∀9 ∈ 7 , 9 > 8 
 																						7; 		% 4; 
	P|47 		% ,7  
(2.17a) 
 
Now, since both the problem of the water quality buyer and the biodiversity buyer can 
be expressed in a linear programming model they can be incorporated into the 
framework of methods outlined earlier in the chapter.  
                                                 
30
 A species selection constraint can also be added in the form: ∑ 6a747 ≥ 17 , where 6a7 is a parameter 
in which 6a7= 1 if parcel 8 contains species , and 6a7= 0 otherwise. A species selection constraint 
ensures that at least one land parcel containing each species is selected and is a common method used 
in the conservation biology literature. 
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Results: Water quality buyer and a biodiversity buyer. 
To visualise the results we present the simulation landscape in Figure 2.11, 
highlighting the specific land parcels purchased by the two independent and 
simultaneous buyers and one example from both the range of negotiated and 
cooperative solutions. In the figure the land parcels paid for by the water quality buyer 
are depicted in blue, those paid for by the government biodiversity buyer are depicted 
in green, those in which both buyers paid for the same land parcels are depicted in 
yellow (these are stacked payments and are only applicable to the independent and 
simultaneous PES purchasing institution) and those in which the cooperative buyer 
acting on behalf of both buyers paid are depicted in white (applicable only to the 
cooperative institution). For the negotiated solution, we show an example from an 
institution with one-round of negotiation in which the water quality buyer was the 
proposer. For the cooperative solution we show an example which lies in the Pareto-
improving zone, as a reminder, that defines the feasible solutions that provide Pareto-
improvements for both buyers over all the negotiated outcomes.  
Figure 2.11a illustrates the independent and simultaneous solution landscape when 
each buyer acts independently. In this solution, because the buyers have not considered 
the existence of other buyers, it leads to a suboptimal configuration of land parcels 
being taken out of production. Observe in figure 2.11a the water quality buyer pays 
for land parcels along the river to be taken out of production as those parcels lead to 
the highest benefit, the biodiversity buyer however, pays for land parcels that creates 
the largest contiguous collection of sites. The biodiversity buyer does not take 
advantage of the land parcels paid for by water quality buyer; for example, the 
biodiversity buyer could have used the concentration of land parcels funded by the 
water quality buyer in the north west of the landscape to create a larger contiguous 
area of land taken out of the agricultural production than they could thinking 
independently about their PES purchasing choices. It is this lack of consideration for 
the other buyer that leads to the suboptimality of the independent simultaneous 
solution. Furthermore, the independent solution is suboptimal in this case despite not 
having any stacked payments for a single land parcel; in scenarios in which stacked 
payments exist, the independent and simultaneous solution would be even less 
desirable.  
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Figure 2.11b illustrates one particular solution arising from the negotiation between 
the buyers. The major difference between the independent and simultaneous solution 
and the negotiated solution can be seen in the location of land parcels paid for by the 
biodiversity buyer. Indeed, the figure shows the biodiversity buyer has changed the 
locations in which they purchase land parcels to take advantage of the configuration 
of the water company’s purchases. Nevertheless, the water quality buyer also makes 
strategic decisions, and these decisions vary depending on whether they are the 
proposer or not in negotiated PES purchasing institution. When the water quality buyer 
is not the proposer it simply chooses the best land parcels in terms of water quality 
(from the remaining land parcels after the government has chosen). Alternatively, 
when the water company is the proposer it chooses in such a way as to influence the 
government into buying the land parcels that are beneficial to the water company31. 
The solution shown in the figure has more contiguous land parcels in the PES scheme 
and those land parcels are located close to the river system. The contiguity of the land 
parcels taken out of agricultural production increasing the benefits for the biodiversity 
buyer, the location of those parcels also has the effect of increasing benefits for the 
water quality buyer because more land parcels close to the river are converted to an 
alternative land-management practice. We see the benefits for the water quality buyer 
increase from 309.6 to 393.2, an increase of 27%, and the benefits for the biodiversity 
buyer increase from 54 to 61, an increase of 13%, compared to the independent and 
simultaneous institution. Hence, we conclude that, for our simulated environment, 
negotiated decision making Pareto-dominates independent and simultaneous decision 
making.  
Figure 2.11c illustrates a cooperative solution sitting on the production possibilities 
frontier. The pattern of land parcels in which the land is taken out of agricultural 
production is different to the patterns seen in the negotiated and independent and 
simultaneous institutions. Since the land parcels are chosen to jointly maximise the 
benefits for the water quality buyer and the biodiversity buyer, those land parcels 
which simultaneously provide connected land parcels and land parcels close to the 
river system are favoured. The example solution presented in the figure shows the 
benefits for the water quality buyer increase from 393.2 to 420.0, an increase of 7%, 
and the benefits for the biodiversity buyer increase from 61 to 64, an increase of 5% 
                                                 
31
 Only if, that strategy provides more benefits overall to the water company 
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over the negotiated solution. As such, the solution is a Pareto-improvement on the non-
cooperative solutions and is achieved by considering both buyers’ objectives together. 
Hence, cooperative decision making, such as when the two buyers give up 
responsibility for their choices to a trusted broker working to their mutual best 
advantage, Pareto-dominates both independent and simultaneous and negotiated non-
cooperative decision making. It is interesting to contrast these results with the results 
from the international environmental agreement literature, for example Barrett (1994) 
conclude that cooperative self-enforcing international environmental agreements may 
not be able to substantially improve on the non-cooperative outcome, particularly 
when the number of parties is large. All the results presented here are for just two 
ecosystem service buyers, it would be interesting in the future to expand our analysis 
to more than two buyers and see if the Pareto dominance of cooperative decision 
making is still present or if we see results similar to the IEA literature between the 
cooperative and non-cooperative outcomes.  
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Figure 2.11. Example naïve, strategic and cooperative simulation solutions to 
the problem of simultaneous purchasing from multiple buyers of ecosystem 
services. 
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2.7. Conclusion and discussion32 
In this chapter, we have developed a powerful and flexible method for exploring the 
outcome of different purchasing institutions in a PES scheme with multiple 
independent buyers. Moreover, the analytical framework we describe can be used to 
identify optimal multi-objective patterns of land use. The general framework, which 
we have illustrated in two examples, allows important characteristics of PES to be 
incorporated, such as different costs and benefits from a land-management change, 
different buyer objectives, and importantly the spatial characteristics and dependency 
of the ecosystem services.  
We have highlighted four multiple-purchaser decision making problems: independent 
simultaneous decision making, independent and sequential decision making, strategic 
negotiated decision making, in which buyers consider how the other buyer will react 
to their spatial choices of where to purchase ecosystem services, and fully cooperative 
decision making, in which, both buyers benefits from the ecosystem services are 
optimised jointly by a third party. These decision making arrangements are not 
exhaustive of all potential arrangements between multiple buyers but instead show a 
range of decision making problems which increase in strategic sophistication and the 
level of cooperation between the buyers. Our investigation shows that negotiated 
solutions (of which there are many) Pareto-dominate the independent and 
simultaneous solution, suggesting that, as a minimum, institutions should be created 
that coordinate and facilitate negotiation between ecosystem services purchasers in a 
particular landscape. Moreover, for many problems there exist a set of cooperative 
solutions that Pareto-dominate all negotiated solutions suggesting that coordinating 
action through empowering a trusted broker to make decisions on behalf of both buyers 
could potentially benefit both buyers.  
We create two simulation environments in which to test our framework. In the first 
simulation we investigated the effect that correlation in the production of ecosystem 
services has on the efficiency for the multiple buyers using our four decision making 
problems. The results show that negotiated decision making and cooperative decision 
making provides Pareto-improvements over independent and simultaneous decision 
                                                 
32
 Further concluding remarks on all three chapters, in which we highlight potential future extensions, 
can be found at the end of this thesis. 
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making in the majority of scenarios. For each individual negotiated solution, Pareto-
improvements are possible by employing a cooperative institution for all correlation 
values apart from perfect negative or perfect positive correlation, in which they do 
equally well to the cooperative solution. For negotiated decision making taken as a 
whole, we find that a Pareto-improving zone exists for all positive correlation values 
less than approximately r = 0.65 (high positive correlation) and for all negative 
correlation values apart from perfect negative correlation. The difference between the 
cooperative and negotiated solutions is highest when the ecosystem services are 
moderately negatively correlated, in other words when the buyers tend to favour 
different locations. It follows that cooperative PES purchasing institutions are likely 
to offer greater efficiency gains when benefits are less positively correlated. For the 
ecosystem services we consider in this chapter, such as biodiversity and water quality, 
the evidence suggests weak positive correlations are fairly likely. Maes et al. (2012) 
show a link between habitats in favourable conservation status and regulating 
ecosystem services such as water quality and Chan et al. (2006) provide evidence that 
such correlations between ecosystem services are likely to be weak, their results show 
correlation coefficient of less than ±0.3 for all 21 pairs they assess apart from carbon 
storage and water storage which has a correlation coefficient of 0.58. Therefore PES 
purchasing institutions for the type of ecosystem services we consider here are likely 
to offer moderate gains. 
Our second simulation environment reflects a more complex and perhaps realistic 
situation. A landscape of agricultural land parcels and a river was created and two 
buyers imagined, one (a water quality buyer) whose benefits relied on the spatial 
heterogeneity of the landscape—sites closer to the river were more beneficial to a 
water quality buyer—and another (a biodiversity buyer) whose benefits relied on the 
spatial interdependency and configuration of the landscape—connected habitats 
provide more benefits to the biodiversity buyer. By introducing spatial 
interdependence into either the costs or benefits we necessarily create a non-linear 
decision problem for the buyer. We show how a non-linear spatially interdependent 
problem can be linearised and solved within our framework. Indeed, any buyer’s 
decision problem can be included as long as it can be represented in a linear way. 
Policy makers are thus able to use the method outlined in this chapter to study specific 
landscape configurations solutions. Moreover, the framework of methods can be used 
106 
 
by a third party broker to generate real solutions—exactly which sites to purchase and 
who should purchase them—that Pareto-dominate any solutions that could be 
negotiated by multiple purchasers thinking in their own self-interest.  
In this chapter we assume a number of simplifications to provide clear results but real 
world complications and heterogeneity can straightforwardly be included in the 
framework of methods. The framework we propose is capable of incorporating real 
world data where such data exists, for example, on the potential costs and benefits of 
providing ecosystem services. In addition, specifics of the spatial landscape can also 
be included. Throughout this chapter we have assumed that the land parcels are exactly 
the same size and shape and that they can be purchased as individual parcels, in reality 
there may be large land parcels, small land parcels and also farmers not interested in 
participating in the scheme. Although these issues add complexity, there are no 
theoretical barriers that mean these nuances could not be incorporated into expanded 
versions of the methods outlined in this chapter. We have also arranged all land parcels 
in square grids, this is clearly unrealistic, and different arrangements of the landscape 
could affect the outcomes. The use of network games in the laboratory experiments 
have shown that the shape of the network matters (Cassar 2007; Banerjee et al. 2012; 
Banerjee et al. 2014), this result is relevant for spatially interdependent benefits where 
the shape of the landscape determines which land parcels share borders with others 
and could be further explored in future research. It is also important to remember our 
analysis is based on there being a single land-management change that the landowner 
can undertake which leads to multiple ecosystem benefits. Although it may be 
common for an action taken by land owners to lead to multiple ecosystem services we 
acknowledge that our results do not necessarily apply to schemes in which a particular 
action leads to a specific ecosystem benefits or where farmers can claim property rights 
over the multiple benefit flows.  
This chapter shows that Pareto-improving cooperative solutions exist but whether the 
multiple purchasers will in reality agree to such a solution depends on the mechanism 
put in place, the negotiation process between the two purchasers, and the negotiation 
between the purchasers and the landowners. Insights into these matters are not possible 
within the methods and simulation environment used in this chapter but are explored 
in the complementary experiment on multiple purchasers in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
AN EXPERIMENTAL EXPLORATION OF MULTIPLE-PURCHASER PAYMENT FOR 
ECOSYSTEM SERVICES SCHEMES 
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3.1. Introduction 
In this chapter, we build on the work of the previous chapter on multiple ecosystem 
services buyers. In the previous chapter, we modelled the buyers’ procurement 
decisions in a range of non-cooperative and cooperative decision settings. We 
concluded that when buyers were modelled as strategic negotiators, solutions Pareto-
dominate outcomes where buyers were modelled as independent and uninformed 
decision makers. While we were able to demonstrate Pareto-improving solutions 
arising from negotiations in the simplified setting of a simulation environment, it does 
not necessarily follow that the same outcomes will be achieved in the far more complex 
context of real negotiations. To gather insights as to whether such solutions might be 
achievable in a real PES scheme and to explore the factors shaping the division of 
gains from negotiations between multiple purchasers and sellers in such a scheme, in 
this chapter, we turn to experimental economic techniques.  
Negotiation is not the only exchange mechanism that might be used to facilitate 
transactions and establish prices in a PES scheme. Alternatives include fixed prices 
and competitive bidding. The choice of mechanism for PES schemes will depend on 
the specific circumstances of any particular scheme. The procurement literature, for 
example, has shown that negotiation might be preferred to competitive bidding when 
the good(s) being procured are complex and there are few available bidders (Bajari 
and Tadelis 2001; Bajari, et al. 2009). In addition, both fixed price mechanisms and 
auctions may stifle communication between buyers and sellers, preventing the 
valuable exchange of knowledge and expertise (Goldberg 1977; Bajari, et al. 2009). 
Since the exchanges transacted in PES schemes are often complex (for example, 
stipulating the timing, locations and types of undertaking expected of a farmer) and 
sellers of ecosystem services are generally assumed to have superior information (for 
example, concerning the complexities surrounding the translation of land-management 
changes into ecosystem service benefits) negotiation between buyers and sellers may 
also play an important role in certain PES mechanisms. 
Accordingly, our experimental investigation focuses on an exchange process 
facilitated through the multilateral bargaining of buyers and sellers. The laboratory 
environment allows for careful control over the information given to the participants 
but also allows for financial decisions to be made by human decision makers rather 
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than simple programming of a computer to simulate rational decision making. For the 
purposes of clarity, our experiments involve just three parties to those negotiations: 
two buyers and one seller. By including a seller in the negotiation process buyers not 
only have to negotiate between themselves regarding how much each might contribute 
to the payment offered to the seller but they must also ensure that that offer is 
satisfactory for the seller. The experiment is conducted over a maximum of 15 rounds 
of negotiation, although each time a participant rejects an offer there is an increasing 
risk (presented clearly to the participants) that negotiations will fail and therefore no 
deal will be agreed. 
We use this experimental framework to investigate a number of complexities of the 
negotiating environment that might typically arise in a PES scheme. First, the degree 
to which the buyers offer (and the seller accepts) an amount over and above the sellers 
costs. Second, the degree to which asymmetry in the gains enjoyed by the two buyers 
from a successful transaction affects the outcome of negotiations. Here we imagine 
that one buyer would benefit more from a PES scheme being implemented. Third, the 
degree to which asymmetry in the income of the two buyers (irrespective of their gains 
from the transaction) affects the outcome of negotiations. Here we imagine that one 
buyer might be a large, wealthy organisation and that the relatively less wealthy buyer 
might be more inclined to free ride on the wealthy buyer’s contribution to the PES 
scheme. Fourth, how negotiations differ under conditions of incomplete information. 
Here we imagine that differences in knowledge exist between the buyers and sellers, 
for example the seller may know the costs for supplying the environmental output but 
the buyers might not. Finally, how negotiations evolve when the benefits enjoyed by 
the buyers from the transaction are not known for sure but are stochastic in nature. 
Here we imagine that the buyers are paying for the seller to undertake an action and 
therefore they are not entirely certain of the actual environmental output that will be 
produced, this could be due to unpredictable phenomenon such as weather patterns. 
This is a common situation for PES schemes but has received relatively little attention 
in the experimental economics literature. This chapter explores these five issues within 
our experimental framework to not only establish whether participants can 
successfully negotiate multilateral agreements in such a purchasing setting but also to 
explore how the gains from successfully-negotiated exchanges are partitioned both 
between the purchasers and between the purchasers and sellers. 
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Previous experimental studies assessing bargaining in the purchase of ecosystem 
services are limited in number and have typically involved just a single buyer and 
seller (Bruce and Clark 2010a,b) or a single buyer and multiple sellers as in the auction 
literature (Reeson et al. 2011) and agglomeration bonus literature (Banerjee et al. 
2014). In this chapter, we move beyond bilateral negotiated ecosystem service 
procurement schemes which have been successfully implemented both in laboratory 
experiments (Bruce and Clark 2010b,2012) and in real world schemes, Perrier-Vittel 
(Perrot-Maître 2006) and United Utilities UK (Smith, et al. 2013) to study multi-lateral 
ecosystem service bargaining—with two buyers and one seller of ecosystem services. 
To do that, we use the non-cooperative, alternating-bargaining setup discussed in 
Section 3.2. A general discussion on non-cooperative bargaining is followed by 
specific literature reviews of the four complexities of multilateral bargaining identified 
above. In Section 3.3, we describe our experimental design and in Section 3.4 report 
the results of their implementation. Finally in Section 3.5 we offer concluding remarks. 
3.2. Bargaining: an ecosystem services procurement mechanism  
Studying negotiation necessarily involves studying the dynamics between the two 
classes of agent, buyers of ecosystem services and sellers of ecosystem services. 
Bargaining is characterised by agents with common interests of cooperation, but with 
conflicting interests about how it is achieved and about the resulting payoffs. For the 
majority of people, businesses and organisations, bargaining is a commonplace 
activity. Numerous day to day tasks either at home or in the workplace involve 
bargaining, companies are frequently bargaining to get the best prices or wages, and 
the policies that emerge from political parties or governments are often the result of 
long and repeated bargaining processes.  
Negotiation as an ecosystem service procurement mechanism has received little 
attention despite being utilised in a variety of real world PES schemes, such as the 
Perrier-Vittel scheme in France (Perrot-Maître 2006) and the United Utilities scheme 
(Smith, et al. 2013). Perrier-Vittel purchased large swathes of farm land around water 
springs and then offered the farmers the rights to farm on the land provided they 
followed management practices that caused minimum water pollution. The 
International Institute for Environment and Development concluded that the success 
of the scheme was the result of the extensive trust building with farmers and a set of 
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mutually agreeable negotiated incentives for the farmers (Perrot-Maître 2006). United 
Utilities implemented The Sustainable Catchment Management Programme (SCaMP) 
programme between 2005 and 2010 with the aim of improving raw water quality and 
conditions for sites of special scientific interest. Through directly negotiating contracts 
with farmers a wide variety of capital items were installed to help farmers deliver 
additional ecosystem services beyond the minimum legal standards33.  
In the wider economics literature research on bargaining and its outcomes has been 
pursued in two parallel fields; non-cooperative game theory and cooperative game 
theory. Non-cooperative game theory focuses on the particular equilibrium outcomes 
that arise from some defined procedure for bargaining between multiple strategic 
agents (Sutton 1986). Cooperative game theory puts no structure on the bargaining 
procedure and instead focuses on the benefits different agents might enjoy when they 
act together in particular combinations (Osborne and Rubinstein 1994). Due to our 
interest in studying the negotiation outcomes for ecosystem services based on the 
structural rules imposed by a PES scheme we proceed to explore bargaining through 
the lens of non-cooperative game theory.  
Non-cooperative game theory considers bargaining to be fully specified by the 
procedural rules of the negotiation process. A bargaining strategy specifies the action 
of an agent at each stage of the negotiation process. The outcome of a negotiation is 
identified as a Nash equilibrium, that is to say a set of bargaining strategies at which 
no agent could benefit from unilaterally changing their strategy (Osborne and 
Rubinstein 1994). If bargaining proceeds through a pre-defined sequence of 
                                                 
33
 An additional study conducted in the Fowey river catchment, UK, recommended pursuing different 
procurement mechanisms in different situations (Day and Couldrick 2013). They recommend an 
‘Advisor-led mechanism’ (where farm advisors go out to visit and negotiate directly with farmers) for 
small scale schemes, where farm advisors have good local knowledge, and known farms are likely to 
yield positive outcomes. In contrast, auction mechanisms are recommended for large scale schemes 
where the buyers have little local knowledge.  
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negotiations then equilibria can be defined by the more specific concept of a subgame 
perfect Nash equilibrium.34 
One of the most studied non-cooperative bargaining games is the ultimatum game. In 
that game, one of the players propose a split of some surplus and the other player has 
the option to either accept or reject that proposal; if the responder rejects then both 
players get nothing. In the ultimatum game the subgame perfect equilibrium stipulates 
that the proposer asks for the entire surplus and the responder accepts, however in 
laboratory experiments the common result is that the responders are able to get more 
than the game theoretical prediction of close to zero but generally less than an equal 
split (Roth 1995). An extension of the ultimatum game is the alternating bargaining 
game which adds multiple stages of offer and counter-offer. In a two round version, 
player 1 makes a proposal and player 2 can accept or reject. If player 2 accepts, the 
game ends, if they reject, then player 2 gets to make a counter-offer. With any finite 
number of rounds the unique subgame perfect equilibrium is one in which the player 
who is the proposer in the last round has all the bargaining power and can claim all the 
surplus. One way in which the alternating bargaining game differs from reality, 
however, is that it fails to recognise that bargaining is itself costly. Stahl’s bargaining 
model (Stahl 1972) captures that complication through adding a cost to each stage of 
a negotiation, a structure that Rubinstein (1982) extended to a game with infinite 
possible rounds of negotiation. These models show that when negotiation is costly a 
subgame perfect equilibrium of the game is achieved in which a more equitable split 
of the surplus is agreed upon in the first round of negotiation. The intuition here is that 
Player 1 is better off proposing a fairer division of the full surplus in the first round 
than holding out for the possibility of a larger share of a diminished surplus later in the 
negotiations. Rubinstein’s model was later generalised to 2 ≥ 3 players by Herrero 
(1985) but the uniqueness of the subgame perfect equilibrium disappears, a result 
which is relevant here as more than two participants are likely for all PES.  
The alternating bargaining game is employed in our experimental design and in the 
following sections we discuss existing experimental literature particularly relevant to 
                                                 
34
 The strategies chosen by all players are said to be a Nash equilibrium if no one could benefit from 
unilaterally changing their strategy, the subgame perfect equilibrium expands this concept to all 
subgames of an extended form game. 
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this experimental investigation, namely, heterogeneous purchasers, in terms of 
asymmetries in benefits inside and outside of a deal, incomplete information, 
stochastic payoffs and multilateral bargaining.  
3.2.1. Heterogeneous purchasers 
In a multi-purchaser PES scheme, buyers are unlikely to be homogeneous. For 
example, organisations may differ in terms of the size of the benefit they stand to gain 
from participating in the scheme. Likewise, organisations may differ in terms of their 
relative size as measured, say, by their wealth or the income they gain from activities 
outside the PES scheme. As a motivating example, imagine the difference between a 
small environmental NGO interested in river ecology and a large water company 
concerned with the quality of raw water abstracted for water supply. Both 
organisations would benefit from a PES reducing diffuse agricultural pollution, but the 
absolute size of those benefits may differ across the two organisations, likewise the 
size of those benefits relative to each organisations income may differ. Since such 
disparities may be common in multi-purchaser PES schemes, we are interested to 
explore how heterogeneity in purchasers impacts on the outcome of bargaining. 
Such disparities have been extensively examined, under a bilateral negotiation 
framework in the experimental bargaining literature since (Rubinstein 1982) proposed 
his model, summaries can be found in (Roth 1995; Camerer 2003; Zwick and Mak 
2012). This literature has been defined by experimental behavioural observations that 
often deviate from game theoretical predictions but sometimes come close to those 
predictions. Zwick and Mak (2012) categorise this debate in terms of “gaming” and 
“fairness”. As an example, imagine both parties know that one of the negotiators has 
an advantage, the negotiator with an advantage will try to exploit the advantage 
(gaming tendencies); conversely, the disadvantaged negotiator will exhibit fairness 
tendencies. They propose that the failure of theoretic predictions can be explained by 
three principles: firstly, the same negotiator can be both self-centred (“gamesman”), 
or inequity averse (“fairman”) depending on the context; secondly, the source of the 
bargaining advantage matters; and thirdly, when fairness has a price, the higher the 
price, the lower the demand for fairness.  
Zwick and Mak (2012) identify characteristics of the negotiation environment to 
explain why game theoretic predictions work well in some cases but not in others. In 
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particular, they propose that if advantages are gained through intrinsic characteristics 
(the characteristic of the negotiator) rather than extrinsic (the characteristics of the 
negotiation procedure) the advantages are more readily exploitable and the results are 
more likely to approximate the game theoretic predictions. Intrinsic characteristics are 
those that the negotiator brings to the table, for example their gains from a deal, or 
their time preferences (patience). On the other hand, extrinsic characteristics are the 
characteristics of the negotiation procedure, such as being the first or the last to make 
a proposal. Zwick and Mak (2012) also propose that demand for fairness is subject to 
some form of cost-benefit evaluation undertaken by the actors involved. With 
heterogeneous negotiators, the degree to which advantaged negotiators attempt to 
exploit their advantage depends on their cost and the degree to which disadvantaged 
negotiators attempt to achieve fairness depends on their cost, in other words, the higher 
their costs the less extreme their demands (Zwick and Chen 1999). 
Although negotiations with heterogeneous subject characteristics have been heavily 
studied this has not been extended to multilateral negotiation environments relevant to 
multiple-purchaser PES schemes. Nevertheless, the vast experimental literature 
suggests that the level of gaming or fairness in the results could be influenced by the 
heterogeneous characteristic of negotiation, such as the size of the gains they stand to 
receive if a deal is agreed or the size of the payoff relating to the ‘outside option’ (the 
amount a player could receive if negotiations break down or they elect to exit 
negotiations).  
3.2.2. Incomplete information 
It seems likely that a real world multi-purchaser PES scheme will be characterised by 
information asymmetries. Compared to the purchasers, the seller of an ecosystem 
service will have a greater certainty of the opportunity cost they incur in providing that 
service and hence the minimum price they are willing to accept to participate in the 
scheme (Salzman 2005). In a similar manner, the exact amounts that different 
purchasers are willing to pay for ecosystem services and the value of their default 
payment is information known only to them (Ferraro 2008).  
Asymmetries in information fundamentally change the negotiation dynamic. With 
incomplete information players can strategically manipulate their offers and responses 
to offers in an attempt to impart themselves with an advantage. For example a player 
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may reject a favourable offer in order to signal high patience, a strong bargaining 
position or a large outside option. Ultimately, such strategizing may lead to less 
efficiency in bargaining outcomes (Kennan and Wilson 1993).  
Bargaining games with incomplete information can be one-sided or two-sided. In one-
sided incomplete information one of the players has private information but the other 
player’s information is public. In addition to theoretical work (a summary can be found 
in Ausubel, Cramton and Deneckere (2002)) there is a large literature on experimental 
studies of incomplete information in bargaining protocols (summaries can be found in 
Roth (1995) and Camerer (2003). Once again the majority of studies use the ultimatum 
game format. For example, Croson (1996) conducted a one-sided incomplete 
information ultimatum game to contrast with a full information treatment, showing 
that varying the information given to the responder affected both the offers made and 
the demands made by the responder. In the treatment conducted in dollars, under 
incomplete information offers made were smaller, in the treatment conducted in 
percentage, under incomplete information demands were higher. The general 
conclusion from incomplete information ultimatum games is that offers are 
significantly lower and the responders accept lower offers (Guth, et al. 1996; Rapoport, 
et al. 1996; Croson, et al. 2003; Schmitt 2004). Shupp et al. (2013) explore the effect 
of incomplete information on multilateral bargaining using alternating bargaining. 
They find that incomplete information increases bargaining delay and the likelihood 
of failed agreements. 
Experimental evidence focused on ecosystem services includes Bruce and Clark 
(2010b,2010a) who study bargaining between two stakeholders using an axiomatic, 
cooperative bargaining approach, where bargaining happens in continuous time. The 
experiment found that subjects were able to reach an agreement that was Pareto-
efficient compared to a disagreement payoff. Bruce and Clark (2012) expand on that 
work to include incomplete information treatments, in which the players only know 
their own payoffs and not the other player’s payoffs. They found that with incomplete 
information, Pareto-efficient deals were almost as likely as with full information. 
However, for agglomeration bonus schemes, where the aim is to induce adjacent 
landowners to coordinate for the production of ecosystem services, Banerjee et al. 
(2014) found that if subjects were informed about their neighbours actions then 
socially optimal outcomes were more likely.  
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3.2.3. Stochastic payoffs 
In reality, the level of ecosystem service benefits enjoyed by the buyers when a seller 
takes a particular action may not be certain. For example, the size of benefits delivered 
by a scheme paying farmers to change land-management practices may be determined 
by unpredictable phenomenon such as weather patterns (Latacz-Lohmann and 
Schilizzi 2005). Indeed, natural processes may mediate the relationship between land-
management change and service flow in such a way that the benefits realised by paying 
for the action are essentially stochastic. 
While some experimental bargaining studies (Roth and Malouf 1979; Roth and 
Murnighan 1982) introduce uncertainty into the players’ payoffs these are designed to 
induce risk neutrality in participants. There have been relatively few experimental 
studies explicitly examining the effect of stochastic payoffs on the negotiation 
procedure, one such example is (Pillutla and Murnighan 1996) who examine responder 
behaviour for an ultimatum game with an unknown pie size but a known small outside 
option ($0, $1, or $2), they find that offers are typically low and are frequently rejected. 
Furthermore, there is, some evidence that stochasticity affects cooperation in public 
goods games. Berger and Hershey (1994) show lower contributions from participants 
when payoffs are stochastic compared to when payoffs are deterministic. Dickinson 
(1998) introduced an element of exogenous risk where the public good may not be 
produced even with positive contributions and a situation where the risk decreases with 
the level of contribution. He shows some evidence of a reduction in contributions 
associated with the uncertain production of the public good. Keser and Montmarquette 
(2008) switch the situation around to assess where contributions reduce the risk of loss 
rather than the chance of gain and show evidence of a decrease in contributions with 
uncertain production.  
3.2.4. Multilateral bargaining 
The majority of theoretic and experimental evidence on bargaining concerns bilateral 
bargaining. When negotiation involves agreement by more than two independent 
agents the term multilateral bargaining is used. The literature studying multilateral 
bargaining is not as well developed; however, PES schemes with multiple buyers and 
at least one seller are examples of a multilateral bargaining situation. 
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Multilateral bargaining has been studied in the experimental literature using the 
ultimatum game (Güth and van Damme 1998; Kagel and Wolfe 2001; Schmitt, et al. 
2008). In this literature there remains one proposer, one responder and an additional 
player who is a non-responder. Using a multilateral ultimatum games with incomplete 
information, Güth and van Damme (1998) show that proposers are not intrinsically 
motivated by fairness but instead want to appear fair to the responder. 
An important element that arises with three or more players is the possibility of 
coalitions. Although coalitions between ecosystem service sellers and buyers are 
possible, we are specifically interested in studying the potential opportunities and 
barriers for multiple-purchaser PES schemes, we therefore look at a subset of 
multilateral problems which require universal consent from all parties. The problem 
of multilateral bargaining with universal consent has been studied in a range of 
situations such as biodiversity conservation, land development, international trade 
agreements and international environmental policy agreements. Lennox et al. (2012) 
study landowner’s ability to holdout for higher payments for voluntary conservation 
agreements. They show that the holdout potential for landowners is significant and that 
this could have implications for which land parcels should be conservation priorities. 
Furthermore, a contemporary series of experimental papers focus on land acquisition 
and development (Cadigan, et al. 2009; Shupp, et al. 2013). Cadigan et al. (2009) study 
the issue of “holdout” in which one player can delay a project by rejecting agreement 
in the hope of receiving higher compensation, they show holdout to be a common 
problem in a range of bargaining institutions.  
In our experiments each party has the power to delay and attempt to holdout for a 
higher payoff. Overall, the experimental design we use to study multiple purchaser 
negotiations for ecosystem services is closest to the experimental design in Shupp et 
al. (2013) who examine multilateral bargaining with incomplete information. We build 
on their work by including a number of characteristics potentially relevant to PES 
schemes; such as, multiple buyers, differing outside options, and stochastic payoffs to 
represent the uncertain realisation of ecosystem services flows from land-management 
changes. To the best of the author’s knowledge, no other study has investigated 
bargaining for ecosystem services with more than a single buyer or with stochastic 
payoffs. 
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3.3. Experimental design and Hypotheses 
Multilateral bargaining experiment 
In our experiment, three players form a group. Two of the players assume the role of 
purchasers of ecosystem services, with the third player as the seller of the ecosystem 
services.35,36 Neutral labels were used in the experiment, so that subjects were labelled 
player’s 1, 2 and 3; nevertheless, for the remainder of this chapter we shall refer to the 
two purchasers as Purchaser 1 and Purchaser 2 and the seller as the Provider to denote 
we are referring to the participants roles in the experimental setup.  
The vast majority of experimental investigations of bargaining involve just two players 
negotiating over how to split a ‘pie’. Our experiments differ from that bilateral design 
in two important ways. First, through the inclusion of a third party in the negotiations 
in the form of the Provider; and, second, the bargaining problem faced by the Provider 
differs from that faced by the two purchasers. This particular setup was chosen to more 
realistically simulate potential multiple-purchaser PES negotiations as it seems 
unlikely that the Provider would be able to specify offer amounts for each purchaser. 
As such, the Provider was offered one amount—the sum of the purchasers’ offers—
and could either accept or reject that offer but did not have the opportunity to propose 
alternative offers. 
In naturally occurring bargaining, players often alternate between offers and counter-
offers, a structure mimicked by our experiment. Accordingly, bargaining began with 
Purchaser 1 submitting a proposal to Purchaser 2. Purchaser 1’s proposal suggests an 
amount that the two purchasers should offer to the Provider, detailing the contribution 
to that amount that they themselves are willing to make and the contribution expected 
from Purchaser 2. If Purchaser 2 agreed to that proposal, then the offer was sent on to 
the Provider for their consideration. If the Provider also agreed to the payment then 
the negotiations are over and a deal is done. Alternatively, if the proposal or offer was 
rejected then a second round of bargaining was initiated. In this second round, 
                                                 
35
 Although we only have one seller of the ecosystem services it is perhaps more insightful to think of 
the seller as a single representative of multiple farmers charged with the task of negotiating on their 
behalf.  
36
 Experiment participants did not know the identities of the other members of their group and the 
members of each group changed from task to task. 
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Purchaser 2 had the opportunity to make a counterproposal. If this counterproposal 
was agreed by both Purchaser 1 and the Provider then a deal was done; otherwise the 
process of proposal and counterproposal continues until all players agree or until 
negotiations fail. Figure 3.1 details the negotiation procedure. In order to keep the 
decision process moving and so that all groups progressed at the same speed, all 
decisions, proposals and acceptances, were subject to time limits. In the event that a 
Purchaser timed out when making a proposal default contributions of £0 for each 
Purchaser were submitted; when a responder (Purchaser or Provider) timed out the 
default submission was rejection. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1. The negotiation procedure used in all experiment treatments. 
Accordingly, negotiations proceed through a maximum of 15 rounds in which 
objections could be raised either by a purchaser who did not like the levels of 
contribution proposed by the other purchaser or by the Provider who felt that an offer 
made by the purchasers was not sufficiently generous. To represent the cost of 
negotiating rejecting a proposal and therefore blocking a deal came with an exogenous 
Round 3 (time t+2)
Proposal: 
Purchaser 1
Accept / reject Proposal: 
Purchaser 2 
Accept / reject offer:
Provider
Round 2 (time t+1)
Proposal: 
Purchaser 2
Accept / reject Proposal: 
Purchaser 1
Accept / reject offer:
Provider
Round 1 (time t)
Proposal: 
Purchaser 1
Accept / reject Proposal: 
Purchaser 2 
Accept / reject offer:
Provider
Rejection – Random draw to determine if 
negotiations proceed to another round 
Rejection – Random draw to determine if 
negotiations proceed to another round 
Rejection – Random draw to determine if 
negotiations proceed to another round 
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risk of the negotiations failing37. In the experiment that risk is randomly realised by 
the computer each time a rejection is made, with odds of failure being clearly displayed 
to the subjects. Those odds of failure increased as the rounds of negotiation progressed 
putting increasing pressure on the subjects to reach a deal. 
Payments 
In a task, both purchasers and the Provider began the experiment entitled to some 
default payment. Each participant was informed that they could forego their default 
payment in favour of a deal payment, but only if all three members of the group agreed 
to that arrangement. For the two purchasers, their deal payment exceeded their default 
payment such that they were always incentivised to reach a deal. In contrast, for the 
Provider their deal payment was always zero.  
To persuade the Provider to incur the cost of forgoing their default payment, the two 
purchasers were given the opportunity to team-up and offer the Provider a payment. 
The essential challenge of the experiment was for the purchasers to agree how much 
each should contribute to an offer that was sufficiently generous to persuade the 
Provider to agree to the deal. Obviously, the most it would ever make sense for one 
purchaser to contribute to such a payment is the difference between their deal payment 
and their default payment. Though for each purchaser, the incentive is to contribute as 
little as possible hoping that the other purchaser will commit sufficient funds to the 
offer to ensure that the Provider to agrees to the deal.  
Experimental treatments 
Five key measures are used to assess differences in the experimental treatments results. 
The first two measures, success and ease of a deal, measure if a deal was reached and 
the ease of the negotiation process. The first measure, success of the negotiation, 
measures the proportion of deals in which agreement was reached between all parties. 
The second measure, ease of reaching a deal, measures the rounds of negotiation taken 
to reach a successful deal. Three further measures assess the composition of payoffs 
and contributions making up a deal. The third measure, contribution, measures the 
                                                 
37
 An example of an exogenous risk to negotiations can be seen in (Muthoo 2002) who propose that 
while two firms negotiate over how to divide the profit from the exploitation of a particularly 
technology a third firm invents a new technology that makes their existing technology obsolete.  
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payment made by an individual Purchaser’s to the Provider, in addition, we measure 
the division of contribution as the Purchasers’ share of the payment made to the 
Provider. The fourth measure uses the concept of a surplus, here we define the surplus 
from a deal as the sum of the differences between the deal payments and the default 
payments, in other words, the surplus is the aggregate gains from a deal.38 In addition, 
the division of surplus measures the share of surplus each party gained in a deal. The 
fifth measure, the level of payoffs, measures the final payoffs received by each party.  
Using the range of measurements outlined above, these experiments explore 
bargaining as a mechanism for effecting transactions in a multi-purchaser PES scheme. 
In particular, to characterise how bargaining outcomes might differ under a range of 
circumstances that might well arise in a multiple-purchaser PES scheme. 
Our experimental design features a total of 10 treatments designed to explore five 
different issues: (i) the degree to which the buyers offer (and the seller accepts) an 
amount over and above the sellers costs; (ii) the degree to which asymmetry in the 
gains enjoyed by the two buyers from a successful transaction affects the outcome of 
negotiations; (iii) the degree to which asymmetry in the income of the two buyers 
(irrespective of their gains from the transaction) affects the outcome of negotiations; 
(iv) how negotiations differ under conditions of incomplete information; particularly 
regarding the payoffs both inside and outside of a deal; (v) how negotiations evolve 
when the benefits enjoyed by the buyers from the transaction are not known for sure 
but are stochastic in nature. 
Offers above seller’s costs with symmetric purchasers (Treatments 1A and 1B). 
Two treatments are included with symmetric default and deal payments for the 
purchasers. In Treatment 1A, the purchasers have deal payments of £15 and all parties 
have default payments of £7.50. Under these circumstances, it was just cost effective 
to make a bilateral deal between one purchaser and the Provider. For example, if one 
Purchaser chose to compensate the Provider alone then it would require all their gains 
from a deal (£15 - £7.50 = £7.50) to make the Provider indifferent between agreeing 
to the deal or not. Under these circumstances we are interested in finding out if the 
                                                 
38
 For example, consider a situation in which all parties have a default payment of £7.50, the sum of 
default payments is therefore £22.50 (3 x £7.50), if the sum of deal payments is equal to £25 we have 
a surplus of £2.50, if the sum of deal payments is equal to £30 the surplus is equal to £7.50. 
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purchasers split the contributions equally. Furthermore, differences in payoffs between 
the purchasers and Provider would suggest differences in negotiating power of 
purchasers who make offers and Provider who can only accept. Under these 
circumstances, do the purchasers just offer enough to keep the Provider interested or 
are they forced to give up some of the surplus to the Provider? Results from ultimatum 
experiments show that responders are able to get more than the game theoretical 
prediction of close to zero but generally less than an equal split. In addition, evidence 
from (Schmitt 2004) on an alternating bargaining suggests that players adjust their 
offers until they find a minimum acceptable offer. 
In Treatment 1B we increased the size of the surplus in the deal by having deal 
payments of £20 for both of the purchasers. By increasing the size of the deal 
payments, we were able to explore how negotiated agreements changed as the benefits 
the purchasers realised from making a deal increased. We were interested to see 
whether deals were reached more easily or more quickly in these circumstances and 
the extent to which the Provider was able to claim some of that increased surplus by 
holding out for a higher payment.  
Asymmetry in gains from a deal (Treatment 2A). 
Treatment 2 introduces asymmetry in deal payments. In Treatment 2A, the deal 
payments are £18 for Purchaser 1 and £12 for Purchaser 2 with default payments of 
£7.50 for all three players. Accordingly, it is possible for Purchaser 1 to form a cost-
effective bilateral deal with the Provider but not Purchaser 2. Observe that the deal 
payments in this Treatment give the same overall surplus from a deal as Treatment 1A 
(sum of deal £30 - sum of default £22.5 gives a surplus of £7.50). 
In many potential multiple-purchaser ecosystem service schemes we might expect one 
of the purchasers to do relatively better out of a deal than others. By including 
asymmetry in the benefits of a deal we wished to explore whether such asymmetry 
would result in a difference in contributions towards the negotiated payments. A 
number of experiments—notably, Roth, et al. 1981; Hoffman and Spitzer 1985; Bruce 
and Clark 2010a, and 2010b—found that their subjects were drawn towards Pareto-
efficient outcomes that equalized payoffs. In order to achieve equal payoffs within our 
multilateral multiple-purchaser setup the Purchasers would need to agree to an unequal 
division of contributions. This will provide insights into whether the subjects are 
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motivated by equality of contribution, over fairness in division of the gains from a deal 
or equal payoffs. 
Asymmetry in the income of the purchasers (Treatments 3A). 
While purchasers may not differ in terms of the additional benefits they stand to realise 
from a deal, they may differ in terms of the overall level of benefits they enjoy. In an 
ecosystem service market, that might correspond to having one purchaser that is a 
large, high-profit company and another that is a small, low-profit company.  
In the experiment, Treatment 3A deal payments are £18 for Purchaser 1 and £12 for 
Purchaser 2, while their corresponding default payments were £10.50 and £4.50. As 
such, both purchasers stood to make the same gain of £7.50 from a deal. Observe that 
the total surplus is comparable to previous Treatments 1A and 2A. 
We were particularly interested in whether the difference in default payments of the 
purchasers would affect the nature of the negotiations. Two differences are important 
in Treatment 3A compared to 2A. Firstly, equalising all three players payoffs cannot 
be achieved without Purchaser 1 accepting a deal that gave her less than her default 
payment. Secondly, the setup means the Purchasers cannot simultaneously reach a deal 
with an equal division of surplus and equal payoffs. This will provide insights to 
answer whether Purchasers are motivated by fairness in division of the gains from a 
deal over equality in payoffs.  
Incomplete information (Treatments 2B, 2C, 3B and 3C). 
In both Treatments 2B and 2C the deal and default payments are identical to Treatment 
2A; therefore the deal payments are £18 for Purchaser 1 and £12 for Purchaser 2 with 
default payments of £7.50 for all three players. Two additional treatments, 3B and 3C 
are analogous to Treatments 2B and 2C but with the deal and default payments of 
Treatment 3A. The purchasers have different default payments (£10.50 and £4.50) but 
stand to gain the same amount from a deal.  
In the real world, it is unlikely that purchasers, negotiating over contributions, will 
reveal the level of benefits they stand to enjoy from a deal being done. To reflect that 
reality, the deal payments in Treatments 2B and 3B were private information; only a 
Purchaser knew what they stood to gain from a deal and Treatments 2C and 3C 
introduce completely private information, with each player only knowing their own 
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deal and default payments. Shupp et al. (2013) explore incomplete information in an 
alternating bargaining environment and find that negotiation takes longer and 
negotiations are more likely to result in failure. Contrary evidence shows that 
acceptance rates are higher with incomplete information perhaps because envy of the 
other player’s payoff is removed with players instead focusing on their monetary 
payoff rather than relative payoff (Bolton and Ockenfels 2000; Schmitt 2004). The 
experimental design employed here allows the measurement of the number of rounds 
until negotiation leads to a deal or to failure allowing a measurement of the ease of 
reaching a deal.  
Bruce and Clark (2010a) investigate unstructured bargaining under private 
information. When comparing their results to full information, they found that subjects 
were less drawn to outcomes that equalised payoffs. By including incomplete 
information in our experimental treatments the subjects are no longer able to equalise 
payoffs or to equalise the division of surplus because they no longer have all the 
required information to reach such outcomes. Under incomplete information we are 
therefore interested in any changes to the division of surplus between the parties, for 
example do the Purchasers move to equalise contributions to the payment under 
incomplete information treatments and is the Provider able to extract any of the 
surplus? 
Furthermore, we explore if subjects are undertaking some form of cost benefit analysis 
as suggested by Zwick and Chen (1999) and Zwick and Mak (2012). Under this 
hypothesis, we would expect that in Treatment 2, as Purchaser 1 has more to gain from 
a deal, and therefore also more to lose from not reaching a deal, that Purchaser 1’s 
contributes more to the payment compared to Treatment 3. 
Stochastic benefits (Treatments 4+ and 4-). 
Treatments 4+ and 4- explored stochastic outcomes. In those treatments, participants 
are faced by an uncertain future characterised by two possible states of the world, a 
and b, each of which has a 0.5 probability of becoming reality. The deal payments 
enjoyed by purchasers in these two states of the world are different. Accordingly, our 
experiment allows purchasers to make conditional offers; that is to say, purchasers 
decide how much they are going to contribute to a payment in each ‘state of the world’. 
In the stochastic treatments, therefore, the Provider receives two offers; one detailing 
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how much they will be paid by the purchasers in the event of ‘state of the world a’ and 
another stating how much they will be paid in ‘state of the world b’. In these treatments 
during negotiations purchasers and the Provider could signal to one another regarding 
which, if either, of the payments in the two ‘states of the world’ had caused them to 
reject a proposal or offer.  
Stochastic benefits are common for PES scheme in that buyers often have to enter PES 
schemes without full knowledge of the benefits they will receive due to the random 
qualities of natural processes. Of primary interest was to see if stochastic benefits alter 
the success and ease of reaching deal as well as any differences in the composition of 
payments and contributions in different states of the world. Do the Purchasers share 
the risk of the stochastic benefit between each other and is any of that risk transferred 
onto the Provider.  
The experimental design is summarised in Table 3.1. 
Implementation 
The experiment was conducted in the Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social 
Sciences at the University of East Anglia (UEA). In total 204 subjects participated in 
14 sessions with between 12 and 18 subjects in each session. The subjects were 
recruited from the UEA undergraduate and graduate populations from a variety of 
disciplines using the online recruitment system (ORSEE) (Greiner 2004). No subject 
participated in more than one session, but each subject participated in multiple 
treatments within a single session, before each treatment the subjects were assigned a 
new role (Purchaser 1, 2 or Provider) and matched with a new group. The experiment 
was programmed and conducted in the z-Tree software (Fischbacher 2007). 
The same procedure was followed in each session. All students were seated at a private 
computer terminal with no communication allowed. Instructions (see Appendix C) 
were read aloud and included a detailed walkthrough in which subjects could see how 
the tasks would progress from the perspective of all the different roles. Any questions 
were answered in private. At the end of the experiment subjects completed a short 
questionnaire on the computer. The final payments were from one randomly selected 
round and an additional £2.50 participation fee. The sessions lasted approximately 1 
hour and 30 minutes including payments. 
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3.4. Results 
Irrational responses 
In total 412 deals were completed. If we take the standpoint that it would be irrational 
for the participants to accept a deal which would make them worse off than their 
default payment; then, of the 412 deals, 47 deals can be classified as irrational for at 
least one of the participants, leaving 365 rational deals. One can hypothesise about the 
reason for the high number of irrational deals, for example, although great care was 
taken to explain the procedure, the tasks were fairly complex and required the 
participants to be engaged. In addition, the role of the subject, deal and default 
payments changed from task to task. This complexity combined with the time pressure 
which the participants were under could go some way to explaining irrational 
bargaining behaviour. A small number of participants in the questionnaire admitted to 
making a mistake due to the time pressure. It should also be noted that other reasons 
such as altruistic behaviour could potentially explain some of the deals we have 
classified as irrational. Unless otherwise stated we use only those deals which can be 
classified as rational for all players in the following analysis. 
Table 3.1 summarises the results for all treatments of the experiment and Table 3.2 
summarises the division of contribution, division of surplus and division of payoffs for 
all deterministic treatment of the experiment.    
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Treatment Information 
Default payment Deal payment Deal 
Success 
Average 
Rounds to 
completion 
Average 
Contribution Average Payoff 
P1 P2 Provider P1 P2 Provider P1 P2 P1 P2 Provider 
1 A Full Public £7.50 £7.50 £7.50 £15 £15 £0 39/40 3.3 (2.8) 
£4.78 
(0.83) 
£4.82 
(0.74) 
£10.22 
(0.83) 
£10.18 
(0.74) 
£9.60 
(1.49) 
 B Full Public £7.50 £7.50 £7.50 £20 £20 £0 39/40 
3.0 
(2.3) 
£6.20 
(0.77) 
£6.20 
(0.87) 
£13.80 
(0.77) 
£13.80 
(0.87) 
£12.40 
(1.61) 
2 A Full Public £7.50 £7.50 £7.50 £18 £12 £0 63/73 
4.6 
(3.5) 
£7.55 
(0.91) 
£2.26 
(0.77) 
£10.45 
(0.91) 
£9.74 
(0.77) 
£9.81 
(0.78) 
 B Deal Private £7.50 £7.50 £7.50 £18 £12 £0 32/38 
7.6 
(3.2) 
£5.89 
(1.21) 
£3.46 
(0.91) 
£12.11 
(1.21) 
£8.54 
(0.91) 
£9.35 
(0.70) 
 C 
Deal & 
Default 
Private 
£7.50 £7.50 £7.50 £18 £12 £0 24/30 8.2 (3.4) 
£5.70 
(1.42) 
£3.53 
(1.04) 
£12.30 
(1.42) 
£8.47 
(1.04) 
£9.23 
(0.92) 
3 A Full Public £10.50 £4.50 £7.50 £18 £12 £0 36/40 
6.5 
(3.7) 
£6.08 
(0.94) 
£3.36 
(1.13) 
£11.92 
(0.94) 
£8.64 
(1.13) 
£9.44 
(1.07) 
 B Deal Private £10.50 £4.50 £7.50 £18 £12 £0 32/41 
7.4 
(3.1) 
£5.50 
(1.05) 
£3.81 
(0.81) 
£12.50 
(1.05) 
£8.19 
(0.81) 
£9.32 
(0.84) 
 C 
Deal & 
Default 
Private 
£10.50 £4.50 £7.50 £18 £12 £0 35/40 6.2 (3.7) 
£4.84 
(0.81) 
£4.40 
(0.83) 
£13.16 
(0.81) 
£7.60 
(0.83) 
£9.24 
(1.34) 
4 
+ 
a 
b Full Public 
£7.50 £7.50 £7.50 £21 £15 
£15 
£9 £0 34/38 
5.3 
(3.7) 
£8.47 
(0.97) 
£6.42 
(0.73) 
£2.59 
(1.28) 
£1.75 
(1.36) 
£12.53 
(0.97) 
£8.58 
(0.73) 
£12.41 
(1.28) 
£7.25 
(1.36) 
£11.06 
(1.13) 
£8.16 
(0.82) 
4  
- 
a 
b 
Full Public £7.50 £7.50 £7.50 
£21 
£15 
£9 
£15 £0 31/33 
3.9 
(2.7) 
£9.13 
(1.29) 
£4.91 
(0.45) 
£0.57 
(0.72) 
£4.81 
(0.52) 
£11.87 
(1.29) 
£10.09 
(0.45) 
£8.43 
(0.72) 
£10.19 
(0.52) 
£9.70 
(0.80) 
£9.73 
(0.88) 
Table 3.1. Summary of results across all treatments. 
For treatment 4, + represents treatment with positive correlation between the purchasers deal payments and – represents the treatment with negative correlation. 
a and b represent the responses to ‘state of the world a’ and ‘state of the world b’ respectively. Averages are means with standard deviations in brackets.  
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Treatment Information 
Division of contribution % Division of surplus % Division of Total Payoffs % 
Total 
Contribution 
to Provider 
P1 P2 
Total 
surplus P1 P2 Provider 
Total 
payoff P1 P2 Provider 
1 A Full Public £9.60 49.8% 50.2% £7.50 36.2% 35.8% 28.0% £30 34.1% 33.9% 32.0% 
 B Full Public £12.40 50.0% 50.0% £17.50 36.0% 36.0% 28.0% £40 34.5% 34.5% 31.0% 
2 A Full Public £9.81 77.0% 23.1% £7.50 39.4% 29.8% 30.8% £30 34.8% 32.5% 32.7% 
 B Deal Private £9.35 63.0% 37.0% £7.50 61.4% 13.9% 24.7% £30 40.4% 28.5% 31.2% 
 C 
Deal & 
Default 
Private 
£9.23 61.7% 38.3% £7.50 64.0% 12.9% 23.1% £30 41.0% 28.2% 30.8% 
3 A Full Public £9.44 64.4% 35.6% £7.50 19.0% 55.2% 25.9% £30 39.8% 28.8% 31.5% 
 B Deal Private £9.32 59.1% 40.9% £7.50 26.6% 49.2% 24.2% £30 41.7% 27.3% 31.1% 
 C 
Deal & 
Default 
Private 
£9.24 52.4% 47.6% £7.50 35.5% 41.3% 23.2% £30 43.9% 25.3% 30.8% 
Table 3.2. Summary of the division of contribution, division of surplus, and division of payoffs across all deterministic 
treatments. 
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Result 1. Offers above seller’s costs with symmetric purchasers. 
In Treatment 1 the Purchasers’ deal and default payments are symmetric and all 
information is public. Treatment 1A and 1B differ only in the deal payments for the 
two purchasers; £15 in Treatment 1A compared to £20 in Treatment 1B.  
Observe the deal success and average rounds to completion data in Table 3.1. The 
majority of the negotiations resulted in deals being completed, 39 from 40 for both 
Treatment 1A and 1B, and those deals were completed relatively quickly, with the 
mean number of rounds to competition of 3.3 for Treatment 1A and 3.0 for Treatment 
1B.  
In our experimental design the Provider was not able to specify offer amounts, this 
was chosen to more realistically simulate potential multiple-purchaser PES 
negotiations as it seems unlikely that the Provider would be able suggest amounts that 
each Purchaser should contribute. A question that arises from such a design is whether 
the relative bargaining strength of the purchasers relative to the Provider results in 
differing payoffs. In Table 3.1 the average payoffs for Treatment 1A for Purchaser 1 
and Purchaser 2 were £10.22 and £10.18 respectively, while for the Provider the 
average payoff was £9.60. In Treatment 1B both purchasers received average payoffs 
of £13.80, and the Provider £12.40. Both treatments show a statistically significant 
difference between the Provider and the Purchasers payoffs (Treatment 1, Wilcoxon-
Rank-Sum, p-value = 0.000 and Treatment 2, Wilcoxon-Rank-Sum, p-value = 0.000). 
For the Provider, rather than being able to bargain for equal payoffs, the negotiations 
move to a minimum acceptable amount above the Providers default payment. This is 
consistent with experimental evidence from the ultimatum and alternating bargaining 
literature that negotiations seek a minimal acceptable amount for the responder (Roth 
1995; Schmitt 2004).
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Result 2. Asymmetry in gains from a deal  
Treatment 2 introduces asymmetry into the deal payments; specifically, Purchaser 1 
has a deal payment of £18 and Purchaser 2 has a deal payment of £12.  
In Treatment 2A39 our first observation is that participants found it harder to complete 
a deal; the number of negotiation rounds averaged 4.6 as compared to 3.3 in the 
Treatment 1A and 3.0 in Treatment 1B. Figure 3.2 shows the distribution of the 
number of negotiation rounds until deals were completed for symmetric deal 
treatments (1A and 1B) and asymmetric deal Treatments (2A) a Wilcoxon-Rank-Sum 
test shows deals were completed quicker in the symmetric treatments (p-value = 
0.010). 
                                                 
39
 An additional treatment was included in the study design which tested for difference in which 
Purchaser opened the negotiations. In the experiment, it was always Purchaser 1 who began the 
negotiations by making a first proposal of payments to be made to the Provider. Accordingly, it was 
always the purchaser with the higher (£18.00) deal payment that began the negotiations. We included 
a similar treatment to Treatment 2A except for the fact that the deal payments of Purchaser 1 and 
Purchaser 2 were swapped. Accordingly it is the subject with the lower, £12.00, deal payment who 
opened the negotiations. The results were qualitatively identical and are therefore reported grouped 
together with treatment 2A.  
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Figure 3.2. Number of rounds until deal completed for symmetric (1A 1B) and 
asymmetric (2A) experimental treatments. 
With asymmetry in the gains from a deal the subjects cannot simultaneously achieve 
equal contributions and equal payoffs or equal contributions and equal division of 
surplus. In Treatment 2A statistically significant asymmetry in the contributions of 
the Purchasers are observable; the average contribution of Purchaser 1 is £7.55 and 
for Purchaser 2 it is £2.26 (Wilcoxon-Rank-Sum, p-value = 0.000). Purchaser 1 
therefore contributed more to the deal but on average still ended up with a significantly 
higher average payoff £10.45 than both Purchaser 2, £9.74 (Wilcoxon-Rank-Sum, p-
value = 0.000) or the Provider, £9.81 (Wilcoxon-Rank-Sum, p-value = 0.000). Since 
the default payments for the Purchasers are equal at £7.50 equivalent statistically 
significance differences are also observable for the division of surplus from a deal. 
We have strong evidence that equal contributions are not the primary motivating 
factor in negotiations since Purchaser 1 is contributing significantly more in 
Treatment 2A than Purchaser 2, as a Consequence, Purchaser 1’s share of the surplus 
is a lot smaller than their share in terms of gains from a deal. Figure 3.3 plots the share 
of the surplus for deals agreed in the symmetric (1A) and asymmetric treatments (2A). 
It is constructed as a ternary plot with Purchaser 1’s share of the surplus on the left 
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edge, Purchaser 2’s share on the bottom edge and the Provider’s share on the right. 
Each edge goes from 0-1 which represents the division of surplus as a proportion. 
Each dot represents a completed deal and the mean division of surplus amounts 
(reported in Table 3.2) are plotted in Figure 3.3 as the solid lines. In the symmetric 
treatment both Purchaser 1, 36.2%, and Purchaser 2, 35.8%, claim a significantly 
higher division of the surplus than the Provider, 28.0% (Wilcoxon-Rank-Sum, p-value 
= 0.001 and p-value = 0.001). However, in the asymmetric treatment Purchaser 1, 
39.4%, is able to claim a statistically significant higher division of the surplus than 
either Purchaser 2, 29.8%, or the Provider, 30.8% (Wilcoxon-Rank-Sum, p-value = 
0.000 and p-value = 0.000).  
 
Figure 3.3. Ternary plot of the proportional split in the total surplus from the 
symmetric (1A) and asymmetric (2A) experimental treatments, with the lines 
showing the mean amount for each agent. 
If the Purchasers were attempting to share the surplus equally we would expect no 
differences between the division of surplus in Treatment 1A and Treatment 2A. 
Comparing Treatment 2A to 1A using average division of surplus provides conflicting 
evidence on whether the subjects are attempting to share the surplus equally. One the 
one hand, statistically significant difference is observable between the division of 
surplus for Purchaser 2 (35.8%) in the symmetric treatment and Purchaser 2 in the 
asymmetric treatment (29.8%) (Wilcoxon-Rank-Sum, p-value = 0.000); on the other 
hand, there is no statistically significant difference for Purchaser 1’s surplus 
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(Wilcoxon-Rank-Sum, p-value = 0.403) despite an increase from 36.2% to 39.8% of 
the division of the surplus. The number of deals in which the Purchasers negotiated to 
exactly equal payoffs provides additional evidence on this. In two-thirds of the deals 
in Treatments 2A (42 from 63) the Purchasers agreed to an equal division of the 
surplus and therefore equal payoffs too. It therefore looks like they are either (i) 
sharing the surplus roughly equally or (ii) agreeing a deal in which they their payoffs 
are roughly equal. Since the default payments are the same for the two Purchasers in 
Treatment 2A we cannot tell between those two hypotheses in this treatment, to 
provide further clarity we turn to Treatment 3A. 
Result 3. Asymmetry in the income of the purchasers. 
Treatment 3A provides the same deal payments as Treatment 2A, the difference is the 
introduction of asymmetry into the default payment. It is Purchaser 1 who gets the 
high deal payment of £18 and also the high default payment of £10.50; Purchaser 2, 
has a low deal payment of £12 and a low default payment of £4.50. Accordingly, both 
purchasers stand to make the same gain from agreeing a deal, £7.50; as in previous 
treatments all information is public.  
With asymmetry in the default payments the subjects cannot simultaneously achieve 
equal division of surplus and equal payoffs. If Purchasers are motivated by equal 
divisions of surplus then that would lead to unequal payoffs as the default payments 
are different, conversely if Purchasers are motivated by equal payoffs then that would 
lead to unequal divisions of surplus. Our results show very unequal divisions of 
surplus and relatively equal payoffs.  
In Treatment 3A, Purchaser 2 claimed a significantly larger share of the surplus, 55%, 
compared to 19% for Purchaser 1 (Wilcoxon-Rank-Sum, p-value = 0.000). Figure 3.4 
plots the division of surplus for Treatment 3A. 
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Figure 3.4. Ternary plot of the proportional split in the total surplus from the 
asymmetric default (3A) experimental treatments, with the lines showing the 
mean amount for each agent. 
In Treatment 3A, it was not possible for the players to achieve equal payoffs unless 
Purchaser 1 decided to accept a deal in which she received less than her default 
payment of £10.50; however, in our data we observe 3 deals in which Purchaser 1 
accepted an amount less than their default payment and everyone received a payoff of 
£10. It seems that, for some subjects, equal payoffs is still desirable despite one 
Purchaser having to accept less than their default amount. All other deals in Treatment 
3A resulted in unequal payoffs, on average, Purchaser 1 contributed significantly 
more to the payment (Wilcoxon-Rank-Sum, p-value = 0.000) but still ended up with 
a higher overall payoff. Statistically significant differences are observable between 
the payoffs of Purchaser 1 and Purchaser 2 in Treatment 3A; the average payoff of 
Purchaser 1 was £11.92 and for Purchaser 2 was £8.64 (Wilcoxon-Rank-Sum, p-value 
= 0.000). In addition, payoffs in Treatment 3A were significantly different to payoffs 
in Treatment 2A (Purchaser 1, Wilcoxon-Rank-Sum, p-value = 0.000) (Purchaser 2, 
Wilcoxon-Rank-Sum, p-value = 0.000).  
Given full information, it seems that equal payoffs is a strong point of attraction for 
bargaining outcomes. In Treatment 3A, even though both Purchasers have the same 
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gains from a deal, and therefore bring equal amounts of surplus to the negotiating 
table, Purchaser 1 contributed significantly more to the deal and thus claimed a smaller 
share of the surplus, 19%, with Purchaser 2 claiming 55%. This evidence agrees with 
previous experimental studies that found that even with asymmetric gains from a deal 
their subjects were drawn towards outcomes that equalized payoffs (Roth, et al. 1981; 
Hoffman and Spitzer 1985; Bruce and Clark 2010a,2010b).  
Result 4. Incomplete information. 
Treatments 2B, 2C, 3B and 3C include incomplete information. The deal payments 
are private information in 2B and 3B, and the deal and default payments are private 
in 2C and 3C. Treatments 2B and 2C have the same deal and default payments as 
Treatment 2A, whereas, Treatments 3B and 3C have the same deal and default 
payments as Treatment 3A. 
Our results provide no support for the hypothesis that incomplete information implies 
negotiations are more likely to result in failure. Comparing the proportion of 
successful deals in Treatment 2A to the proportion of successful deals in Treatment 
2B and 2C, and similarly 3A to 3B and 3C, using Fisher’s test of equality of 
proportions, reveals no statistically significant differences between the proportions 
(Treatment 2: Fisher exact test, p-value = 1, Treatment 3: Fisher exact test, p-value = 
1).  
Our results provide some support for the hypothesis that incomplete information 
implies more prolonged negotiation. For Treatment 2 an observable difference 
between the incomplete information treatments and full information treatment shows 
bargaining to be relatively harder; the average number of rounds of negotiation is 7.6 
in Treatment 2B and 8.2 in Treatment 2C compared to 4.6 in Treatment 2A. Figure 
3.5 shows the number of negotiation rounds taken to complete a deal for the full 
information treatment (2A) compared to the incomplete information treatments (2B 
and 2C). The results show that in the full information treatment deals were completed 
significantly quicker than the incomplete treatment deals (Wilcoxon-Rank-Sum, p-
value = 0.000). However, these differences are not repeated when comparing 
Treatment 3A with 3B and 3C (Wilcoxon-Rank-Sum, p-value = 0.516).  
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Figure 3.5. Number of rounds until deal completed for full information (2A) 
and incomplete information (2B 2C) experimental treatments. 
We therefore have some evidence to support the conclusion in Shupp et al. (2013) 
who found that bargaining was more prolonged in incomplete information treatments 
but no support for their conclusion that incomplete information led to more failures to 
reach a deal. 
Figure 3.6 illustrates the division of contributions between the two purchasers and the 
division of surplus between the purchasers and the Provider for all asymmetric 
treatments with complete and incomplete information.  
For Treatment 2 a statistically significant reduction is observable for Purchaser 1 in 
the division of the contribution from 76.9% to 63% between Treatment 2A and 2B 
(Wilcoxon-Rank-Sum, p-value = 0.000), but only a small non-statistically significant 
drop between Treatment 2B and 2C (Wilcoxon-Rank-Sum, p-value = 0.390). This 
translates to significant changes in the division of surplus between Treatment 2A and 
2B but not between Treatment 2B and 2C. Purchaser 1 was only able to capture 39.4% 
in Treatment 2A but in Treatment 2B they could capture 61.4% of the surplus 
(Wilcoxon-Rank-Sum, p-value = 0.000). At the same time, Purchaser 2 was able to 
capture 29.8% of the surplus in Treatment 2A but only 13.9% in Treatment 2B 
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(Wilcoxon-Rank-Sum, p-value = 0.000). With Private unequal deal payments the 
purchaser with the high deal payment (Purchaser 1) was able to capture a much higher 
share of the surplus.  
For Treatment 3 statistically significant reductions are observable for Purchaser 1 in 
the division of contribution from 64.4% to 59.1% between Treatment 3A and 3B 
(Wilcoxon-Rank-Sum, p-value = 0.022) and from 59.1% to 52.4% between Treatment 
3B and 3C (Wilcoxon-Rank-Sum, p-value = 0.009). These translate to statistically 
significant changes in the division of surplus between Treatment 3A and 3B, and 3B 
and 3C with Purchaser 1 moving from 19% in Treatment 3A to 26.6% in Treatment 
3B (Wilcoxon-Rank-Sum, p-value = 0.022) and 35.5% in Treatment 3C (Wilcoxon-
Rank-Sum, p-value = 0.009). Statistically significant differences are also observed for 
Purchaser 2’s share of the surplus between Treatment 3A and 3B (Wilcoxon-Rank-
Sum, p-value = 0.018) and 3C (Wilcoxon-Rank-Sum, p-value = 0.011).  
 
Figure 3.6. Division of contributions and division of surplus for asymmetric 
deal and asymmetric default treatments (Treatments: 2A, 2B, 2C, 3A, 3B, 3C). 
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Since the purchasers did not know the other purchasers default payment in either 
Treatment 2C or 3C we claim that a reasonable assumption for a purchaser would be 
to assume that the other purchaser had the same default payment as them. Under that 
assumption, we would expect no difference in the division of surplus between 
Treatment 2B and 2C because the purchasers in treatment 2C would assume, in this 
case rightly, that they have equal default payments. At the same time, we would expect 
to see a difference between treatment 3B and 3C because the assumption of equal 
default payments in Treatment 3C would be false. The division of surplus results 
support this hypothesis. A statistically significant difference was observable between 
the division of surplus in Treatment 3B and 3C (Wilcoxon-Rank-Sum, Purchaser 1: 
p-value = 0.009, Purchaser 2: p-value = 0.011) but not Treatment 2B and 2C 
(Wilcoxon-Rank-Sum, Purchaser 1: p-value = 0.387, Purchaser 2: p-value = 0.755). 
Finally, we explore the difference in the contributions in Treatment 2C compared to 
Treatment 3C. In Treatment 3C the purchasers’ contributions to the payment are close 
to equal, Purchaser 1 contributes on average 52.4% whereas Purchaser 2 contributes 
47.6%. In the absence of knowledge about the other purchaser’s deal and default 
payment we might expect the Purchasers to decide that equal contributions is fair. 
Although in Treatment 3 there is a small difference in contributions there is a much 
larger difference observable in Treatment 2C, Purchaser 1, 61.7% and Purchaser 2 
38.3%. This suggests a fundamental difference between the deals completed in the 
two fully private information treatment. One possible explanation comes from Zwick 
and Mak’s (2012) cost-benefit proposal that because Purchaser 1 has more to gain 
from a deal in Treatment 2C than Purchaser 2, they will be more willing to 
compromise and offer to contribute a higher share of the payment.  
Result 5. Benefits of the deal are stochastic. 
The Treatments 4+ and 4- are full information treatments, such that the deal and 
default payments are public information, but the actual deal benefits are stochastic. 
The key design feature that distinguishes Treatment 4+ and 4- is that in Treatment 4+ 
deal payments are positively correlated; both Purchaser 1 and Purchaser 2 get their 
higher payment in ‘state of the world a’ and their lower payment in ‘state of the world 
b’. In contrast, in Treatment 4- deal payments are negatively correlated; Purchaser 1 
realises their high payment when Purchaser 2 realises their low payment and vice 
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versa; note that even purchasers lower payment are higher than their default payment. 
In addition, the payments are designed to maintain an asymmetry between the 
purchasers; Purchaser 1 has opportunities for deal payments that are as large if not 
larger than those of Purchaser 2. For both purchasers the deal payment in one ‘state 
of the world’ is larger than that in the other. 
Despite the added complexity in the bargaining procedure, participants were able to 
reach a deal in a similar number of rounds to asymmetric full information treatments. 
Figure 3.7 shows the number of negotiation rounds until deals were completed for the 
deterministic treatments (Treatments: 2A, 3A) compared to the stochastic payments 
(Treatments: 4+, 4-). The results show no statistically significant differences in the 
number of rounds to complete a deal (Wilcoxon-Rank-Sum, p-value = 0.247). 
 
Figure 3.7. Number of rounds until deal completed for deterministic (2A, 3A) 
and stochastic (4+ 4-) experimental treatments. 
Consider now the outcome of Treatment 4+ in Figure 3.8 where deal payments are 
positively correlated across states of the world. Rather than offering the Provider the 
same payment no matter what the ‘state of the world’, the deal that the purchasers 
agree to is one where they pay the Provider more, £11.06, if things turn out well and 
they both get their high payments (‘state of the world a’) and less, £8.16, if things turn 
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out badly and they both get their low payments (‘state of the world b’). In effect, in 
this treatment the purchasers push some of the risks of a bad outcome onto the 
Provider.  
In contrast, observe the outcome of Treatment 4- in Figure 3.8 where deal payments 
are negatively correlated. In this case, the Provider gets very similar payments in both 
‘states of the world’, £9.70 and £9.73. The purchasers, on the other hand, arrange their 
payments quite differently. Compared to positively correlated case, they pay relatively 
more when they are the purchaser to enjoy the ‘good state of the world’ (such that the 
other purchaser experiences their ‘bad state’) and relatively less when they are the 
purchaser to enjoy the ‘bad state of the world’ (such that the other purchaser 
experiences their ‘good state’). Essentially, in Treatment 4- the purchasers share the 
risk of different possible outcomes between themselves rather than with the Provider. 
 
Figure 3.8. Deal payoffs and contributions from the stochastic benefit 
treatments (Treatments: 4+ a, 4+ b, 4- a, 4- b). 
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Furthermore, the stochastic treatments provide additional evidence that the 
participants are drawn to equal payoffs when information is complete. The top panel 
of Figure 3.8 shows the mean deal payoffs for Treatments 4+ and 4- are very similar 
for each participant in all of the stochastic treatment scenarios, this is achieved despite 
the large differences in the potential deal benefits (£21 Purchaser 1, £9 Purchaser 2 in 
4- a). The bottom panel of Figure 3.8 shows that Purchaser 1, the purchaser who stands 
to gain the most from a deal, has contributed much larger amounts on average than 
Purchaser 2 in order to achieve equal or near equal payoffs.  
3.5. Conclusion and discussion40 
In this chapter, we analyse dual-purchaser multilateral bargaining as a mechanism for 
procuring ecosystem services. In the real world, it is likely that multiple-purchaser 
PES schemes are going to include organisations which vary with respect to the amount 
of benefits they will receive from a successfully negotiated deal, those benefits may 
not be known exactly by the purchasers or be difficult to quantify due to the range of 
stochastic natural processes involved, in addition, such organisation may also vary 
with respect to the benefits outside of a PES scheme, such as the costs and benefits of 
an alternative. As such, we implemented a broad series of experimental treatments to 
understand the nature of bargaining outcomes under a range of circumstances that 
might characterise a PES mechanism. 
In all treatments, the Provider, unlike the purchasers, was not able to specify offer 
amounts, this difference resulted in the Provider, rather than being able to bargain for 
equal payoffs, instead negotiating towards a minimum acceptable amount above their 
default payment. This is consistent with experimental evidence from the ultimatum 
and alternating bargaining literature that negotiations seek a minimal acceptable 
amount for the responder (Roth 1995; Schmitt 2004). 
A previous multilateral bargaining study found that with incomplete information 
negotiations were (i) more likely to result in failure and (ii) take longer to reach a 
successful deal (Shupp, et al. 2013). We find no evidence to support the first claim, 
the proportion of successful negotiations was similar in all the treatment scenarios 
                                                 
40
 Further concluding remarks on all three chapters, in which we highlight potential future extensions, 
can be found at the end of this thesis. 
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presented—symmetric and asymmetric benefits inside and outside a deal, complete 
and incomplete information and stochastic payoffs—the vast majority of groups were 
able to reach agreements. We find some evidence to support their second claim, the 
number of rounds of negotiation was significantly higher in the incomplete 
asymmetric deal payment treatments (2B and 2C) compared to Treatment 2A but this 
pattern was not repeated in the incomplete asymmetric default payment treatments 
(3B and 3C) compared to Treatment 3A. Overall, as we added realism into the 
experiment through inequality in benefits and incomplete information, the number of 
rounds needed to reach a deal increased. While in our experimental framework most 
of the deals were still completed it is important to note that the increase in the length 
of negotiations could cause real world negotiations to be a drawn-out and potentially 
costly process.  
Existing studies have found that subjects were drawn towards outcomes that equalized 
payoffs (Roth, et al. 1981; Hoffman and Spitzer 1985; Bruce and Clark 2010a,2010b). 
The results of this chapter support this conclusion, given full information, it seems 
that equal payoffs is a strong point of attraction for bargaining outcomes.  
Furthermore, through varying the level of information, treatments were included in 
which the subjects could not identify the contributions that would lead to equal 
payoffs. By varying the level of information two hypotheses were tested. Firstly, one 
might speculate that with private information, since the purchasers can no longer 
negotiate to a fair distribution of payoffs, subjects might instead be drawn towards a 
deal in which the purchasers make equal contributions towards the payment to the 
Provider. Alternatively, one might speculate that even with private information if 
subjects are undertaking some form of cost benefit analysis as suggested by Zwick 
and Chen (1999) and Zwick and Mak (2012) we would expect that in Treatment 2, as 
Purchaser 1 has more to gain from a deal, and therefore also more to lose from not 
reaching a deal, that Purchaser 1 contributes more to the payment compared to 
Treatment 3. Our results support the cost-benefit analysis hypothesis. When 
purchasers have different default payments, but equal gains from a deal, the 
contributions were fairly equal, however, when one purchaser has more to gain from 
a deal, and therefore more to lose if a deal does not go ahead, that purchaser 
contributes more. We see this result even when all information is private and the 
purchasers do not know their relative advantages or disadvantages. 
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Finally, the stochastic benefits treatments provide further evidence of a preference for 
equality of payoffs when information is public. Ecosystem services differ from most 
traditional goods in that there exists an inherent uncertainty in their production. When 
paying for ecosystem services the actual outcome and payoffs are unknown to the 
purchasers. We achieved this by having a 50% chance of one outcome and a 50% 
chance of another; although we acknowledge that a continuum of potential outcomes 
would be more realistic, this was not feasible in a laboratory experiment. In the 
stochastic treatments with positive correlation between the purchasers’ benefits, the 
purchasers shared the risk with the Provider, such that in the ‘good state of the world’ 
the Provider would receive a higher payment compared to the ‘bad state of the world’; 
in contrast, in the stochastic treatment with negative correlation the purchasers shared 
the risk between each other. This pattern of payments led to fairly equal final payoffs 
between the subjects across the different treatments and different states of the world. 
In addition, the proportion of successful deals and the number of rounds of negotiation 
was comparable in the stochastic treatments to other asymmetric full information 
treatments.  
The policy recommendations from these experiments are clear. Participants in 
negotiated dual-purchaser PES schemes can reach deals that are agreeable to all 
parties in a variety of scenarios relevant to real world negotiations, including 
asymmetric benefits and asymmetric incomes, incomplete information and stochastic 
benefits. However, the nature of both the benefits from negotiation and the structure 
of negotiation leads to different patterns of response. For example, the negotiations 
seek a minimal acceptable amount for the responder (the ecosystem service seller);  
with full information, the negotiations seek equal payoffs, this includes asymmetric 
benefit, asymmetric income and stochastic benefits (when the benefits were not 
known with certainty); with incomplete information, the evidence suggests that the 
purchasers implement some sort of cost-benefit thinking such that when one purchaser 
has more to gain from a deal, and therefore more to lose if a deal does not go ahead, 
that purchaser contributes more.  
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
In Part I of this thesis we used an existing CV dataset to explore respondents’ 
preference uncertainty. Chapter 1 set out two clear aims: the first, to explore the 
hypothesis that common elicitation anomalies observed in CV studies may arise 
because respondents with uncertain preferences are required to answer as if those 
preferences were precisely-defined even when valuing complex and unfamiliar non-
market goods; the second, to develop and implement a novel econometric method of 
analysing uncertain WTP data. 
We found evidence that uncertainty alone cannot explain common elicitation 
anomalies such as starting point bias and higher WTP estimates in DC questions 
compared to OE questions. Uncertain preferences, like certain preferences, can be 
shifted up or down by the elicitation method used. The exact mechanism through 
which elicitation anomalies manifest is not yet apparent. Our study looked purely at 
uncertainty as an explanation; in reality there may be a combination of a number of 
factors which are leading to elicitation anomalies including other aspects regarding 
the form of the preferences and the idea that certain formats of CV elicitation 
encourage strategic (Carson et al., (2001)) or ill-considered responses (Poe and 
Vossler (2009), Hutchinson et al. (2007)). 
To analyse our data we made use of a multi-state semi-parametric estimator, adapted 
from the duration modelling literature of the medical sciences. Our model assumed 
that individuals transition to different states of certainty as the amount on the WTP 
scale is increased to higher amounts. For example, an individual starts out, at the lower 
end of the WTP scale, certain that they would pay and as the amount increases they 
transition into a state of uncertainty and finally into a state of certainty about not 
paying. We consider the duration model to be a step forward compared to other 
models used to analyse uncertain CV data such as Wang (1997) and Evans et al. 
(2003) and is comparable to Kobayashi et al. (2012) in its ability to analyse thresholds 
in which respondents switch their certainty about paying for a good. Moreover, our 
estimator allows statistical analysis over the full range of the WTP value distribution 
without requiring restrictive parametric assumptions. A straight-forward expansion of 
the estimator would be to include more than three states, for example, by dividing the 
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state of uncertainty into “probably would pay”, “not sure” and “probably would not 
pay”; however including the polychotomous choice responses relies on the 
respondents interpretation of the term “probably”, as noted by Hanley et al. (2009) 
this is unlikely to be identical for every respondent. A further extension to the model 
would be the inclusion of covariates such as income or experience/knowledge of the 
good, this would add to the richness of the model and allow further exploration into 
the uncertainty range. For example, respondents with larger incomes may be willing 
to pay more, shifting their uncertainty range higher up the willingness to pay scale. 
Directly asking respondents in CV surveys their WTP is one of the few quantitative 
methods available to assess full economic value (including both use and non-use 
values) of non-market goods. It therefore remains vitally important to better 
understand the reasons we consistently observe elicitation anomalies in such surveys. 
Asking people to answer such questions as if they had precisely-defined preferences 
when they are uncertain of their preferences may be one element of this, however, our 
study showed that such uncertainty could not fully explain elicitation anomalies. It 
would be interesting to explore if more experienced or knowledgeable respondents 
had narrower uncertainty ranges, perhaps because their preferences were more well-
defined prior to the survey, and if those respondents provided values that were 
procedurally invariant. A starting point might be to examine familiar goods, possibly 
in a laboratory environment, to understand if the uncertainty range is still malleable, 
or to examine experience goods to understand the influence of learning and experience 
on the uncertainty range. 
 
Part II of this thesis considered multiple buyers PES schemes. In Chapter 2 we focused 
on the issue of PES mechanism design when the activity incentivised through the 
scheme benefits multiple groups each of whom might be prepared to contribute to 
payments made through the scheme. In particular, we focused on the issue of spatial 
coordination on the demand side of the market; that is to say, the question of which 
beneficiary of the PES scheme buys land-management changes on which land parcels. 
To study multiple-purchaser PES schemes, Chapter 2 developed a framework of 
methods. The framework can incorporate different buyers’ objectives, for example 
objectives for different ecosystem service benefits, and include different constraints 
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on those objectives; in addition, the framework solves a variety of PES purchasing 
institutions and does this over a variety of spatial landscapes. 
Two simulation modelling environments were created to highlight the flexibility and 
power of the framework of methods. From these environments we are able to draw 
conclusions about the situations in which we expect a multiple-purchaser PES scheme 
to be practical. We conclude that negotiated solutions Pareto-dominate the 
independent and simultaneous solution suggesting that, as a minimum, institutions 
should be created that coordinate and facilitate negotiation between ecosystem 
services purchasers in a particular landscape. Moreover, for many problems there exist 
cooperative solutions that Pareto-dominate all strategic solutions suggesting that 
coordinating action through empowering a trusted broker to make decisions on behalf 
of both buyers could potentially benefit both buyers.  
It would be of great benefit to investigate these findings under a wide range of 
different environments and a wide range of multiple-purchaser decision making 
problems. The example we presented in Section 2.5 showed two budget constrained 
buyers, although this is a common way of modelling ecosystem services buyers it is 
just one of a number of possible combinations of potential buyers. In Appendix B we 
show how the framework can easily incorporate not just budget constrained buyers 
but also target constrained, or profit maximising decision problems. 
In Section 2.6 we presented a more complex and realistic example, in that, one buyer’s 
benefits rely on the spatial heterogeneity of benefits from different land uses in the 
landscape and another buyer’s benefits rely on the spatial interdependence and 
configuration of land uses in the landscape. By introducing spatial interdependence 
into either the costs or benefits we created a non-linear decision problem for the buyer.  
We showed how a non-linear spatially interdependent problem can be linearised and 
solved by our framework. Indeed, any buyer’s decision problem can be included as 
long as it can be represented in a linear way, however, we acknowledge that the 
practicalities of solving some decision problems may not, in practice, be a simple task, 
particularly if exact optimal solutions are required. In future work, it would be 
interesting to investigate the technical challenges of combining non-linear decision 
problems; in addition, there are likely to be further technical challenges in expanding 
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the multiple-purchaser framework to include more than two buyers’ decision 
problems. 
Furthermore, in Section 2.6, we presented an example of how our framework can also 
be used to generate optimal patterns of land use across a more realistic spatial 
landscape, this type of exercise could potentially be of interest to both buyers of 
ecosystem services and policy makers. Policy makers could, for example, study 
specific land-use configurations, producing solutions—exactly which sites to 
purchase and who should purchase them—that Pareto-dominate any solutions that 
could be negotiated by multiple-purchasers thinking of their own self-interest. The 
method presented therefore provides the groundwork for a potential policy-relevant 
practical tool for facilitating multiple-purchaser PES schemes.  
One potential avenue for future research would be to apply the framework of methods 
developed in Chapter 2 to real world data. Modelling an actual catchment with real 
supply prices and real buyers of ecosystem services. By proving the method outside 
of the test environment it would provide increased policy relevance. A more ambitious 
expansion could be to develop the framework into an optimal spatial ecosystem 
service decision making tool for direct use by policy makers.  
Inside the simulation modelling environment there are a number of potential 
expansions/improvements that could be pursued in future work. The negotiated 
decision problem is currently not solved to a point of convergence as would be 
expected by Rubinstein’s (1982) alternate bargaining theory. This is due to the 
computationally intensive nested optimisations and genetic algorithm that is built into 
the negotiated decision problem, and would therefore require a smaller and simpler 
test environment to prove the concept. In addition, the decision making problems 
modelled in Chapter 2 do not allow the buyers to offer or receive any form of side 
payment, this is an area which has been shown to be important in the outcome of 
international agreements (Barrett 1994; Barrett 2001; Barrett and Stavins 2003). 
Finally, the landowner’s costs used in the simulation environment are modelled as 
constant, this is clearly unrealistic. Heterogeneous costs can easily be included in the 
current framework and this includes real world data, where such costs exist. However, 
in PES schemes these costs are not just the cost to the farmer of providing 
environmental output, as shown in the auctions literature they may include an element 
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of bid shading where the landowner would like to make a profit, alternatively, the 
landowner may be willing to accept less than their cost if they get some benefit from 
engaging in pro-environmental land-management. One way to model the incentives 
of multiple sellers within framework of methods would be to utilise agent-based 
modelling techniques.  
 
Chapter 3 of this thesis also explored the issue of multiple purchasers for ecosystem 
services but focused on negotiation as a procurement mechanism. We designed and 
conducted novel three-person bargaining experiments in which two potential buyers 
negotiated not only between each other but also with a seller of ecosystem services to 
reach a mutually beneficial outcome. The experiments were structured as non-
cooperative alternating bargaining experiments, where two buyers alternate in 
proposing how much each buyer should pay and therefore also how much the seller 
receives. 
The experiments extend the literature on negotiation as an ecosystem service 
procurement mechanism by moving beyond bilateral negotiation to consider 
multilateral negotiation with multiple purchasers of ecosystem services. The results 
showed that the negotiation outcome is pulled around by the nature of the bargaining 
setup, future experimental work could explore the bargaining setup further. For 
example, previous experimental work from Binmore et al. (1991) highlights the 
difference between an exogenous random termination and a choice to exit 
negotiations. Additional experimental work could be undertaken using our 
multilateral ecosystem procurement setup but with participants able to opt out of the 
bargaining process and take their outside option. Giving participants the option to opt 
out of negotiation could lead to more breakdowns in the negotiation process, 
particularly if some participants view the benefits of the negotiation as unfavourable 
when compared to the time costs involved in the negotiation. Alternatively, it may 
also have the effect of increasing pressure on the proposer to provide payoffs 
considered fair to all parties earlier in the negotiation process to avoid negotiation 
breakdown.  
Furthermore, Chapter 3 showed that asymmetric benefits both inside and outside of a 
deal affect negotiation between multiple purchasers, this could be a key factor in 
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determining the outcomes of negotiation between multiple ecosystem service 
purchasers. The potential exists for future work inside an experimental framework, 
for example, taking the differences between the purchasers’ deal payments to more 
extreme levels so that one purchaser has considerably higher benefits. We could then 
test for higher contributions from the purchaser with the most to gain from a deal; this 
would add evidence to answer the hypothesis that subjects are undertaking some form 
of cost-benefit analysis as suggested by Zwick and Chen (1999) and Zwick and Mak 
(2012). 
Inside the experimental environment there are a number of potential 
expansions/improvements that could be pursued in future work. Currently the series 
of experiments lack a comparison with a treatment without a participant playing the 
role of the seller. Instead of a human seller, a control experiment could be conducted 
in which the buyers are negotiating towards a set price. Although one would assume 
that the buyers would negotiate so that they only paid that set price exactly, there may 
be interesting outcomes when the set price cannot be split evenly between the buyers. 
In the current design, the series of experiments are all set up such that the seller cannot 
propose a price that they are willing to accept. At the time of designing the experiment 
it was decided that it would be unrealistic to allow the seller to specify the amounts 
that they wanted the buyers to pay individually, however, one way around this would 
be to have the seller request a total amount and see if the buyers offer such an amount. 
Finally, as with Chapter 2, Chapter 3 could benefit from future work which included 
multiple sellers of ecosystem services. Additional experiments could be run as an 
auction in which the sellers of ecosystem services compete on the price they are 
willing to accept. 
Extra experimental treatments would provide additional realism to the multiple-
purchaser ecosystem service procurement experimental framework set out in this 
thesis, providing further evidence for the opportunities and barriers of multiple-
purchaser ecosystem service schemes. Ultimately though, expansion beyond the 
experimental techniques to other quantitative techniques may be necessary, for 
example, moving beyond three way negotiation in a laboratory environment may 
prove too computationally challenging for the participants. An alternative would be 
to move to simulation modelling; for example, simulation through agent based 
modelling would allow for numerous providers of ecosystem services and enable the 
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simultaneous study of both the demand and supply side of PES schemes under the 
same framework. Ideally, investigations into negotiated multiple-purchaser PES 
schemes would then move to small scale field trials to gain further insights of the kind 
that can only be attained through practical implementation. 
 
Overall, this thesis applies quantitative techniques of environmental economics, 
contributing methodological advances in the econometric analysis of uncertain WTP 
data from CV surveys, the modelling of multiple purchaser PES schemes and the study 
of negotiated multiple purchaser PES schemes in laboratory experiments. Being able 
to draw on a variety of quantitative techniques provides the variety of evidence needed 
for policy makers to make better informed decisions on future resource allocation such 
as the topics discussed in this thesis—the decision to invest in new coastal defences 
or the decision to pay landowners to produce environmental output.   
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APPENDIX A1 
The following appendix refers to Chapter 1 and derives the estimating equations for (<, C, F) used in the semi-parametric estimator.  
We first differentiate (1.5) with respect to ps: 
 (a) 	=		PQP 73 	 ln(<7)'(7K U +
T
K 	¢$£1 − P <7
'(
7K ¤ −	P ¢7
'(
7K <7 (A.1) 
Taking the derivative of the first element: 
	=		PQP a3 	 1<a
'(
7K U
T
K  
a represents one specific 7 for one <a. The sum of a  across all intervals and all 
individuals equates to the number of respondents who survived which we will denote 2a therefore:  
	=		 2a<a  
<a is also present in two of the primal constraints which yield: 
∂∂pa =	−	¢$			&			 ∂∂pa =	−	¢7 
After combining the equations and setting equal to zero we rearrange to yield: 
2a<a 	−	¢7 =		 ¢$ 
Multiplying through by <a provides the following equation due to the complementary 
slackness constraint, ¢7<7 = 0.  
 2a =	<a¢$ (A.2) 
Summing over all 8 where 8 = 1,2, … ,1 + 1 
P 27'(7K = ¢$ P <7
'(
7K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Hence after substituting ∑ 27'(7K  = N and ∑ <7'(7K  = 1 we obtain: 
] =	¢$ 
Finally substituting back into to (A.2) and rearranging gives the empirical estimator 
for <a (1.6). 
 <a =	2a]  (A.3) 
 
Next we differentiate (1.5) with respect to λr:  
 
(C^) = 	P¨P^5 	 ln  C^	DE31 +	C^	DE3 
J
;K
T
K
+	6^5 ln 1 −		 C^	DE31 +	C^	DE3 		© −		Pª;C^
J
;K  
(A.4) 
 P¨P^5 	 ln  C^	DE31 +	C^	DE3 	
J
;K ©
T
K  
(A.5) 
 	P¨P6^5 	ln 1 −		 C^	DE31 +	C^	DE3 		
J
;K ©
T
K  
(A.6) 
 
 −		Pª;C^J;K  (A.7) 
 
Differentiating (A.5) we obtain the following equation due to ^5	(	 = 	1,2, … , :) 
being one for respondents who failed in interval  and zero otherwise: 
P¨^5 	 C^	DE31 +	C^	DE3 
+ 			 DE31 +	C^	DE3 	−		 C^	D
E3(1 +	C^	DE3)		 ©
T
K  
Rearranging and cancelling we obtain: 
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P«^5 		 1	C^ 	− 		 D
E31 +	C^	DE3 		 ¬
T
K  
Differentiating (A.6) we obtain the following equation due to 6^5	(	 = 	1,2, … , :) 
being one for respondents who survived up to interval  and zero otherwise: 
−	P¨6^5 	1 −		 C^	DE31 +	C^	DE3 
+ 	 DE31 +	C^	DE3 	− 			 C^	D
E3(1 +	C^	DE3) 	©
T
K  
Rearranging and cancelling we obtain: 
P«6^5 	 DE31 +	C^	DE3 		¬
T
K  
Differentiating (A.7) we obtain: 
−	ª^  
Therefore, 
 
∂G∂C^ =	P«^5 		 1	C^ 	− 		 D
E31 +	C^	DE3		  −		6^5 	 D
E31 +	C^	DE3 		
T
K
−	ª^ 	¬ 
(A.8) 
Setting the expression in (A.8) to zero and multiplying through by C^ gives the 
following equation (due to complementary slackness condition of ª;C; = 0 the final 
term in (A.8) drops out): 
∂G∂C^ =	P«^5 		1	 −		 C^	D
E31 +	C^	DE3		  −		6^5 	 C^D
E31 +	C^	DE3 			¬
T
K = 0 
Rearranging we obtain: 
 P5^TK =P
C^	DE31 +	C^	DE3 (5^ +	65^)
T
K 		 = 1,2, … , : (A.9) 
By taking the C^ outside the summation and replacing the notation for ∑ 5^TK  with 25^ we obtain: 
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25^ = C^P 	DE31 +	C^	DE3 (5^ +	65^)
T
K 		 = 1,2, … , : 
Rearranging to leave C^ on the right side of the equation gives: 
25^
∑ 	DE31 +	C^	DE3 (5^ +	65^)TK 	
= C^ 
And finally multiplying the top and bottom of the left hand side of the equation by C^ 
gives the estimating equation (1.7): 
 
C^			25^∑ C^	DE31 +	C^	DE3 (5^ +	65^)TK 		
= C^ (A.10) 
 
Next we differentiate (1.5) with respect to n.  
 
(F) = 	P¨P;5 	 ln  C;	DE31 +	C;	DE3 
J
;K
T
K
+	6;5 ln 1 −		 C;	DE31 +	C;	DE3 		© 
(A.11) 
 P¨P;5 	 ln  C;	DE31 +	C;	DE3 	
J
;K ©
T
K  
(A.12) 
 	P¨P6;5 	ln 1 −		 C;	DE31 +	C;	DE3 		
J
;K ©
T
K  
(A.13) 
Differentiating (A.12) we obtain the following equation: 
PP¨;5 	 C;	DE31 +	C;	DE3 
+ 			 C;	DE3	1 +	C;	DE3 	− 		 (C;	D
E3)	(1 +	C;	DE3)		 ©
J
;K
T
K  
Rearranging and cancelling we obtain: 
PP«;5				 1 −	 C;	DE3	1 +	C;	DE3 	 ¬
J
;K
T
K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Differentiating (A.13) we obtain the following equation: 
PP¨6;5 1 −	 C;	DE31 +	C;	DE3 
+ 			 C;	DE3	1 +	C;	DE3 	− 		 (C;	D
E3)	(1 +	C;	DE3)		 ©
J
;K 	
T
K  
Rearranging and cancelling we obtain: 
−	PP«	6;5			  C;	DE3	1 +	C;	DE3 	 ¬
J
;K 	
T
K  
Therefore: 
∂G∂F 	= 	P
T
K P«	; 	1 −	
C;	DE3	1 +	C;	DE3	  −		6;5 	 C;	D
E3	1 +	C;	DE3 	 ¬
J
;K = 0 
After rearranging, we obtain the estimating equation in (1.8): 
 
∂G∂F 	= 		P
T
K P«	; 	1 −	
C;	DE3	1 +	C;	DE3	 ¬
J
;K
=	PTK P«6;5 	
C;	DE3	1 +	C;	DE3	 ¬
J
;K 		 
(A.14) 
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APPENDIX A2 
The following Appendix builds on Appendix A1 to incorporate the initial bid level 
(the dichotomous choice or open ended contingent valuation task, task 1 in Chapter 
1) dummy variables for the transition from uncertainty to certainly would not pay. In 
particular we show how differentiating our models differs when we add in the initial 
bid level dummy variables.  
 =	 L2 M	 +		¢$£1 −	P<77 ¤ −		P¢7<7 	− 		Pª;C;
J
;K7  
The only changes are contained inside the hazard function (ℎ;) which makes 
differentiating very simple.  
 
L2	(C^) = 	P¨P^5 	 ln(ℎ;) +	6^5 ln(1 −		ℎ;)		J;K ©
T
K
−		Pª;C^J;K  
(A.15) 
Differentiating (A.15) w.r.t C^ we obtain: 
 
∂G∂C^ =P«^
5
	C^ 	−		ℎ;  (^5 + 	6^5) 	− ª^ 	¬
T
K  
(A.16) 
Differentiating (A.15) w.r.t Fj∗ we obtain: 
 
∂G∂Fj∗ =P¨
⋮gi©
T
K P	;(1 − ℎ;	) − 6;5ℎ;!
J
;K  
(A.17) 
 
Include initial bid level dummy variables for the transition from certainly would pay 
to uncertainty. 
¯ =	 L2 M	 −	P ª7o7'(7K 	 
Taking logs gives: 
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L2	G¯_o7` = 	PQP 73 	 ln_ℎ°7` +	673 ln_1 −		ℎ°7`		'(7K U
T
K
−		P ª7o7'(7K . 
(A.18) 
Differentiating (A.18) w.r.t o7 we obtain: 
 
∂G¯∂o7 =P«7
3
	o7∗ 	− 		ℎ°7  (73 + 	673) 	− ª^ 	¬
T
K  
(A.19) 
Differentiating (A.18) w.r.t rj we obtain: 
 
∂Grj =P¨
g$⋮gi©
T
K Pb	73_1 − ℎ°7 	` − 673ℎ°7c
'(
7K  
(A.20) 
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APPENDIX A3 
We include here the contingent valuation survey used to collect the data for Chapter 
1. Note that question 14 varies depending on whether the respondent was answering 
a dichotomous choice or open ended question.  
 
Location of interview.................................................................................................... 
CONFIDENTIAL 
 
-Date  
-Day (circle correct day) 
1= MON 2= TUE 3=WED 4=THU 5=FRI  
6= SAT 7=SUN 
 
- Time interview started  
   (24 hour clock) 
- Time interview ended    
    (24 hour clock) 
- Weather conditions (circle the correct response) 
 (a) Sunny =   1 (c) Dry =   1 
 Broken Cloud =   2 Drizzle/Showers =   2 
 Overcast =   3 Persistent rain =   3 
 (b) Hot (>20) =   1 (d) Calm =   1 
 Warm (15-20) =   2 Breezy =   2 
 Cool (10-15) =   3 Windy =   3 
    Cold (<10)     =   4 
 - Tide Level (circle the correct response) 
    Low tide =   1 
    Mid tide =   2 
    High tide =   3 
    Not known =   4 
- Is the sea (circle the correct response)  
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  Rough = 1 
  Moderately Rough =2 
Calm = 3 
 
INTERVIEWER INSTRUCTIONS 
1. Statements and questions to be read out are shown in bold type; 
2. When recording answers circle the number of the appropriate response or fill in 
boxes as indicated; 
3. If interviewing a family group you should aim to interview the head of household. 
Hello, I am (GIVE NAME and show ID) from the University of East Anglia we are 
conducting a survey regarding the beaches at Southwold. Would you mind answering 
a few questions, it will take about 10 minutes and any information you provide will be 
kept strictly confidential. 
If willing then proceed. If not then withdraw politely and make a note of the refusal 
on the tally sheet. 
 
1. Before I start can I just check if you live in the UK or not ? 
If answer = Yes, then proceed 
If answer = No, then explain that the questionnaire is only applicable to UK citizens, 
ask for country of residence then withdraw politely and record this on the refusal tally 
sheet making a note of the country of residence. 
 
I want to show you this map of Southwold (show card 1). Now as you may know, 
here is the pier (INDICATE), here is the North beach which you may know as 
Easton Bavents (INDICATE) and South of the pier is the Town Front beach 
(INDICATE) 
 
2. Can you tell me how often you visit each of these areas (show card 2) First the 
North Beach at Easton Bavents (get response). The Town Front Beach south of 
the pier (get response) and finally the pier itself (get response). (NOTE: for 
holidaymakers ensure they do not answer 1, 2, 3 etc - all answers refer to per year 
visits, therefore holidaymakers will usually be response 4 or 5)   
 
  
North Beach 
(Easton 
Bavents) 
Town Front 
Beach (South) The Pier 
 1 = I visit at least daily 
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 2 = I visit at least 3 times a week 
      
 3 = I visit at least once a week 
      
 4 = I visit about 10 days a year 
      
 5 = I visit about 5 days a year 
      
 6 = I visit about once a year 
      
 7 = I visit less than once a year 
      
 8 = I have never visited here before 
      
  
3. On a typical trip would you visit more than one of these areas (If yes circle 
all that apply for a typical visit) 
0 = No, I would only visit one area on a typical visit (go to Qu.5) 
1 = Yes, I typically visit more than one of these areas (go to Qu.4) 
 
4. And which of the areas are they? (circle all that apply for a typical visit) 
1 =  North Beach (Easton Bavents) 
2 = Town Front Beach 
3 = The pier  
0 = Not asked (said no to Qu.3) 
 
5.  We want to find out where visitors come from, I am not going to ask for your 
full address but can you tell me your home postcode? (note that we are not asking 
for their house number so they will not be receiving any mail) 
(Get full postcode)         
 
Alternatively, if you do not know your full post code could I have your 
approximate address ignoring the house number and street name (typical 
examples are area in a city and that city name [not just city name], or village or 
nearest town. In all cases also elicit the county name). 
Village or Area within city 
               
 
Nearest town or City 
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County 
               
 
 
6. Roughly how far away is it from your home address to here? 
One way distance in miles     
Or distance in metres     
 
7. Did you set out from that home address today?  
 Yes = 1 (go to Q.10) 
 No  = 0 (go to Q.8) 
8. Are you staying with family or friends or in rented holiday accommodation 
here? 
1 = Staying with family/friends      
2 = Staying in rented holiday accommodation  
3 = Other (please specify) .................................................................... 
 
9. How far did you travel today to get here, just the one way distance?   
Distance in miles:     OR distance in metres:    
1 metre is approximately 1 yard 
 
10.  How long did it take you to get here today? 
   Hours    Minutes 
 
11. When you come to Southwold beach which of these do you do often, sometimes 
or never (SHOW CARD 3) 
 
ACTIVITY OFTEN SOMETIMES NEVER 
1. Relaxing on the beach 1 2 3 
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2. Walking the dog  1 2 3 
3. Other Walking  1 2 3 
4. Picnicking 1 2 3 
5. Fishing  1 2 3 
6. Boating/sailing 1 2 3 
7. Swimming/paddling/surfing 1 2 3 
8. Going to restaurants / pubs /cafes 1 2 3 
9. Visit local shops or arcades 1 2 3 
10. Bird / wildlife watching 1 2 3 
 
12. Which of the above, or any other activity, do you feel is your main reason for 
visiting Southwold sea front today? 
Write activity code number (FROM CARD 3/Q.10) in the following box: 
  
 
OR write in other main activity:  
.............................................................................................. 
 
13. How long in total will you spend on the seafront today? 
   Hours    Minutes 
Don’t know  = 0 
      
I now want to show you some information (show info card 1). Here again is the 
map of Southwold (indicate). At present the sea defences along the coast here are 
old and in a poor state of repair. This photo shows the North Beach (indicate 
upper left photo) where you can see the stumps of the old wooden defences called 
groynes (indicate). At the Town Front Beach the wooden groynes are also in a 
poor state of repair (indicate lower left photo). 
This has resulted in the erosion of the beach. As you can see in these pictures the 
beach is very narrow at high tide (indicate left hand side pictures) it’s actually 
considerably narrower than it used to be. 
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Government funding will ensure the sea wall is maintained to defend the 
properties in the town. However, additional defences could be put in place to 
extend the size of the beach. (show info card 1) It is proposed that new sand will 
be brought in from the sea and added to the beaches. To stop future erosion new 
rock defences would be built at the North Beach (indicate upper right photo) and 
new timber groynes built at the Town Front Beach (indicate lower right photo). 
This will substantially increase the size of both beaches as shown in these photos 
(indicate right hand side photos).  
The scheme to enlarge the beach would result in additional costs. These costs 
would have to be met from extra general taxes as paid by your household on the 
everyday things you purchase. 
In a moment I am going to ask you what is the most your household would be 
prepared to pay per year in extra general taxes to fund the beach enlargement.  
However, before you answer I want you to think about all of the following 
(SHOW CARD 4): 
1. Irrespective of this scheme, the sea wall at Southwold will be maintained 
and the properties will be protected from flooding 
2.   There are alternative beaches which you could travel to; 
3. And any money you would pay towards this scheme would not be 
available to you for other purchases. 
 
Dichotomous Choice 
14. So please tell me whether your household would be willing to pay £ ………... 
per year for the scheme to enlarge the beaches at Southwold? 
1 =  yes 
2 = no 
Open Ended 
14. So please tell me what is the most that your household would be willing to 
pay per year for the scheme to enlarge the beaches at Southwold? 
Answer £..........................................per annum 
 
15. Now I realise that was a difficult question and that you may not be very 
certain of your answer. Take a look at this card. Can you tell me which of these 
statements best describes your feelings about paying £ ………... for the enlarged 
beaches? (circle appropriate number) 
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Definitely 
would pay 
this amount 
Probably 
would pay 
this amount 
Not sure if I 
would pay 
this amount 
Probably would 
not pay this 
amount 
Definitely would 
not pay this 
amount 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
16. We are interested in finding out the amounts of money that you definitely 
would pay and those that you would definitely not pay for the enlarged beaches. 
Take a look at this list of money amounts (flick through valuation sheets to show 
the range of values).  
 
IF YES (NO) TO QUESTION 14 (DEFINITELY YES (NO)) TO QUESTION 15): 
Just now you said that you would/(WOULD NOT) pay £ ………... for the 
enlarged beaches. I’ll indicate your answer by placing a tick in the “Definitely 
Yes”/(“DEFINITELY NO”) box next to that amount. 
Now consider the higher/(LOWER) amounts on the list. (Pass list and 
clipboard to respondent). Starting with £ ………... (next highest/(LOWEST) 
amount), work down/(UP) the list considering each of these amounts in turn 
until you reach an amount that there’s a possibility you would not/(WOULD) 
pay, however small. (Allow respondent time to determine this amount). Again, 
looking at the card decide which category best describes your response to that 
amount and tick the corresponding box on the list. 
Continue working down/(UP) the amounts on the list, ticking one box for each 
amount. Stop once you reach an amount that you definitely would 
not/(WOULD) pay. 
 
IF UNSURE TO QUESTION 14 (PROBABLY/NOT SURE TO QUESTION 15): 
Just now you said that you “probably would”/”uncertain whether 
would”/“would not” (answer to Question 15) pay £ ………... for the enlarged 
beaches. I’ll indicate your answer by placing a tick in the “probably yes”/”not 
sure”/“probably no”  box next to that amount. 
Now consider the next amount down on the list. Still looking at the card, if 
the amount was (£next highest amount) which of the categories on the card 
best describes your response to that amount (tick in appropriate box next to 
amount on valuation sheet). 
Now it’s your turn (Pass list and clipboard to respondent). Work down the 
amounts on the list, ticking one box for each amount. Stop once you reach an 
amount that you DEFINITELY WOULD NOT PAY. 
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Now I’d like you work up the amounts on the list. Starting at (£next lowest 
amount) tick one box for each amount and stop once you reach an amount 
that you DEFINITELY WOULD PAY. 
 
17. (FOR RESPONDENTS WILLING TO STATE AN AMOUNT) Why were you 
prepared to pay towards this scheme?  
........................................................................................................................................ 
NOW GO TO Q.19 
 
18. (FOR RESPONDENTS  NOT WILLING TO PAY ANYTHING) Why were 
you not willing to pay for this scheme?  
........................................................................................................................................ 
19. There is an alternative scheme (show info card 2) which is the same in all 
respects except that instead of timber groynes, rock defences would be used on 
the Town Front Beach (indicate lower right hand side photo) 
 
Thinking back to the previous scheme using wooden groynes. You said that the 
most you would definitely pay for that scheme was £X. Would you also definitely 
pay £X for the alternative scheme using rock groynes rather than timber 
groynes. 
 
IF YES THEN ASK HIGHER AMOUNTS, STOP WHEN RESPONDENT IS NOT 
DEFINETELY SURE THEY WILL PAY THE AMOUNT 
 
IF NO THEN ASK LOWER AMOUNTS STOP WHEN THE RESPONDENT IS 
NOT DEFFINETELY SURE THEY WILL PAY THE AMOUNT 
 
(only tick the highest amount they would definitely pay) 
 
For zero payers in first scheme: Thinking back you said you would not pay for the 
timber groynes, would you change your answer for a scheme with rock defences? 
0 = No 
1 = Yes (if so ask higher amounts and tick as appropriate) 
 
20 . (FOR RESPONDENTS WILLING TO STATE AN AMOUNT) What is the 
main reason for your answer? 
 
........................................................................................................................................ 
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21. If Southwold had a bigger beach as described would you visit more often, 
less often or about the same? 
0 = less often 
1 = about the same (go to Qu.23) 
2 = more often 
 
22. So roughly how many more / less times would you visit each year? 
........................................................ more / less times per year 
 
23.  Now from this card (SHOW CARD 6) could you tell me which letter 
corresponds to your age group? 
LETTER AGE IN YEARS 
A 0-4 
B 5-9 
C 10-15 
D 16-19 
E 20-29 
F 30-39 
G 40-49 
H 50-59 
I 60-69 
J 70 + 
Age group (Letter please)  
 
24. Again using the same card (SHOW CARD 6) could you tell me how many people 
in your household fall into each age category. 
LETTER AGE IN YEARS NUMBER IN HOUSEHOLD 
A 0-4  
B 5-9  
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C 10-15  
D 16-19  
E 20-29  
F 30-39  
G 40-49  
H 50-59  
I 60-69  
J 70 +  
 
25. How would you classify your employment status: (SHOW CARD 7) 
1 = Full time employed 
2 = Full time self employed  
3 = employed part time  
4 = unemployed  
5 = on a government training scheme  
6 = retired  
7 = homemaker  
8 = student  
9 = other (please specify)  
26. Could you please tell me which of these letters, A to I (SHOW CARD 8), best 
describes your total household income (pre-tax including state benefits, pensions, 
interest on investments, etc.). If necessary please stress: 
a.  All answers are completely anonymous and confidential; 
b. The importance of getting an accurate reply to this question - we need to account 
for the fact that ability to pay clearly influences responses to tax and entrance fee 
questions. 
 
 
Letter 
Total Household Income (£) 
 Yearly (£) Weekly (£) 
A 0-4,999 0-96 
B 5,000-7,499 96-144 
C 7,500-9,999 144-192 
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D 10,000-14,999 192-288 
E 15,000-19,999 288-385 
F 20,000-29,999 385-577 
G 30,000-39,999 577-769 
H 40,000-49,999 769-962 
I 50,000+ 962+ 
 
INCOME CATEGORY LETTER:   
 
27. Is anyone in your household a member of any of the following groups?  
(SHOW CARD 9 Circle all that apply) 
  1 = Any sports club 
  2 = Any church/religious/charity group 
  3 = Lions/Rotary etc. 
  4 = Women’s Institute 
  5 = Sailing/ Boating Club  
  6 = Angling Club  
  7 = Beach/coastline campaign group 
  8 = National Trust 
  9 = RSPB 
10 = Greenpeace/Friends of the Earth 
11 = World Wide Fund for Nature 
12 = Other local or County nature trust, society or volunteers  
13 = Other social group (please specify)__________________________ 
14 = Other not covered above (please specify)__________________________ 
  
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR HELP 
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RESPONDENT SEX (circle number) 
Female =   0 
Male    =   1 
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APPENDIX A4 
We include here the contingent valuation payment card used to collect the data for 
Chapter 1. 
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APPENDIX B1 
The decision problems of purchasers of ecosystem services can be modelled as budget 
constrained, target constrained or profit maximising, depending on the motivations of 
the buyers. Moreover, the buyers’ problems can be included in a broad range of 
methods available in the conservation biology literature. Two key problem designs 
have taken prominence in that literature: the species set covering problem (SCP), and 
the species maximal covering problem (MCP) (Williams, et al. 2005). In the species 
SCP the objective is to select the minimum number of land parcels (or area) whilst 
selecting at least one land parcel containing each species or other features. In the MCP 
the objective is to maximise the number of species (or other features) represented in 
the solution whilst setting a limit on the number of land parcels selected. Such models 
can be used instead of SCP where appropriate and ReVelle, Williams and Boland 
(2002) give a good introduction to how these models are used in the reserve selection 
literature as well as grounding the subject in terms of a common problem (facility 
location) in operations research.  
Here, as in the main text for the Chapter 2, we focus on the species SCP. In particular 
we show methods for expanding our framework of methods to be able to include target 
constrained and profit maximising buyers, highlighting a method (tangent line 
approximation) to deal with the inherent non-linearity of profit maximising problems. 
As a reminder, a species set covering problem can be represented in the following 
model: 
minX 	P47
T
7K  (B1) 
						. .		P747 ≥ 1												 = 1,2, … ,-T7K 		 
 
												47 ∈ {0,1}																			8 = 1,2, … ,]  
 
where N is the number of land parcels and m is the number of species. If 7 = 1 then 
species  is present at land parcel 8 and 0 otherwise and if 47 = 1 then land parcel j is 
selected. The species SCP objective (B1) minimises the number of land parcels 
selected while the constraint ensures that each species is represented at least once.  
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Target-constrained buyers  
A number of potential purchasers for ecosystem services are more concerned with 
achieving a certain target level rather than spending a budget, as an example let us 
imagine a national government concerned about meeting their carbon reduction 
targets41. The primary consideration in meeting ecosystem service targets is to keep 
costs as low as possible, therefore the objectives of such buyers can be modelled using 
a variation of the species SCP. Specifically, instead of simply minimising the number 
of land parcels or area of land parcels selected we can minimise the total cost of land 
parcels selected whilst meeting both the species representation constraint and the 
target constraint (Williams, et al. 2005). For example in the following objective: 
minX 	P|747
T
7K  (B2) 
						. .		P747 ≥ 1												 = 1,2, … ,-T7K  
P747 ≥ T7K 																							 
 
															47 ∈ {0,1}																		8 = 1,2, … ,]  
 
Where |7 is the cost of land parcel 8, 7 is the benefit of land parcel 8, and  is the 
carbon reduction target. As the buyers’ problems can be represented in a linear form 
they can easily be included within the framework of methods set out in Chapter 2.  
 
Profit maximising buyers 
Other buyers’ decision problems may be better represented by a profit maximising 
problem, in other words the buyers are looking to maximise the difference between 
                                                 
41
 A further example of a potential purchaser prioritising a target at the minimum cost would be the 
offsetting of environmental harmful activities in one locality by purchasing ecosystem services 
elsewhere. In that situation, it is easy to imagine that the motivation of the developers can again to be 
modelled by meeting a target of ecosystem services for the minimum cost.  
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their costs and benefits. To illustrate, let us imagine a water company paying for 
upstream catchment management. Measuring the water companies benefits could be 
represented using a number of metrics, for example, cubic metres of clean water or 
reduction in a particular pollutant entering the watercourse, however to calculate the 
difference in the costs and benefits requires the benefits to be measured in monetary 
terms. The relationship between monetary benefits and ecosystem service benefits 
need not be linear, indeed by assuming diminishing marginal benefits, the benefits are 
inherently non-linear. To fix ideas, imagine a water company has a water abstraction 
point downstream to a number of farms, and agricultural activity from these farms 
leads to the runoff of a variety of pollutants. We can imagine that the benefit to the 
water company from each upstream farm changing to an alternative land-management 
practice is independent but that the monetary benefits are dependent on the quantity 
of farms that have already converted to an alternative land-management practice (from 
the classifications of benefits in the main text this would be an example of spatial 
interdependence - quantity). For example, if the level of ecosystem services have 
already been increased such that the water quality of the river meets drinking water 
standards then there is minimal benefit to the water company from a further land-
management change. Furthermore, if the water quality of the river is just above 
drinking water standards then the water company may have relatively cheap methods 
for dealing with low levels of pollutants, such as dilution; however, if the quantity is 
a long way from drinking water standards, the water company may have use expensive 
methods of cleaning the water, such as active carbon techniques. 
A profit maximising buyer’s decision problem can be represented in the following: 
maxX P±(747) −		 (|747)			
T
7K  (B3) 												47 ∈ {0,1}																			8 = 1,2, … ,] 
 
where ± describes the relationship that the benefits have to money. By maximising 
the difference between costs and benefits the buyer will select all the land parcels that 
provide a positive contribution to overall profit.  
An important aspect of the profit maximising objective is the non-linearity in the 
benefits of the buyer, ±(747). Assuming diminishing marginal financial benefits 
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leads to a difficult combinatorial problem to solve. To the best of the authors’ 
knowledge little work has been done on these problems within the ecosystem service 
literature, however, similar problems have been studied in other areas. For example, 
the competitive facility location problem uses spatial interactive models to study the 
best place to locate new facilities dependent on the location of other facilities and the 
location of customers (Aboolian, et al. 2007,2009). Aboolian et al. (2009) show that 
incorporating non-linear spatially dependent benefits into objectives can be solved by 
off-the-shelf linear optimisation programmes by using the Tangent Line 
Approximation (TLA) technique. The TLA techniques forms a piece-wise 
approximation of any non-decreasing concave function which goes through the origin 
and is a twice differentiable. This type of function is commonly used to represent 
diminishing marginal benefits.  
Tangent line approximation (TLA) 
The TLA procedure is based on the piece-wise approximation of a non-separable 
concave objective function, for further details see (Aboolian, et al. 2007,2009). 
Let ±(747) be a concave, non-decreasing and twice-differentiable function with ±(0) = 0. The aim of the tangent line approximation technique is to create a piecewise 
linear approximation ±p(747) with r the bound on the error of the approximation, 
such that ±(747) % ±p(747). The benefits function and the piecewise linear 
approximation are presented in Figure B1. 
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Figure B1. A concave function with a piecewise linear function approximated 
using the TLA technique. 
The dotted line in Figure B1 represents the piecewise linear approximation of the 
concave benefits function. The approximation identifies M break points along the 747 
axis: |, |, … , |², and M corresponding points along the ±(747) axis: , , … , ².  
To describe the TLA technique we make us of the following notation: each line 
segment is indexed by L with L = 1, … , M, in addition, ³ represents the slope of line 
segment L, the starting point of segment L is represented by |³ and the end point of a 
segment |³(. 
To represent the functional form of the profit maximising purchasers diminishing 
benefits curve we use the following: 
±(747) = 747´ + 747 (B4) 
where A denotes a constant.  
The derivative of equation B1 is: 
±s_747` 	= 		 ´_´ + 747` (B5) 
 
Step 1:  L = 1, |$ = $ = 0,  = ±	’(0) 
We start by setting ±p_747` = 0 and using the point 0 as the starting point for the 
first segment. Furthermore, we set the slope  of the first segment equal to ±′(0). To 
find the end point | of the first line segment we need to find the value for 747 where 
relative error µ¶(@X@)+µ(@X@)µ(@X@)  = r. To do that we calculate the point ±p(|) on the 
ray originating at 0 and with the slope  that gives a relative error of r: $ + | = ±(|)(1 + r) (B6) 
where $ is the intercept and for the first segment $ = 0. Equation B6 can be re-
written as: 
$ + 	| = |´ +	| (1 + r) (B7) 
And the value of | can be found by solving the following quadratic equation:  
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| = −(´ + $ − 1 − r)	± ($ + ´ − 1 − r) − 4()(´$)2  (B8) 
To find the value of the corresponding point :  = $ + | − |$. 
Step 2: L = L + 1 
To calculate the slope of segment L for L = 2,… , M we find the slope of the ray 
originating at point (|³+, ³+) that is tangent to ±(747). The point of tangency |¹, 
has two requirements: the ray originating at point (|³+, ³+) and the curve ±(747) 
meet and at that point in space the derivatives are equal. The slope ³ is calculated as ±′(|¹). The end point |³ is calculated as in step 1 such that: 
|³ = −(´³ + ³+ − 1 − r) 	±	(´³ + ³+ − 1 − r) − 4(³)(´³+)2³  (B9) 
The procedure continues until ±p(747) has been defined for all points along the 747 
axis. 
 
The TLA technique defines ±p(747) as M piecewise linear functions, those linear 
functions can be included in our framework of methods because it consists of the sum 
of M linear functions: 
±p_747` = 	Pg³³º³²³K  (B10) 
where g³ is the length of each segment, ³ the slope and º³ denote M new continuous 
decision variables. Thus to obtain a linear model, one has to price to pay in terms of 
the increasing the size of the problem.  
The water company’s profit maximisation decision problem can now be modelled as 
an integer linear program: 
14PPg³³º³²³K
T
7K − |747  
. .P747T7K =Pg³ º³
²
³K  												47 ∈ {0,1}																			8 = 1,2, … ,] 											0 % º³ % 1																	L = 1,2, … , M 
(B11) 
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where the first constraint relates the º³ decision variables back to the original 47 
decision variables and the concave shape of the marginal benefit function ensures the 
segments enter the solution to the integer linear programme in the correct order. 
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APPENDIX B2 
Here we provide example code from the genetic algorithm and integer 
programming models from the negotiated PES purchasing institution.  
 
%% Genetic Algorithm 
 
%% I. Setup the GA parameters 
ff  ='fitnessfunc';      % 2 Absolute Buyers 
ff2  ='fitnessfunc2';      % 1 Absolute 1 Relative 
Buyer 
maxit  =100;       % maximum number of 
iterations 
maxcost  =9999999;      % maximum allowable cost 
popsize  =100;       % set population size 
mutrate  =0.001;       % set mutation rate 
selection =0.5;       % fraction of population kept 
  
%% II. Create the initial population 
 
% Generate a random population 
if RndCount == 1   
    p0 = zeros(bigN - Nsites_L,1) ; p1 = ones(Nsites_L,1); p = vertcat (p0, p1);  
    pop = zeros(popsize,bigN); 
    for pindex = (1:1:popsize) 
        loopsites  = reshape(p(randperm(size(p,1))), 1, bigN);  
        pop(pindex,:) = loopsites; 
    end    
end  
% randperm(n) returns a row vector containing a random permutation of the integers from 1 to n 
inclusive. 
 
%% III. Main genetic Algorithm Loop 
 
iga=0; % generation counter initialized 
  
while iga<maxit 
    
%% IV. Call the integer programmes which model the buyers’ decision problems 
     if Relative == 0 
[sol, value, valuefollower] = feval(ff,pop,bigN, follower_benefits, leader_benefits, 
cost_final, Nsites_L, BudgetF, BudgetL, sol, value, valuefollower, constraint);  
% Spatially independent - water quality buyer 
     elseif Relative == 1 
[sol, value, valuefollower] = feval(ff2,pop,bigN, follower_benefits, leader_benefits, 
cost_final, Nsites_L, BudgetF, BudgetL, sol, value, valuefollower, constraint, 
pair_dist, pair_dist_len, speciesbysite_mat, Nspecies, z_constraint, x_constraint, 
cutoff, m, n, alt_LF);  
% Spatially interdependent – Biodiversity buyer 
     end 
 
     iga=iga+1; % increments generation counter 
 
%% V. Stopping criteria 
    if iga>maxit || cost(1)>maxcost 
      break 
     end  
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%% VI. Selection criteria  
% Keep top chromosome 
Top = pop(1,:); 
for ic=1:2:popsize/2 
off1 = zeros(1, bigN); off2 = zeros(1, bigN); off3 = zeros(1, bigN); off4 = zeros(1, 
bigN); 
     A = pop(ic,:); B = pop(ic+1,:); % select mates 
     [AB1, AB1ind] = find((A==1)&(B==1)); 
     [ABx, ABxind] = find((A==0)&(B==1)|(A==1)&(B==0)); 
RndABxind = randperm(size(ABxind,2), size(ABxind,2)/2);  
% random integers half the length of ABxind 
RndABxind2 = randperm(size(ABxind,2), size(ABxind,2)/2);  
% random integers half the length of ABxind 
    % Update offspring 
     off1(AB1ind)=1; off1(ABxind(RndABxind))=1; 
     off2(AB1ind)=1; off2(ABxind)=1; off2(ABxind(RndABxind))=0; 
     off3(AB1ind)=1; off3(ABxind(RndABxind2))=1; 
     off4(AB1ind)=1; off4(ABxind)=1; off4(ABxind(RndABxind2))=0; 
     % Assign to pop 
     pop(ic,:) = off1; 
     pop(ic+1,:) = off2; 
     pop(popsize + 1 - ic,:) = off3; 
     pop(popsize - ic,:) = off4; 
end 
% Insert the top chromosome kept from last iteration  
    pop(popsize,:) = Top; 
  
%% VII. Mutate the population 
     nmut=ceil(popsize*bigN*mutrate); 
     for ic = 1:nmut 
row1=ceil(rand*(popsize-1))+1; 
col1=ceil(rand*bigN); 
col2=ceil(rand*bigN); 
temp=pop(row1,col1); 
pop(row1,col1)=pop(row1,col2); 
pop(row1,col2)=temp; 
im(ic)=row1; 
     end 
     
     % Check for infeasible populations 
     for fcheckind = 1:popsize 
          if sum(pop(fcheckind,:),2) > Nsites_L;  % row sum 
               pop(fcheckind,:) = reshape(p(randperm(size(p,1))), 1, bigN);  
% Replace infeasible populations with random 
populations 
          end 
     end 
 
end  
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Below are examples of the integer linear programming used for the buyers’ decision 
problems in the negotiation process called in step IV of the genetic algorithm. 
They are programmed as CPLEX objects within Matlab.  
 
%% Water quality buyer:    
              
            % Initialize the CPLEX object 
            cplex                = Cplex('CplexMIP');    % Cplex object 
            cplex.Model.sense  = 'maximize';    % Maximise or Minimise 
  
            % Use arrays to populate the model 
            cplex.Model.obj     = follower_benefits;    % objective 
            cplex.Model.lb       = zeros(bigN,1);     % lower bound 
            cplex.Model.ub       = ones(bigN,1);     % upper bound 
            cplex.Model.ctype = repmat('B',1,bigN);     % variable type (binary, 
continuous) 
            cplex.Model.A       = [cost_final; 
                                  pop(pop_ind,:) 
                                  follower_benefits]; 
% constraints 
            cplex.Model.lhs      = horzcat(BudgetF + BudgetL,Nsites_L, constraint); 
% left hand side constraints 
            cplex.Model.rhs      = horzcat(0,Nsites_L, inf);   % Right hand side constraints 
            % Optimize the problem 
            cplex.solve();      % call the solver 
  
         
%% Biodiversity buyer:      
 
            % Initialize the CPLEX object 
            cplex               = Cplex('CplexMIP');    % Cplex object 
            cplex.Model.sense  = 'maximize';     % Maximise or Minimise 
 
            % Use arrays to populate the model 
            cplex.Model.obj    = horzcat(zeros(1,bigN),pair_dist);   % objective 
            cplex.Model.lb     = zeros(bigN+pair_dist_len,1);   % lower bound 
            cplex.Model.ub     = ones(bigN+pair_dist_len,1);   % upper bound 
            cplex.Model.ctype  = horzcat(repmat('B',1,bigN),repmat('C',1,pair_dist_len));  
% variable type (binary, 
continuous) 
            cplex.Model.A    =  [horzcat(speciesbysite_mat,zeros(Nspecies,length(pair_dist))); 
                  horzcat(x_constraint,-z_constraint) 
                  horzcat(cost_final,zeros(1,pair_dist_len)) 
                  horzcat(pop(pop_ind,:), zeros(1,pair_dist_len))]; 
% constraints 
cplex.Model.lhs  = 
horzcat(ones(1,Nspecies),zeros(1,pair_dist_len),zeros(1,pair_dist_len),Bu
dgetF + BudgetL,Nsites_L); 
% left hand side constraints 
            cplex.Model.rhs  = 
horzcat(inf(1,Nspecies),inf(1,pair_dist_len),inf(1,pair_dist_len),0,Nsites_L); 
% right hand side constraints 
            % Optimize the problem 
            cplex.solve();       % call the solver 
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APPENDIX C 
Chapter 3: Experiment walkthrough 
Welcome 
• Welcome to the experiment! We are about start. 
• Before we start, please could you put away anything that you have on your 
desks and turn off and put away your mobile phones. We will be paying you 
for your participation in this experiment and in return we expect that you will 
focus on that task for the next hour to an hour and a half. 
• During that time you and the other participants in the room will be undertaking 
a series of 7 tasks on the computers.  
• In those tasks you will be teamed-up with 2 other participants to make a group 
of THREE people. You won't know who the other people are in your group 
and the members of your group will change from task to task.  
• Each task will involve you negotiating with the other members of your group 
in an attempt to agree on a DEAL. Whether you reach a deal and what 
particular deal you agree upon will determine how much money you will be 
entitled to from that task.  
• On your desk, you should have a document outlining the key elements of each 
task. You can refer to that as we walk you through how a task will be played 
out on your computer.  
Task and Round Counters and Timer 
• To do that, we are going to begin by introducing you to the basic elements you 
will see on the screen in each task. So, to the top left of your screen you should 
see a task counter, this will update as you work through each of the seven 
tasks. 
• In each task you will go through a series of rounds of negotiation with the 
other members of your group. The counter to the top right will tell you which 
round of negotiation you have reached. 
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• The final element at the top of the screen is a timer. You should now be able 
to see that counting down.  
• During the negotiations you will have to make decisions, but you will only 
have limited time to come to those decisions … sometimes as little as 10 
seconds. As soon as it is your turn to make a decision, the COUNT DOWN 
begins. If the countdown reaches zero then you will TIME OUT and forfeit 
your opportunity to make that decision … which may have an impact on how 
much you get paid. As a result, you will have to think quickly during the 
experiment. 
 
Default Payment 
• In each task, each person in a Group of 3 is allocated to take the role of 
PLAYER 1, PLAYER 2 or PLAYER 3 … which particular role you take on 
will change from task to task.  
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• Each player in your group starts out entitled to the same DEFAULT 
PAYMENT. This is the payment that you will get if your negotiations fail and 
the three members of your group cannot agree to a DEAL.  
• The first box on your screen shows this payment. For all the tasks you will 
undertake today your DEFAULT PAYMENT will be £7.50. 
• Alternatively, provided each of the 3 players in your group agrees to the idea, 
then instead of each member getting their DEFAULT PAYMENT they will 
get their DEAL PAYMENT instead.  
 
Deal Payment Players 1 & 2 
• The Deal payments for Players 1 and 2 are shown in the two boxes that have 
now appeared on your screen. 
• Notice that the role that you will be playing in any particular Task will be 
indicated to you by highlighting the title of that Player’s Deal payment box in 
Blue. In this example, you are Player 2 … though remember which role you 
play will change from task to task. 
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• If you agree to a deal, then in some tasks there may be more than one possible 
outcome and you won’t know which of those outcomes will turn out to be your 
actual Deal payment until after the negotiations have finished. We label those 
different Outcomes A and B. In the task we are considering here, however, 
there is only one outcome … outcome A. Accordingly, as Player 2 in this task, 
if your group were to agree to a Deal then you can be 100% certain that you 
will be due a Deal payment of £19.  The first few tasks will be just like this. 
Don’t worry, we’ll come back and talk you through Deals with more than one 
Outcome before you start on those tasks. 
• Notice that as Player 2, your Deal payment of £19 is considerably higher than 
your Default payment of £7.50. The same is true for Player 1 who stands to 
make £14 if a deal is agreed as opposed to the Default payment of £7.50. 
Indeed, in all the tasks Players 1 and 2 will always have Deal payments that 
are larger than their Default payments and, therefore, will be keen for all 3 
Players to reach an agreement that allows them to claim their Default 
payments. 
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Deal payment Player 3 
• The key obstacle in reaching an agreement, however, is that the Deal payment 
for Player 3 is always zero. You should be able to see the Deal payment box 
for Player 3 at the bottom of your screen. 
• For that reason, the only way agreement can be reached is if the Players can 
negotiate a DEAL. That Deal involves Players 1 and 2 committing to share 
enough of their Deal payments with Player 3 so as to convince Player 3 that it 
is worth their while agreeing to the Deal. 
• Negotiations in a task always begin with Player 1 making a PROPOSAL to 
Player 2. In that Proposal Player 1 suggests how much of their own Deal 
payment and how much of Player 2's Deal payment should be offered to Player 
3. The sum of those two suggested contributions is the proposed payment to 
be made to Player 3.  
• Player 1's Proposal is passed on to Player 2 who must decide whether to 
REJECT or ACCEPT it. If Player 2 rejects the Proposal, they may get the 
chance to offer a COUNTER PROPOSAL ... and negotiations may go back 
and forth between Players 1 and 2 until they finally agree on a Proposal to 
offer to Player 3.  
Reject Proposal 
• In this walk through, we join the negotiations part way through. In the left 
hand side of the Proposal Accept/Reject Box that has just appeared on your 
screen the Proposal History table which lists the last 5 proposals that have 
passed between Players 1 and 2.  
• In this case, Player 1 started the negotiation by proposing that she pay £2.50 
towards a payment to Player 3 while you, as Player 2, should contribute a 
further £7.50 … giving a total Payment to Player 3 of £10. In this case, you 
rejected that proposal (which is why it is coloured red in the table) and 
suggested a counter proposal in which Player 1 paid £5 and you paid £4 (a 
total Payment to Player 3 of £9). Unfortunately, Player 1 wasn’t happy with 
that proposal and rejected it, coming back with another proposal in which she 
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pays £4 and you pay £8. Since that is the current proposal on the table, it is 
coloured black in the Proposal History table. 
• You can see that current proposal written out in large in the right hand side of 
the box in red text and next to it a red decision button with the word “rejected” 
written on it. This is exactly what the screen will look like when you first 
receive a proposal to consider. The fact that the decision button says “rejected” 
and the text is red indicates that you currently intend to reject that proposal.  
• By clicking on that decision button you can indicate, instead, that you would 
like to Accept the Proposal instead. Go ahead and try that now.  
• Notice that the text has gone green and the decision button is now grey with 
the word “accepted” on it. That indicates that you currently intend to accept 
the proposal.  
• To register your decision you MUST press on OK. Whatever word is written 
on the button when you press OK will be the decision you register in the 
negotiation. If you fail to press OK then the computer will not register your 
decision and just assume that you have rejected the Proposal. 
• Now click on the decision button again to change it back to rejected. Observe 
the text that appears next to the OK button. This text is a warning, informing 
you that should you click OK and thereby reject the proposal then you run the 
risk that the NEGOTIATIONS WILL FAIL. If that happens then no Deal is 
reached and each player will have to content themselves with their DEFAULT 
PAYMENT. 
• In this case the Probability of such a failure happening if you decide to reject 
the proposal is 1 in 30. If you were to go ahead and press OK, the computer 
would use its random functions and those odds to establish whether you have 
been unlucky and the negotiations have failed. During a negotiation those 
probabilities start out low at 1 chance in 500 ... by the time 5 rejections have 
been made in a negotiation that probability is up to 1 in 100 ... by the tenth 
rejection 1 in 15 ... and by the fifteenth more than 1 in 2.  
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• Making this decision even harder is the fact that you have to do it against the 
clock. We’ve disabled that for the purposes of this walk through, but when you 
start the real tasks, as soon as you see this screen the countdown clock will 
start clicking down. If you haven’t pressed OK to register your decision by the 
time the countdown clock reaches zero, the computer will simply assume that 
you are rejecting the proposal. 
• Let’s, assume that you are sufficiently unhappy with this Proposal that you are 
prepared to take the risk of rejecting it. Make sure the decision button says 
“rejected” then press OK. Actually we’ve disabled that button as well, but we 
will move you on automatically from our master program. 
 
Make a Proposal 
• In this case you got lucky and the negotiations did not fail. You now have the 
opportunity to make a proposal of your own. 
• To make your counter proposal you fill in the amounts that you think that you 
and the other player should make to Player 3 in the boxes provided. In entering 
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those amounts, be aware that the units are in £s … if you want to include a 
pence amount (which you are perfectly entitled to do) you will have to enter it 
after a decimal point. 
• Since these amounts will be paid for out of Deal payments you will never be 
able to suggest an amount that exceeds a Player’s Deal payment. 
• Please fill in the boxes with the following proposal: Player 1 pays  £5, you pay 
£6. Now press enter to register your proposal. Notice that in deciding on a 
proposal, you will again be up against the clock. If the countdown reaches zero 
before you have pressed the Enter button, then the computer will simply 
assume that your proposal is that you both pay £0 to Player 3. 
• Go ahead and press Enter to send you proposal off to Player 1 for them to 
consider … though again notice that for the purposes of this walk through that 
we have disabled the Enter button and also have got the computer to ensure 
that you entered the amounts £5 and £6. 
 
Waiting for the Other Player to Consider a Proposal 
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• Once you have sent your proposal to Player 1, you will move on to a waiting 
screen. This shouldn’t take too long, but please do remain patient … there’s 
nothing more you can do until Player 1 decides whether to accept or reject 
your proposal. 
Accept Proposal 
• In this case Player 1 decided to reject your proposal. You all got lucky in that 
the negotiation did not fail when they pressed reject … and now Player 1 has 
come back with a new Proposal. In this Proposal Player 1 pays £4.50 and you 
contribute £6.50 towards a combined payment to Player 3 of £11. 
• Notice that the Proposal History table has been updated to show your last 
proposal … which Player 1 rejected ... and Player 1’s new proposal. 
• Notice also that the risk of the negotiations failing if you reject has also gone 
up from 1 in 30 to 1 in 15.  
• Let’s imagine that you are now happy with the proposal and don’t want to take 
the risk of rejecting. 
• Toggle the decision button so it reads “accepted” and then press OK to accept 
the proposal and then we will move you on to the next screen. 
Waiting for Player 3 to Consider an Offer 
• The proposal that you have agreed to with Player 1 is now sent over to Player 
3 to consider. You will now have to wait to see whether Player 3 is going to 
accept your Offer.  
• If Player 3 does accept your offer, then everyone has consented and a Deal is 
done. If Player 3 rejects your Offer then you may get the chance to enter into 
fresh negotiations with Player 1 to see if you can agree to another Offer to put 
before Player 3. 
Player 3 waiting for an Offer  
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• Again, if you are Player 3, please be patient … it may take Players 1 and 2 a 
few rounds of proposal and counter-proposal before agreeing on an offer … 
provided negotiations don’t fail before they reach an agreement. 
Accept/Reject Offer 
• When (and if) an offer arrives, Player 3 will see a screen containing an Offer 
Accept/Reject Box just like this. To the left is a table listing the offers that 
have been made to Player 3 in this task. To the right you can see the current 
offer and buttons allowing Player 3 to accept or reject that offer.  
• Notice that Player 3 only sees the total amount that Players 1 and 2 have agreed 
to pay, not their individual contributions. 
• The buttons on this screen work in much the same way as those we looked at 
previously. When the screen first appears to Player 3, the decision button will 
say “rejected” indicating an intention to reject the Offer. Again, rejecting an 
offer comes with a risk of the negotiation failing. That risk is written next to 
the OK button. 
• For the sake of argument, let us assume that you, as Player 3, are happy enough 
with this offer to think that it is not worth taking the risk of rejecting. Toggle 
the decision button so that it goes from “rejected” to “accepted”, the text of 
the Offer should go green and, since you are now not planning to reject, the 
risk information disappears. 
• Again in the real tasks you will be making this decision against the clock and 
you will have to hit the OK button to register your decision before the 
countdown times out. 
• Press OK now … though remember for the walk through we’ve disabled that 
button and will move you on from our control program. 
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Deal Done Screen 
• Since Player 3 has accepted an offer made by Players 1 and 2, this task ends 
with all three players agreeing to a deal. In this case, Player 3 has foregone the 
fall-back payment of £7.50 in favour of the £11 offered by Players 1 and 2. If, 
at the end of the experiment, this task was picked as the one as the one that 
counts for real for Player 3, then this will be the amount of money they earn 
from participating in the experiment. 
• As a deal was done by this group, each will now see a screen showing what 
they stand to gain from that task.  
• Before they can move on to the next task, they will have to wait until all the 
other groups finish. Once everyone has completed the task, the next task 
begins by teaming you up with a different set of two people to form a new 
group. 
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Stochastic treatment walkthrough 
• We are now moving on to another set of tasks which are slightly more 
complicated than those you have just done in so much as the Deal payments 
for Players 1 and 2 can take one of two possible values and which of those is 
the actual value is not known during the negotiations. 
Information Boxes 
• Those two possible Deal payments are shown as Outcome A and Outcome B 
in the information boxes for Players 1 and 2. Notice that Player 3 always has 
a Deal payment of £0 whatever the outcome. 
• While you do not know which outcome will be the actual outcome, you do 
know that there is exactly half a chance (50% chance) it will be Outcome A 
and half a chance it will be Outcome B. In this case, if it turns out to be 
Outcome A, your Deal payment as Player 2 will be £17 while the Deal 
payment for Player 3 will be £20. If, on the other hand it turns out to be 
Outcome B, your Deal payment will be £11 and Player 1’s will be £10. 
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Proposal Screen 
• Now in making a Proposal you must consider what payments you think should 
be made to Player 3 in the event of Outcome A and what payments should be 
made to Player 3 in the event of Outcome B. You must fill those amounts in 
the boxes provided and then press Enter to send you Proposal to the other 
Player to consider. Again you will be making your decisions against the clock. 
• In deciding on those amounts bear in mind that Player 3 might be prepared to 
take some of the risk and accept an offer in which payment in one of the 
outcomes is below £7.50, provided the payment in the other outcome was 
sufficiently high that they thought taking that risk was worthwhile. 
 
Screen: Proposal Screen 
• When you receive a Proposal the screen will now look like this. In making 
your decision you have a separate decision button for each Outcome. 
Accordingly, you could accept the proposed payments in Outcome A, but 
reject those for Outcome B. 
199 
 
• Try toggling the decision buttons for the two Outcomes to “accepted”. You 
should see the text of the proposal for an Outcome going green, when you 
toggle the decision button for that outcome to “accepted”.  
• Notice that the risk associated with reject only disappears when you have 
accepted the Proposal for both Outcomes. If you were to do that then, the 
proposal would be passed on to Player 3 for their consideration. 
• Alternatively, you may decide that you are happy with the payments for one 
Outcome, but not those for the other. In that case, the Proposal would be 
rejected and your decisions would be recorded in the Proposal History table to 
the left of the screen. 
• For example, in the second to last row of the Proposal History table, you can 
see how Player 1 reacted to your last Offer. You suggested that in the event of 
Outcome A that they should pay £7.30 and that you should pay £4.50. They 
didn’t agree with that and hence those numbers are coloured red in the table. 
In contrast, you suggested that in the event of Outcome B that you should both 
pay £2.50. They accepted that part of the proposal and hence those numbers 
are coloured green in the table.  Indeed, they have kept those suggested 
payments as part of the proposal they have sent back to you to consider. 
200 
 
 
Screen: Offer Screen 
• Finally, when an Offer arrives with Player 3 they will see a screen like this, 
showing the payments that are being offered by Players 1 and 2 in the event 
of Outcome A and in the event of Outcome B.  
• Player 3 can express their opinions on that Offer by toggling the decision 
buttons from “rejected” to “accepted”. Try that now. 
• Of course, Player 3 only avoids the risk associated with making a rejection if 
the payments proposed for both Outcomes are accepted. If that happens then 
all 3 Players have agreed and a DEAL is done. 
• At the end of the experiment, if this task is the one that is chosen for real, then 
we need to find out whether Outcome A or Outcome B is the actual outcome. 
To do that we will simply toss a coin. If the coin comes up Heads then 
Outcome A is the actual outcome and you will get paid what you agreed to in 
the Deal under that outcome. Alternatively, if she coin comes up Tails then 
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Outcome B is the actual outcome and you will get paid what you agreed to in 
the Deal under that outcome. 
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